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Geo. G. Meade

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
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Geo. W. Meade



MAJ. GEN. GEO. G. MEADE.

THE

MILITARY AND NAVAL

HISTORY OF THE REBELLION

IN THE UNITED STATES.

WITH

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF DECEASED OFFICERS.

Illustrated with Steel Plate Portraits.

BY

W. J. TENNEY,

EDITOR OF THE "AMERICAN ANNUAL CYCLOPÆDIA."

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HISTORY OF THE REBELLION

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CHAPTER XXXVIII.

Position of the Armies at the beginning of 1864—Gen. Sherman's march to Meridian—Opposing movements of the Enemy
Gen. Gilmore's movements in Florida—Battle of Olustee—Campaign of Gen. Banks on the Red River—Battles—Cooperation of Gen. Steele—Its Results—Capture of Fort Pillow and slaughter of the Garrison—Unsuccessful Operations in North Carolina.

At the commencement of the year, 1864, the Army of the Potomac, under Gen. Meade, was near Culpepper Court House, in Virginia, with the army under Gen. Lee in front and south of him. The Confederate Gen. Early had been ordered to command the forces in the Shenandoah valley, with his headquarters at Staunton. The Federal forces held Winchester, Martinsburg, and Harper's Ferry, and occupied the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad in Western Virginia. Gen. Burnside was still at Knoxville, in East Tennessee, with a line of communication into Kentucky. Eastward of him was Gen. Longstreet, with a division of the Confederate army. The army of Gen. Grant was in front of Chattanooga, in the southeast corner of Tennessee, and a force of the enemy before him at Dalton, under Gen. Bragg. The following address to his soldiers had been issued by Gen. Grant, near the close of 1863 :

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE }
MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, }
CHATTANOOGA, TENN., December 10, 1863. }

The General commanding takes this opportunity of returning his sincere thanks and congratulations to the brave Armies of the Cumberland, the Ohio, the Tennessee, and their comrades from the Potomac, for the recent splendid and decisive successes achieved over the enemy. In a short time you have recovered from him the control of the Tennessee River, from Bridgeport to Knoxville. You dislodged him from his great stronghold upon Lookout Mountain, drove him from Chattanooga valley, wrested from his determined grasp the possession of Missionary Ridge, repelled with heavy loss to him his repeated assaults upon Knoxville, forcing him to raise the siege there, driving him at all points, utterly routed and discomfited, beyond the limits of the State. By your noble heroism and determined courage, you have effectually defeated the plans of the enemy for regaining possession of the States of Kentucky and Tennessee. You have secured positions from which no rebellious power can drive or dislodge you. For all this the General commanding thanks you collectively and individually. The loyal people of the United States thank and bless you. Their hopes and prayers for your success against this unholy rebellion are with you daily. Their faith in you will not be in vain. Their hopes will not be blasted. Their prayers to Almighty God will be answered. You will yet go to other fields of strife; and with the invincible bravery and unflinching loyalty to justice and right which have characterized you in the past, you will prove that no enemy can withstand you, and that no defenses, however formidable, can check your onward march.

By order of Major-General U. S. GRANT.
T. S. BOWERS, Ass't Adj.-Gen.

The line of communication of Gen. Grant extended to Nashville by the railroad, through Stevenson and Murfreesboro'. Florence and Corinth were also held by a Federal force until

the earlier portion of the year, when the former was occupied by the enemy. Military posts consisting of fortifications and heavy guns, with negro troops, were established on the Mississippi River at Cairo, Columbus, New Madrid, Fort Pillow, Memphis, Helena, Goodrich's Landing, Vicksburg, Natchez, Port Hudson, Baton Rouge, New Orleans, and Forts Jackson and St. Philip. There were also forces at other points adjacent to these. A large force was under the command of Gen. Banks, in New Orleans, with detachments at Brashear City, and at Brownsville, on the Rio Grande. Gen. Steele occupied Little Rock, Arkansas, with a considerable force, and Gen. Rosecrans, in command of the department, had a small body of troops in Missouri. The military positions on the coast of North Carolina and South Carolina remained unchanged.

The number of troops in the field at the commencement of the year can be only indefinitely estimated. Between October, 1863, and May, 1864, seven hundred thousand new troops took the field, as stated by Senator Wilson in Congress. A portion of these supplied the place of the three years' men whose term of service expired in 1864. A large majority of the latter, however, reenlisted.

The number of Confederate troops in the field known as veterans, in the beginning of the year, was as follows: That portion of the Southern army which constituted the force under Gen. Lee (counting in Gen. Longstreet, who commanded a portion of his army), numbered ninety thousand troops. This is also counting in the troops which were in the vicinity of Abingdon, Lynchburg, and other portions of Southwestern Virginia and East Tennessee, formerly under Gen. Samuel Jones, who was detached from Gen. Lee's army late in September, 1863, to operate against Gen. Burnside, and afterwards under the command of Gen. Breckinridge. At Richmond and at Petersburg there were, not counting in citizens and home guards, about three thousand men. Between Petersburg and Weldon there were one thousand men. Along the railroad, between Weldon and Wilmington, there were at least six thousand men. The forces under Gen. Pickett numbered eight thousand men. Imboden and Moseby together had four thousand men—all guerrillas. This swelled the army in Eastern Virginia and North Carolina to one hundred and twelve thousand strong.

The second great army in the Confederacy was that under Gen. Johnston, a large portion

of which was cavalry. The army known as the Army of the Tennessee was composed of two corps, each having six divisions of infantry, amounting to thirty-six thousand men. There were also several divisions of cavalry, numbering at least eighteen thousand men, making an aggregate of fifty-four thousand. This included the four divisions sent to reënforce Gen. Polk, and the two divisions sent to Mobile, and the entire cavalry under Wheeler, Wharton, and John Morgan. Gen. Johnston also had command of all the Confederate forces in Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, except those at Savannah, Mobile, and under Forrest, who had an independent (roving) commission. Before the arrival of Gen. Sherman at Meridian, Gen. Polk had eighteen thousand troops, only two thousand of which were veterans.

The forces in South Carolina and at Savannah, under Gen. Beauregard, and in Florida, under Gen. McCown, numbered ten thousand. This only included the veterans, or old soldiers, as the armies in these three localities above mentioned a little later numbered twenty-five thousand men.

The next regular armies of the Confederacy were the Trans-Mississippi forces, scattered in different portions of Arkansas and Texas, and all under the command of Lieut.-Gen. Kirby Smith, the army in Arkansas under Gen. Holmes, and the army in Texas under Gen. Magruder; the old soldiers of which numbered twelve thousand men.

The forces at Mobile, under Gens. Maury and Claiborne, numbered about eight thousand. The forces under Gen. Forrest, and under Chalmers, Lee, and Richardson, amounted to six thousand, which included all the veterans in the rebel service.

To this may be added, however, in the same line, twelve thousand soldiers engaged in important prison guard, and in the hospitals and quartermasters' and commissary departments. There were also about two thousand men engaged in the guerrilla warfare on the banks of the Mississippi. No other guerrilla bands of importance existed in Gen. Grant's department. There was not a single squad in Kentucky, East and Middle Tennessee, Northern Alabama, or Northern Georgia. There were still several guerrilla organizations in West Tennessee and Northern Mississippi. The people themselves had rid the country.

The total of these veterans was two hundred and twenty-four thousand; to these were added, at the beginning of the year, one hundred and twenty thousand conscripts, making the number in the service three hundred and forty-four thousand.

The earliest operations of importance, in 1864, consisted of a movement under Gen. Sherman from Vicksburg, Mississippi, to Meridian, Alabama; another under Gen. Smith, from Memphis, Tennessee, to cooperate with Gen. Sherman; another under Gen. Grant's

orders, from Chattanooga, Tennessee, upon Dalton, Georgia, and another under Gen. Schofield, who relieved Gen. Burnside, upon the forces under Gen. Longstreet, in East Tennessee.

Upon the return of Gen. Sherman from East Tennessee to Chattanooga, his command was stationed at Scottsboro', Alabama, and thence along the Memphis and Chattanooga Railroad, to Huntsville. Near the end of January, Gen. Sherman went to Memphis and Vicksburg, to command an expedition. Corinth was abandoned, and the Memphis Railroad eastward of Lagrange to Huntsville, and a large body of troops sent down the Mississippi to Vicksburg.

The following letter was addressed by Gen. Sherman, at this time, to his adjutant-general, relative to the course to be pursued by subordinate commanders of military districts to the inhabitants:

HEADQUARTERS DEPT. OF THE TENNESSEE, }
VICKSBURG, January 31, 1864.

Major R. M. Sawyer, Asst. Adj.-Gen. Army of the Tennessee, Huntsville.

DEAR SAWYER: In my former letter I have answered all your questions, save one, and that relates to the treatment of inhabitants known or suspected to be hostile, or "secesh." This is in truth the most difficult business of our army as it advances and occupies the Southern country. It is almost impossible to lay down rules, and I invariably leave this whole subject to the local commanders, but am willing to give them the benefit of my acquired knowledge and experience.

In Europe, whence we derive our principles of war, as developed by their histories, wars are between kings or rulers, through hired armies, and not between peoples.

The war which prevails in our land is essentially a war of races. The Southern people entered into a clear compact of Government, but still maintained a species of separate interests, history, and prejudices. These latter became stronger and stronger, till they have led to a war which has developed the fruits of the bitterest kind.

We of the North are, beyond all question, right in our lawful cause, but we are not bound to ignore the fact that the people of the South have prejudices which form part of their nature, and which they cannot throw off without an effort of reason, or the slower process of natural change. Now, the question arises, should we treat as absolute enemies all in the South who differ from us in opinion or prejudice, kill or banish them; or should we give them time to think, and gradually change their conduct so as to conform to the new order of things, which is slowly and gradually creeping into their country?

When men take arms to resist our rightful authority, we are compelled to use force, because all reason and argument cease when arms are resorted to. When provisions, forage, horses, mules, wagons, etc., are used by our enemy, it is clearly our duty and right to take them, because otherwise they might be used against us.

In like manner, all houses left vacant by an inimical people are clearly our right, or such as are needed as storehouses, hospitals, and quarters. But a question arises as to dwellings used by women, children, and non-combatants. So long as non-combatants remain in their houses and keep to their accustomed business, their opinions and prejudices can in no wise influence the war, and therefore should not be noticed. But if any one comes out into the public streets and creates disorder, he or she should be punished, restrained, or banished, either to the rear or front, as the officer in command adjudges. If the people, or any of them, keep up a correspondence

with parties in hostility, they are spies, and can be punished with death or minor punishment.

These are well-established principles of war, and the people of the South having appealed to war, are barred from appealing to our Constitution, which they have practically and publicly defied. They have appealed to war, and must abide its rules and laws. The United States, as a belligerent party claiming right in the soil as the ultimate sovereign, have a right to change the population, and it may be and is, both politic and just, we should do so in certain districts. When the inhabitants persist too long in hostility, it may be both politic and right we should banish them and appropriate their lands to a more loyal and useful population. No man will deny that the United States would be benefited by dispossessing a single prejudiced, hard-headed, and disloyal planter, and substituting in his place a dozen or more patient, industrious, good families, even if they be of foreign birth. I think it does good to present this view of the case to many Southern gentlemen, who grew rich and wealthy, not by virtue alone of their industry and skill, but by reason of the protection and impetus to prosperity given by our hitherto moderate and magnanimous Government. It is all idle nonsense for these Southern planters to say that they made the South, that they own it, and that they can do as they please—even to break up our Government, and to shut up the natural avenues of trade, intercourse, and commerce.

We know, and they know, if they are intelligent beings; that, as compared with the whole world, they are but as five millions are to one thousand millions—that they did not create the land—that their only title to its use and usufruct is the deed of the United States; and if they appeal to war, they hold their all by a very insecure tenure.

For my part I believe that this war is the result of false political doctrine, for which we are all as a people responsible, viz.: that any and every people have a right to self-government; and I would give all a chance to reflect, and when in error to recant. I know slave owners finding themselves in possession of a species of property in opposition to the growing sentiment of the whole civilized world, conceived their property in danger, and foolishly appealed to war; and by skillful political handling involved with themselves the whole South on the doctrines of error and prejudice. I believe that some of the rich and slaveholding are prejudiced to an extent that nothing but death and ruin will extinguish, but hope that as the poorer and industrial classes of the South realize their relative weakness, and their dependence upon the fruits of the earth and good will of their fellow-men, they will not only discover the error of their ways, and repent of their hasty action, but bless those who persistently maintained a Constitutional Government, strong enough to sustain itself, protect its citizens, and promise peaceful homes to millions yet unborn.

In this belief, whilst I assert for our Government the highest military prerogatives, I am willing to bear in patience that political nonsense of slave rights, State rights, freedom of conscience, freedom of press, and such other trash as have deluded the Southern people into war, anarchy, bloodshed, and the foulest crimes that have disgraced any time or any people.

I would advise the commanding officers at Huntsville, and such other towns as are occupied by our troops, to assemble the inhabitants and explain to them these plain, self-evident propositions, and tell them that it is for them *now* to say, whether they and their children shall inherit the beautiful land, which, by the accident of nature, has fallen to their share. The Government of the United States has in North Alabama any and all rights which they choose to enforce in war, to take their lives, their homes, their lands, their every thing, because they cannot deny that war does exist there, and war is simply power unrestrained by constitution or compact. If they want eternal war, well and good—we will accept

the issue and dispossess them, and put our friends in possession. I know thousands and millions of good people who, at simple notice, would come to North Alabama and accept the elegant houses and plantations now there. If the people of Huntsville think different, let them persist in war three years longer, and then they will not be consulted. Three years ago, by a little reflection and patience they could have had a hundred years of peace and prosperity, but they preferred war; very well, last year they could have saved their slaves, but now it is too late—all the powers of earth cannot restore to them their slaves any more than their dead grandfathers. Next year their lands will be taken, for in war we can take them, and *rightfully*, too, and in another year they may beg in vain for their lives. A people who will persevere in war beyond a certain limit, ought to know the consequences. Many, many people, with less pertinacity than the South, have been wiped out of national existence.

My own belief is, that even now the non-slaveholding classes of the South are alienating from their associates in war. Already I hear crimination. Those who have property left, should take warning in time.

Since I have come down here, I have seen many Southern planters who now hire their negroes, and acknowledge that they knew not the earthquake they were to make by appealing to secession. They thought that the politicians had prepared the way, and that they could part in peace. They now see that we are bound together as one nation, by indissoluble ties, and that any interest or any people that set themselves up in antagonism to the nation, must perish.

While I would not remit one jot or tittle of our nation's rights, in peace or war, I do make allowances for past political errors and false prejudices. Our national Congress and Supreme Courts are the proper arenas in which to discuss conflicting opinions and not the battle-field.

You may not hear from me again, and if you think it will do any good, call some of the people together, and explain these my views. You may even read to them this letter, and let them use it, so as to prepare them for my coming.

To those who submit to the rightful law and authority, all gentleness and forbearance, but to the petulant and persistent secessionists, why, death is mercy, and the quicker he or she is disposed of, the better. Satan, and the rebellious saints of heaven, were allowed a continuance of existence in hell, merely to swell their just punishment. To such as would rebel against a Government so mild and just as ours was in peace, a punishment equal would not be unjust.


We are progressing well in this quarter. Though I have not changed my opinion that we may soon assume the existence of our National Government, yet years will pass before ruffianism, murder, and robbery will cease to afflict this region of our country.

Truly your friend,

(Signed)

W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding.

The advance of Gen. Sherman's movement, consisting of the 17th corps, under Gen. McPherson, left Vicksburg on February 2d, in light marching order, with rations for some days. The enemy were encountered after crossing the Big Black River, during the day, and some skirmishing ensued. The encampment was made that night on the west side of Baker's Creek, the enemy appearing in line of battle on the opposite side. The Confederate force consisted of about two thousand cavalry under Gen. Whitworth, who was in command from Jackson westward. At Canton there was



a force of about five thousand men under Gen. Loring, and at Meridian Gen. Polk with ten thousand more. The latter officer was in command of the department.

The preparations for Gen. Sherman's expedition had attracted the attention of the enemy, and many unaware of the difficulties of such a movement across the country, had supposed his object might be an attack on Mobile. The uncertainty which existed is shown by the following order, issued at a later date:

MOBILE, February 10, 1864.

DEAR SIR: I have just been informed by General Polk that the enemy is moving from Morton against Mobile. It is, therefore, my duty to ask all persons who cannot take part in the defence of the city to leave it.

I am, sir, very respectfully yours,
DABNEY MAURY,
Major-General Commanding.

To Col. JOHN FORSYTH, Mobile.

The Governor of Alabama, upon the first advance of the Federal troops from Vicksburg, issued the following address to the people:

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT OF ALABAMA, }
MONTGOMERY, February 6, 1864. }

To the People of Alabama:

The recent action of Congress has deprived the State of much of the materials of the second-class militia. It is important to the defence of the State, that Alabama shall have more troops subject to the call of her Commander-in-chief. We have, within the State, the materials for an efficient army. It needs nothing but the spirit, the prompt and willing spirit to fight, as men ought to fight, to guard our firesides and drive the hireling Yankee from our borders. We are threatened with raids into the heart of the State.

As your Executive Chief I call upon the middle aged, the young men and boys, to organize into companies at once, and report, without delay, that they are organized and ready. I cannot suppose that Alabamians will wait to be drafted into the service. The enthusiastic reenlistment of our veteran troops in the Virginia and Tennessee armies has caused a thrill of joyful hope to animate the hearts of even the creaking and despondent. If these battle-scarred heroes, who for three years have carried their lives in their hands, ready to be sacrificed in the defence of their homes and liberty, are willing to battle on while the feet of a hated foe press our soil, shall we at home be laggards in the race of glory? I trust no such damning stigma shall rest upon the honored name of Alabama.

I confidently expect a hearty, prompt, and noble response to this call.

The rolls of companies will be reported to the Adjutant-General.

T. H. WATTS, Governor of Alabama.

The force of Gen. Sherman consisted of two corps under Gen. McPherson and Hurlbut, estimated at thirty thousand men, with sixty pieces of light artillery. He reached Jackson on February 6th, and pressed forward toward Meridian. The enemy fell back, destroying all provision, and making a desert of the country. From Jackson Gen. Sherman crossed the Pearl River, and passed through Brandon to Morton. Here the enemy had made dispositions for a battle, but retired during the night. On the next day the army advanced and reached Meridian. The enemy state that all the Confederate Government property was

previously removed, and nearly all the machinery of the railroad company. The force under Gen. Polk fell back across the Tombigbee. On his arrival at Meridian Gen. Sherman issued the following congratulatory address to his troops:

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE, }
MERIDIAN, Miss., February 13, 1864. }

The General Commanding conveys his congratulations and thanks to the officers and men composing this command for their most successful accomplishment of one of the great problems of the war. Meridian, the great railway centre of the Southwest, is now in our possession, and by industry and hard work can be rendered useless to the enemy, and deprive him of the chief source of supply to his armies. Secrecy in plan and rapidity of execution accomplish the best results of war; and the General Commanding assures all that by following their leaders fearlessly and with confidence they will in time reap the reward so dear to us all—a peace that will never again be disturbed in our country by a discontented minority.

By order of

W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding.

On the same day he issued the following instructions:

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE, }
MERIDIAN, Miss., February 13, 1864. }

1. The destruction of the railroads intersecting at Meridian is of great importance, and should be done most effectually. Every tie and rail for many miles in each direction should be absolutely destroyed or injured, and every bridge and culvert should be completely destroyed. To insure this end, to General Hurlbut is entrusted the destruction east and north, and to General McPherson the roads west and south. The troops should be impressed with the importance of this work, and also that time is material, and therefore it should be begun at once and be prosecuted with all the energy possible. Working parties should be composed of about one-half the command, and they should move by regiments, provided with their arms and haversacks, ready to repel attacks of cavalry. The other half in reserve will be able to watch the enemy retreating eastward.

2. Colonel E. F. Winslow, commanding cavalry, will keep his cavalry in advance of the party working eastward, and will act as though this army were slowly pursuing the enemy.

3. Special instructions will be given as to the general supply train; and the troops now in Meridian will, under proper brigade parties, collect meal, meat, and supplies. The destruction of buildings must be deferred till the last moment, when a special detail will be made for that purpose.

By order of

W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding.

Gen. Sherman reports that while at Meridian he made "the most complete destruction of railroads ever beheld." This was done on the road running south as far as Quitman; on the east as far as Cuba Station, twenty miles; and two miles north to Lauderdale Springs. Lauderdale County was already desolate, and the country between Meridian and Demopolis was sterile and unproductive. While at Meridian he heard nothing of the cavalry force under Gen. W. S. Smith, who was ordered to be there from Memphis by February 10th; and after occupying the town for a week, and his supplies growing short, he began to fall back toward Vicksburg, making a circuit by the north to Canton. This place was reached February

26th. His total loss was reported at one hundred and seventy men killed and wounded.

Meantime, Gen. W. S. Smith, who was ordered to report to Gen. Sherman at Meridian, moved from Memphis on February 11th, with a force of seven thousand men, consisting of cavalry and a brigade of infantry. After two days the expedition reached the Tallahatchie. A demonstration was made westward by the infantry toward Panola, thus attracting the attention of a force of the enemy, while the cavalry moved eastward to New Albany, where the river was crossed without opposition. Gen. Smith then pushed forward, and in the vicinity of Houston encountered some troops under Col. Gholson. They fell back to a swamp, where a considerable force was concentrated. Finding it impossible to turn either flank of this position, Gen. Smith moved rapidly eastward, while a demonstration was made in front of the enemy as if an attack was intended. On the same day he surprised and entered Okalona. The 9th Illinois cavalry, Lieut.-Col. Burgh, was then sent to Aberdeen to endeavor to secure a crossing of the Tombigbee. On the next morning Col. Grierson was sent forward with a brigade to support the 9th, with directions to threaten Columbus strongly. With the remaining force Gen. Smith advanced along the railroad toward West Point, tearing up the track and burning all the corn he found. The quantity which he destroyed is reported as nearly a million of bushels, with about two thousand bales of cotton. During this portion of the march negroes flocked to Gen. Smith by hundreds, mounted on their masters' horses and mules. They welcomed Gen. Smith as their deliverer whenever he met them: "God bless ye; has yer come at last? We've been lookin' for you for a long time, and had almost done gone give it up," was the cry of many. They bid farewell to their wives and children and marched in the van.

Hearing that the enemy was concentrated in heavy force at West Point, the brigade at Aberdeen was called over by a forced march to the railroad, at a station fifteen miles north of West Point. Two miles north of this station Gen. Smith encountered a force of the enemy, which fell back, after a sharp skirmish, through the town to a swamp on the right. Gen. Smith now found the enemy on his front in strong force, holding all the crossings of the swamp on the right; also on the line of the Octibbeha in front, and that of the Tombigbee River on his left. He could attack only with light carbines, as his horses were useless on the marshy ground. The enemy were armed with muskets and rifles. Gen. Smith was also now encumbered with pack-trains, and mules and horses captured, numbering about two thousand, beside as many negroes. To guard these his effective force was reduced, and he therefore determined to make a demonstration in front, and at the same time fall back with his trains and his main body to Okalona.

This movement was successfully executed, although the enemy pressed closely, under the command of Gens. Forrest, Lee, and Chalmers. At Okalona, on the 22d, Gen. Smith was attacked, and suffered severely in the loss of men, besides five howitzers. His retreat that day was followed up. Under cover of the night he moved toward Pontotoc. This movement is thus described: "Picture to yourself, if you can, a living, moving mass of men, negroes, mules, and horses, of four thousand or five thousand, all *en masse*, literally jammed, huddled, and crowded into the smallest possible space; night setting in; artillery and small arms booming behind us; cavalry all around and ahead, moving on, on, on over fences, through fields and brush, over hills and across mud-holes, streams, and bridges, and still on, on into the night, until the moon rises on the scene and shows us some of the outlines of this living panorama. I forgot to say that in this crowd were a lot of prisoners, too, once or twice attempting to escape, followed by the swift report of the revolver, once with bitter consequences to the escaping prisoners."

During the day the enemy had moved on each flank, with the evident design of reaching the Tallahatchie River in advance, and forming a junction to prevent the crossing of Gen. Smith and capture his whole force; but, by marching all night, he safely crossed the river at New Albany. On the 23d the rear guard had skirmishing all day. On the 25th the advance reached Memphis, at 11 p. m., having marched nearly fifty miles that day. It was reported that a million bushels of corn were destroyed, many miles in length of the Memphis and Ohio Railroad, bridges, cotton-gins, and buildings. Says one: "We have probably devoured fifty thousand hams, some eggs, chickens, turkeys, milk, and butter by wholesale, and such *et ceteras* as can be found in so rich a country as we have passed through." The captured stock and trains were brought off safely. The loss was less than two hundred killed and captured. The expedition failed to make a junction with Gen. Sherman.

When the expedition of Gen. Sherman returned toward Vicksburg, a detachment was sent up the Yazoo River, accompanied with some gunboats. Yazoo City was attacked, but the enemy held it until reinforced. An amount of stores and cotton was destroyed. The Federal loss was about fifty killed and wounded. The general results of this movement, including those of Gens. Sherman and Smith, is stated to have been as follows: One hundred and fifty miles of railroad, sixty-seven bridges, seven hundred trestles, twenty locomotives, twenty-eight cars, several thousand bales of cotton, several steam mills, and over two million bushels of corn were destroyed. Some prisoners were captured, and upwards of eight thousand negroes and refugees came in with the various columns.

Many dwellings and all the outbuildings and farming utensils were destroyed.

The expedition of Gen. Sherman was generally supposed to be designed for the capture of Mobile. But, however that may have been, no official statement has been made. As it advanced toward Meridian, a force was detached from the army of Gen. Johnston, formerly commanded by Gen. Bragg, near Dalton, in Georgia, and sent to reinforce Gen. Polk. Two divisions of Gen. Hardee's Corps, under Gens. Stewart and Anderson, composed this force. To counteract this movement of the enemy, another was set on foot by Gen. Grant, then in command at Chattanooga. This consisted of an advance of the Fourteenth Corps, under Gen. Palmer, upon Dalton. It commenced on February 22d. The divisions of Gens. Jeff. C. Davis, Johnson, and Baird participated on the right, or direct road to Dalton, and the division of Gen. Stanley, under command of Gen. Crufts, on the left. This latter division had been encamped at Cleveland, and formed a junction with the main force between Ringgold and Tunnel Hill. The advance of the main force passed to the left of the Chickamauga battle-field, over Taylor's Ridge and through Ringgold Gap. A small force of the enemy was seen here, who retired. Ringgold, twenty-three miles from Chattanooga, was occupied that night. On the next day the column moved at daylight, and during the forenoon there was constant skirmishing with the cavalry of the enemy. At noon Gen. Crufts made a junction, and the whole corps moved forward in line of battle, with cavalry in advance and on the flanks, until it reached the vicinity of Tunnel Hill. On the ridge were four pieces of artillery, under Gen. Wheeler, which soon opened fire. These were dislodged in a short time by the 2d Minnesota and 9th Indiana batteries, and the ridge occupied about 4 p. m. The advance continued and the cavalry force pressed forward in pursuit of the few scattered enemies, until it was checked by a cross-fire from six guns, at Rocky Fall, in a gorge through which the railroad and turnpike passes. The enemy succeeded in holding that position for the night. On the next morning, after considerable heavy fighting, the corps advanced into the town and captured about a hundred and fifty prisoners. The movement was immediately continued upon Dalton, distant seven miles from Tunnel Hill. The corps descended through the gaps into the Rocky Fall valley, the division of Gen. Crufts being on the left, Gen. Johnson on the right, Gen. Baird on the left centre, and Gen. Davis on the right centre. During the whole forenoon there was lively skirmishing, and the enemy's force evidently increased in numbers. Gen. Palmer advanced cautiously within two miles of Dalton, when it appeared that preparations had been made by the whole of Gen. Johnson's army to receive him. Considerable activity was perceptible in the interior of the enemy's

works, and their cavalry began to hover about the flanks of Gen. Palmer's corps. Deserters reported that two divisions which had started toward Mobile had returned. Gen. Palmer now fell back to Tunnel Hill. His loss in the expedition was about three hundred and fifty killed and wounded. That of the enemy is unknown. Some prisoners were taken by Gen. Palmer. On March 10th he had fallen back to Ringgold.

The movement in East Tennessee consisted merely in an advance toward the position of Gen. Longstreet, who was then reported to be retreating into Virginia. He finally joined the army of Gen. Lee with his command.

In the Department of the South, authority was given to Gen. Q. A. Gillmore commanding, on December 22d, 1863, to undertake such operations as he might deem best on a conference with Admiral Dahlgren commanding the naval force. On the 13th of January the President wrote to Gen. Gillmore as follows:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, January 13, 1864.

Major-General GILLMORE: I understand an effort is being made by some worthy gentlemen to reconstruct a legal State Government in Florida. Florida is in your department, and it is not unlikely you may be therein person. I have given Mr. Hay a commission of major and sent him to you with some blank books and other blanks to aid in the construction. He will explain as to the manner of using the blanks, and also my general views on the subject. It is desirable for all to cooperate; but if irreconcilable differences of opinion shall arise you are master. I wish the thing done in the most speedy way possible, so that when done it be within the range of the late proclamation on the subject. The detail labor will of course have to be done by others, but I shall be greatly obliged if you will give it such general supervision as you can find consistent with your more strictly military duties.

A. LINCOLN.

On January 14th Gen. Gillmore proposed to the War Department to occupy the west bank of the St. John's River in Florida, and establish small depots there preparatory to an advance west. On the 22d of January he was informed by the Secretary that the matter was left entirely to his judgment and discretion with the means at his command. On January 31st Gen. Gillmore again wrote to the Secretary that the objects to be obtained by the operations were:

1st. "To procure an outlet for cotton, lumber, timber, &c.

2d. "To cut off one of the enemy's sources of commissary supplies, &c.

3d. "To obtain recruits for my colored regiments.

4th. "To inaugurate measures for the speedy restoration of Florida to her allegiance in accordance with the instructions which he had received from the President, by the hands of Major John Hay, Assistant Adjutant-General."

On the same day Gen. Gillmore issued the following order:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH. }
HILTON HEAD, S. C., January 31, 1864.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 16.—In accordance with the provision of the Presidential Proclamation of Pardon and Amnesty, given at Washington on the 8th day of December, in the year of our

and in case of danger, some of the scouts must swim the river and bring us information. As we approach the city the party must take great care that they do not get ahead of the other party on the south side, and must conceal themselves and watch our movements. We will try and secure the bridge to the city, one mile below Belle Isle, and release the prisoners at the same time. If we don't succeed they must then dash down, and we will try to carry the bridge by storm. When necessary the men must be filed through the woods and along the river bank. The bridge once secured and the prisoners loose and over the river, the bridges will be burned and the city destroyed.

The men must be kept together and well in hand, and once in the city, it must be destroyed and Jeff. Davis and his Cabinet killed. Pioneers will go along with combustible material. The officer must use his discretion about the time of assisting us. Horses and cattle which we do not need immediately must be shot, rather than left.

Every thing on the canal and elsewhere, of service to the rebels, must be destroyed.

As Gen. Custer may follow me, be careful not to give a false alarm. The signal officer must be prepared to communicate at night by rockets, and in other things pertaining to his department. The Quartermasters and Commissaries must be on the lookout for their departments, and see that there are no delays on their account. The engineer officer will follow and survey the road as we pass over it, &c. The pioneers must be prepared to construct a bridge or destroy one. They must have plenty of oakum and turpentine for burning, which will be soaked and rolled into balls and be given to the men to burn when we get into the city. Torpedoes will only be used by the pioneers for burning the main bridges, &c. They must be prepared to destroy the railroads.

Men will branch off to the right with a few pioneers and destroy the bridges and railroads south of Richmond, and then join us at the city. They must be well prepared with torpedoes, &c.

The line of Falling Creek is probably the best to march along, or, as they approach the city, Good's Creek, so that no reinforcements can come up on any cars.

No one must be allowed to pass ahead, for fear of communicating news.

Rejoin the command with all haste, and if cut off, cross the river above Richmond and rejoin us. Men will stop at Bellona Arsenal and totally destroy it and every thing else but hospitals; then follow on and rejoin the command at Richmond with all haste, and, if cut off, cross the river and rejoin us. As Gen. Custer may follow me, be careful and not give a false alarm.

On the approach of Gen. Kilpatrick Richmond was in a defenceless condition. The Departments of the Government were closed and the clerks armed for defence. Men were collected from every quarter to oppose him. At the same time great consternation prevailed.

On the 29th of February an act of Congress to revive the grade of Lieutenant-General was approved by President Lincoln. He immediately sent the nomination of Maj.-Gen. Ulysses S. Grant to the Senate for confirmation. On March 3d this nomination was confirmed by the Senate. Gen. Grant was then in command of the army in Tennessee. He at once left his Department for Washington, and visited the President on March 9th. On presenting to him the commission as Lieutenant-General, in the presence of the Cabinet, Gen. Halleck, Gen. Rawlins, and Col. Comstock, of Gen. Grant's staff, the son of Gen. Grant, Mr. Lovejoy, of

the House of Representatives, and others, the President rose and said:

GEN. GRANT: The nation's appreciation of what you have done, and its reliance upon you for what remains to do, in the existing great struggle, are now presented with this commission, constituting you Lieutenant-General in the Army of the United States. With this high honor devolves upon you, also, a corresponding responsibility. As the country herein trusts you, so, under God, it will sustain you. I scarcely need to add that with what I here speak for the nation, goes my own hearty personal concurrence.

To which Gen. Grant replied:

MR. PRESIDENT: I accept this commission with gratitude for the high honor conferred.

With the aid of the noble armies that have fought on so many fields for our common country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations.

I feel the full weight of the responsibilities now devolving on me, and I know that if they are met, it will be due to those armies, and, above, all to the favor of that Providence which leads both nations and men.

On the 11th of March Gen. Grant returned to Nashville, Tennessee. On the 12th, the following order was issued at Washington:

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, }
WASHINGTON, March 12. }

General Orders No. 98.

The President of the United States orders as follows: 1. Maj.-Gen. Halleck is, at his own request, relieved from duty as General-in-Chief of the Army, and Lieut.-Gen. U. S. Grant assigned to the command of the Armies of the United States. The headquarters of the army will be in Washington and also with Lieut.-Gen. Grant in the field.

2. Maj.-Gen. Halleck is assigned to duty in Washington as Chief-of-Staff of the Army, under the direction of the Secretary of War and the Lieutenant-General commanding. His orders will be obeyed and respected accordingly.

3. Maj.-Gen. W. T. Sherman is assigned to the command of the military division of the Mississippi, composed of the Department of the Ohio, the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and the Arkansas.

4. Maj.-Gen. J. B. McPherson is assigned to the command of the Department and Army of the Tennessee.

5. In relieving Maj.-Gen. Halleck from duty as General-in-Chief, the President desires to express his approbation and thanks for the zealous manner in which the arduous and responsible duties of that position have been performed.

By order of the Secretary of War.

E. D. TOWNSEND, Ass't Adj't Gen.

On the 17th, Gen. Grant issued the following order:

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF UNITED STATES, }
NASHVILLE, March 17, 1864. }

General Orders No. 1.

In pursuance of the following order of the President—

EXECUTIVE MANSION, }
WASHINGTON, D. C., March 10, 1864. }

Under the authority of the act of Congress to revive the grade of Lieutenant-General of the United States Army, approved February 29th, 1864, Lieut.-Gen. U. S. Grant, U. S. A., is appointed to the command of the Armies of the United States.

(Signed) A. LINCOLN.

I assume command of the Armies of the United States. My headquarters will be in the field, and until further orders will be with the Army of the Potomac. There will be an officers' headquarters in Washington, to which all official communications

will be sent, except those from the army where headquarters are at the date of this address.

(Signed) U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-Gen. U. S. A.

On the 19th Gen. Grant left Nashville for Washington, and proceeded thence to the Army of the Potomac. On the 24th the following order was issued by Gen. Meade, in command of the Army of the Potomac:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, }
Thursday, March 24, 1864. }

General Orders No. 10.

The following order has been received from the War Department:

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, }
WASHINGTON, March 23, 1864. }

General Orders No. 15.

By direction of the President of the United States the number of army corps comprising the army of the Potomac will be reduced to three, viz., the 2d, 5th, and 6th corps; and the troops of the other two corps, viz., the 1st and 3d, will be temporarily reorganized and distributed among the 2d, 5th and 6th by the commanding general, who will determine what existing organizations will retain their corps badges and other distinctive marks. The staff and officers of the 2d corps, which are temporarily broken up, will be assigned to vacancies in the other corps, so far as such vacancies may exist. Those for whom there are no vacancies will cease to be considered as officers of the general staff of army corps.

2. Maj.-Gen. G. K. Warren is assigned by the President to the command of the 5th corps.

3. The following general officers are detached from the Army of the Potomac, and will report for orders to the Adjutant General of the army, viz.: Maj.-Gen. George Sykes, U. S. V.; Maj.-Gen. W. H. French, U. S. V.; Maj.-Gen. John Newton, U. S. V.; Brig.-Gen. J. R. Kenly, U. S. V.; Brig.-Gen. F. Spinola, U. S. V., and Brig.-Gen. Solomon Meredith, U. S. V.

By order of the Secretary of War.

E. D. TOWNSEND, Ass't Adj't Gen.

The following arrangements are made to carry out the provisions of the foregoing order:

The 2d, 5th, and 6th army corps will each be consolidated into two divisions. The 1st and 2d divisions of the 3d corps are transferred to the 2d corps, preserving their badges and distinctive marks. The 3d division of the 3d corps is transferred permanently to the 6th corps. The three divisions now forming the 1st corps are transferred to the 5th corps, preserving their badges and distinctive marks, and on forming the 5th corps they will be consolidated into two divisions.

The commanders of divisions transferred to the 2d, 5th, and 6th corps will at once report to the commanders of those corps for instructions. Brig.-Gen. J. B. Carr will report to Maj.-Gen. Hancock, commanding 2d corps, and Brig.-Gen. H. Prince to Maj.-Gen. Sedgwick, commanding 6th corps. The chief of artillery will assign eight batteries each to the 2d, 5th, and 6th corps; the batteries to be taken from those now with the corps and with the 1st and 3d corps. The batteries with the several corps in excess of the above allowance will join the artillery reserve.

The consolidation of divisions called for in this order will be made by the corps commanders concerned, who are authorized to rearrange the brigades of their respective commands in such manner as they may think best for the service. The reassignment of officers of the staff departments consequent upon the reorganization of the army, will be made upon the nomination of chiefs of the staff departments at these headquarters.

Special instructions will be given hereafter with respect to staff officers of the 2d corps, temporarily broken up.

The Major-General Commanding avails himself

of the occasion to say that, in view of the reduced strength of nearly all the regiments serving in this army, the temporary reduction of the army corps to three is a measure imperatively demanded by the best interests of the service, and that the reasons for attaching the 1st and 3d corps for the time being to other corps, were in no respect founded on any supposed inferiority of those corps to the other corps of the army. All the corps have equally proved their valor in many fields, and all have equal claims to the confidence of the Government and the country. The 1st and 3d corps will retain their badges and distinctive marks, and the Major-General Commanding indulges the hope that the ranks of the army will be filled at an early day, so that those corps can again be reorganized.

By command of Maj.-Gen. MEADE.
S. WILLIAMS, Ass't Adj't Gen.

A concentration of troops was now commenced in preparation for a campaign against Richmond, in Virginia, by the Army of the Potomac, under Gen. Meade, and a campaign against Atlanta, in Georgia, by the Army of Tennessee, under Gen. Sherman. Gen. Grant continued to be present with the Army of the Potomac during the year. Gen. Meade was as truly the commander of that army as Gen. W. T. Sherman of the army operating in Georgia, and both these officers were equally under the command of Gen. Grant. His presence with the Army of the Potomac naturally led to his assuming a more direct and personal supervision of affairs in Virginia than he was able to do of the co-operative movement of Gen. Sherman in Georgia. The orders of Gen. Grant to Gen. Meade were of the most general character. The manner of executing them was left to the judgment and skill of the latter. It was now nine months since the Army of the Potomac had fought a general battle, and seven months since the Western army marched into Chattanooga—the last battle for the possession of which was fought in November.

The month of April passed in reorganizing both armies, and in making preparations for the campaign against Richmond and Atlanta.

It was the middle of March when Gen. Grant turned over the military division of the Mississippi, comprising the departments of the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and the Ohio, to Major-General W. T. Sherman, who had previously commanded the department of the Tennessee, to which Major-General McPherson was soon after assigned. In the succeeding month the general plan of the summer campaign, which contemplated a simultaneous advance upon Richmond by the army of the Potomac, and upon Atlanta from Chattanooga, by the several western armies, was matured, and Gen. Sherman at once bent every energy to the perfecting and enlargement of the communications between Nashville and Chattanooga, his primary and secondary bases, and to the accumulation in the latter place of a sufficient quantity of provisions and military stores. These went forward with great rapidity, and by the end of April the depots in Chattanooga were reported abundantly supplied for all immediate purposes.

At this time the headquarters of the armies of the Tennessee, the Cumberland, and the Ohio, were respectively at Huntsville, Chattanooga, and Knoxville; and on the 27th, Gen. Sherman having been notified by Gen. Grant that the Army of the Potomac would march from Culpepper on or about May 5th, and that he wished the movement from Chattanooga to commence at the same time, put his troops in motion toward the latter place. The total force under his command for offensive purposes, was as follows:

Army of the Cumberland, Major-Gen. Thomas Commanding.

Infantry.....	54,568
Artillery.....	2,377
Cavalry.....	3,828
Total.....	60,773
Guns.....	130

Army of the Tennessee, Major-Gen. McPherson Commanding.

Infantry.....	22,437
Artillery.....	1,404
Cavalry.....	624
Total.....	24,465
Guns.....	96

Army of the Ohio, Major-Gen. Schofield Commanding.


Infantry.....	11,183
Artillery.....	679
Cavalry.....	1,679
Total.....	13,559
Guns.....	23

making a grand aggregate of 88,188 infantry, 4,460 artillery, and 6,149 cavalry, or 98,797 men and 254 guns. The Army of the Cumberland comprised the 4th corps, Gen. Howard; the 14th corps, Gen. Palmer, and the 20th corps, Gen. Hooker; the Army of the Tennessee, the 15th corps, Gen. Logan; the 16th corps, Gen. Dodge; and later in the campaign, the 17th corps, Gen. Blair; and the Army of the Ohio, the 23d corps, Gen. Schofield. These armies were grouped on the morning of May 6th as follows: That of the Cumberland at Ringgold, on the Western and Atlantic Railroad, 23 miles southeast of Chattanooga; that of the Tennessee at Gordon's Mill, on the Chickamauga, eight miles west of Ringgold; and that of the Ohio, near Red Clay, on the Georgia line, about ten miles northeast of Ringgold. The enemy, comprising Gens. Hardee's, Hood's, and Polk's corps of infantry and artillery, and Wheeler's division of cavalry, the whole commanded by Lieut.-General Joseph E. Johnston, of the Confederate Army, lay in and about Dalton, fifteen miles south of Ringgold, on the railroad, the advance being at Tunnel Hill, a station about midway between the two places. Their cavalry were estimated by Gen. Sherman at 10,000 men, and the infantry and artillery at from 45,000 to 50,000, of whom much the greater part were veteran troops.

Topographically considered, the State of Georgia admits of three distinct divisions: 1. A mountainous region, embracing the north-west corner of the State, and which terminates at the Kenesaw Mountain, near Marietta, 120 miles from Chattanooga; 2. A gently undulat-

ing country extending from the mountainous region to a line passing in a northeasterly direction through Columbus, Macon, and Augusta; and 3. A level country extending to the seaboard, for the most part sandy and thickly covered with pine woods, and along the coast bordered by extensive swamps. The north-western portion of the State, as far south as Atlanta, is almost exclusively a grain and grass-bearing region; the middle and eastern divisions being devoted chiefly to the cultivation of cotton. But its mineral wealth, particularly in iron ores, which abound among the mountains, has, since the commencement of the war, rendered the possession of this first-mentioned division a matter of prime importance to the Confederates. At Etowah, Rome, and Atlanta were large iron works in the employ of the rebel government, the capture and permanent occupation of which by a Union force would be likely to cause much embarrassment, not to speak of cotton and woollen mills at Roswell, Rome, and elsewhere, which turned out large quantities of fabrics for the use of the rebel troops.

Atlanta, lying near the boundary between the northwestern and middle divisions had, previous to the war, become an important centre of railroad communication and trade between the western and Atlantic and Gulf States, and one of the chief manufacturing towns of the South. It is laid out in a circle, two miles in diameter, in the centre of which was the passenger depot (since destroyed) of railroads radiating to Chattanooga, Augusta, Macon, and Montgomery; and the business portion of the town contained many fine blocks of warehouses for storing goods consigned from the north and northwest to the cotton regions of the South. Here also were established the machine shops of the principal railroads, the most extensive rolling mill in the South, foundries, pistol, and tent factories, and numerous works under the direction of the Confederate Government for casting shot and shell, and the manufacture of gun-carriages, cartridges, caps, shoes, clothing, and other military supplies. The population, numbering in 1860 about 15,000, had, subsequent to the commencement of the war, been increased by the arrival of refugees and government officials and employés to fully 20,000. In any event the capture of the place, with its vast stores and costly machinery, would so cripple the rebel resources, that the simple suggestion of such a contingency sent a thrill of alarm through the entire Confederacy. In the opinion of many its importance was not second even to that of Richmond. Strenuous efforts were accordingly put forth for its defence, and the line of approach along the Western and Atlantic Railroad, which is crossed by the Oostanaula and Etowah, branches of the Coosa River, which in turn is a branch of the Alabama, and by the Chattahoochee, and is girt as far as Marietta by ranges of rugged hills, was rendered as difficult for Sherman as the abundant



resources at the disposal of Johnston would admit. Should the mountain region be traversed or turned, and the Chattahoochee be crossed by an invading army, the enormous strength of Atlanta itself still gave promise of a long and perhaps successful defence, while an active cavalry force operating on Sherman's flanks might so seriously interrupt his communications as to compel him to retrace his steps and abandon the campaign. His forces were also liable to daily depletion as he advanced by the necessity of garrisoning captured places as well as of guarding the line of railway, while Johnston, moving constantly nearer to his supplies and reinforcements, would probably be relatively stronger when he reached Atlanta than when he started. The consequences which defeat would entail upon either party seemed so disastrous that the campaign was watched with an interest hardly inferior to that attending the more extensive operations around Richmond.

For the convenience of reference the following table of stations on the Western and Atlantic Railroad, with their distances from Chattanooga, is appended :

	Miles.		Miles.
Boyce.....	5	Kingston.....	79
Chickamauga.....	10	Cass.....	86
Johnson.....	18	Cartersville.....	91
Ringgold.....	23	Etowah.....	95
Tunnel Hill.....	31	Altoona.....	98
Dalton.....	38	Ackworth.....	102
Tilton.....	47	Big Shanty.....	103
Resaca.....	56	Marietta.....	119
Calhoun.....	60	Vining's.....	130
Adairsville.....	69	Atlanta.....	183

A reconnoissance by Gen. Sherman of Gen. Johnston's position at Dalton satisfied him that an attack in front was impracticable, even should the enemy abandon their works at Tunnel Hill. Directly south of this eminence, through which passes the railroad by a tunnel eighteen hundred feet in length, opens a level valley about three miles long by half to three-quarters of a mile in width, bounded at its further extremity by "Rocky Faced Ridge," a steep, thickly-wooded and rugged eminence, which commands the approach to Dalton both by railroad and wagon road, and extends as an impassable barrier along its west side for many miles. The outlet to this valley is through a narrow mountain pass called Buzzard Roost, nearly midway between Tunnel Hill and Dalton, which by means of abatis, a formidable series of batteries, and a line of rifle-pits at its northern entrance, had been rendered absolutely impregnable to a force advancing along the railroad. On its northeast side Dalton was defended by strong works on Mill Creek. Gen. Sherman accordingly directed Gen. McPherson, with the Army of the Tennessee, to move rapidly southward from his position at Gordon's Mill, *via* Ship's Gap, Villanov, and Snake Creek Gap, upon Resaca, a station eighteen miles below Dalton, or upon any other point on the railroad which might prove more accessible. This movement, he supposed, would compel Gen. Johnston to evacuate Dalton, when Gen.

McPherson would be in a position to harass the enemy's flank, while the main body of the Federal army pressed him from the north. While this flanking movement was in progress a strong feint of attack was to be made by Gen. Thomas in front of Buzzard Roost, and Gen. Schofield, with the Army of the Ohio, was directed to close up upon the latter's left.

On the 7th Gen. Thomas advanced from Ringgold toward Tunnel Hill, which was carried by the 14th corps under Gen. Palmer, after a brief skirmish, with the loss of a few men wounded. The slight resistance offered by the enemy indicated that they had no intention of defending the position, but only sought to hold Gen. Thomas in check until they could make good their retreat to the stronger position of Buzzard Roost. The Federal line was established on the same evening about a mile south of Tunnel Hill. On the 8th a demonstration in force was made against Rocky Faced Ridge and Buzzard Roost, which, on the 9th, was pushed almost to a battle. The 4th (Howard's) corps succeeded in carrying the ridge, but found the crest too narrow to enable it to attack the pass with any prospect of success. Gen. Schofield meanwhile came up on Gen. Thomas's left, which was held by Gen. Howard, and a brigade of his cavalry, while demonstrating against the enemy's right flank, met with some loss in an encounter with a superior force of rebel infantry.

On the 8th Gen. McPherson passed through Snake Creek Gap, surprising a rebel cavalry force sent to hold the position, and approached within a mile of Resaca, which he found too strong to be carried by assault. Apprehending, also, that if he should attempt to cross over to the railroad he might expose his left flank to an attack from the direction of Dalton, he fell back to a strong position at the west end of Snake Creek Gap, and reported to Gen. Sherman. The latter, finding that the demonstration on the enemy's flank had failed to compel him to evacuate his strong position, immediately determined to put the remainder of his army in motion for Snake Creek Gap; and on the 10th Gen. Hooker's (20th) corps, which held the right of Gen. Thomas's line, started for that place, followed on the succeeding day by the rest of Thomas's troops, with the exception of two divisions of Howard's corps and some cavalry, who were left to threaten the enemy in front of Buzzard Roost, and by Gen. Schofield's army; the three armies thus holding the same relative positions occupied by them at the commencement of the campaign. The Federal loss in the actions of the 8th and 9th was between 700 and 800 killed, wounded, and missing, the greater number being only slightly wounded.

Resaca, toward which Sherman was now moving, is situated on the Oostanaula, in a peninsula formed by the junction of that river with its northwest fork, the Conasanga, and across this peninsula the rebels had erected

continuous lines of rifle-pits with strong field fortifications, particularly about the town, by means of which their flanks were protected on either river, and a line of retreat preserved across the Oostanaula. Friday, May 13th, was occupied by the troops in deploying through Snake Creek Gap and getting into position in Sugar Valley, a fertile tract beyond, much broken by hills, which are covered by a dense undergrowth, and on that account difficult of approach. The movement was covered by the cavalry under Gen. Kilpatrick, who, while pressing the enemy toward Resaca, fell into an ambuscade and received a severe flesh wound, which incapacitated him for several months for active duty. During the day the Federal lines were advanced toward Resaca, the right under McPherson resting on the Oostanaula, about two miles below the town, and extending thence northward so as to face it; the centre, under Gen. Thomas, closing up upon Gen. McPherson's left, and the left, under Schofield, striking the Conasauga near Tilton, a station on the railroad about midway between Dalton and Resaca. Beside the protection afforded by the two rivers, both flanks of the army were covered by heavy bodies of cavalry. The scene of these operations was a rugged, thickly-wooded country, abounding in steep hills and narrow ravines, through one of which, directly in front of the rebel lines, flows Camp Creek, a small stream emptying into the Oostanaula near Resaca.

Gen. Johnston was not long in detecting the object of Sherman's flanking march, and judging the position at Dalton to be no longer tenable, he moved rapidly southward on the 12th, and having the shorter line of march, reached Resaca with his entire force before the Union army had debouched from Snake Creek Gap. The divisions of Howard's corps left to watch Buzzard Roost, soon after occupied Dalton, which was found thoroughly stripped of supplies and almost deserted, and moving in the enemy's rear, effected a junction on the 14th with the Federal left, near Tilton. The successful turning of the rebel position at Dalton was justly considered a great step gained in the movement upon Atlanta; and even among the rebel troops there were many who thought that if their leader could not hold for more than four days a place so strongly fortified by nature, he would be unable to maintain himself for a long time at any of the remaining points north of Atlanta, no one of which was perhaps so capable of defence as Dalton.

The night of the 13th was employed by the rebels in strengthening their already formidable position by additional earthworks, and on the morning of the 14th they were in complete readiness for an attack, their right wing being held by Gen. Hardee, their centre by Gen. Hood, and their left by Gen. Polk. Skirmishing commenced at an early hour, and the object of Gen. Sherman being to press Resaca at all points, while a force of infantry and cav-

alry crossed the Oostanaula and threatened Calhoun in the rear, the firing toward noon grew heavy along the whole rebel line. The Federal general had hoped to be able to turn the rebel left wing, and thus cut off their retreat, but the nature of the ground rendered this impossible. At 1 p. m. an attempt was made by Palmer's corps, holding the left centre, to break the enemy's line, and force him from an elevated position in the immediate front. To reach this point it was necessary to descend a hill in full range of rebel artillery, ford a stream thickly bordered with undergrowth and interlacing vines, and then, crossing a valley full of ditches and other obstructions, to mount the opposite eminence. In the teeth of a murderous fire of musketry and artillery, Palmer's troops charged down the hill and across the creek; but becoming speedily entangled in the obstructions, and unable to find shelter or to return with effect the plunging fire of the enemy, which caused havoc in their ranks, they were forced to retire, with a loss estimated at upwards of a thousand. About the same time, further to the left, Gen. Judah's division of the 23d corps and Newton's of the 4th corps, moving over comparatively level ground, succeeded, after a desperate struggle, in forcing the enemy to abandon an important position on their outer line. Although the Federal troops were unable to hold this, they succeeded in advancing their line and getting their artillery into a position to prevent the enemy from reoccupying the works. On the extreme left, that portion of the 4th corps which had arrived from Dalton, in concert with Gen. Schofield, maintained heavy skirmishing with the rebel right, the dense woods in that direction preventing the use of artillery, and effectually concealing the movements of troops on either side. The operations on Gen. McPherson's end of the line were, during the morning, of the same character.

At about 3 o'clock in the afternoon Gen. Johnston, perceiving that no serious impression had been made upon his lines, quietly massed a heavy force on the road to Tilton, with a view of turning the Federal left flank, held by Stanley's division of the 4th corps. The attack was delivered with impetuosity and in such overwhelming numbers, that Stanley's troops, after a stubborn resistance, were forced in confusion from a hill upon which they were posted. The rebels rushed on with loud yells across an open field west of the hill, and for a few moments matters wore a critical aspect. Fortunately, however, the movement of the rebel right had been early detected, and Hooker's corps sent from the centre to reinforce the Federal left. The timely arrival of a portion of his troops checked the rebel advance, and the scattered division of Stanley having been partially rallied, the rebels were at dusk driven back within their lines with severe loss. Meanwhile Gen. McPherson, taking advantage of the enemy's occupation with this movement, ordered Logan's (15th) corps, with a portion of the 16th, to

cross Camp Creek and carry a hill and a line of rifle-pits on the enemy's extreme left, in front of Resaca, which was effected with slight loss. As the position was one which would enable the Federal General to pour a destructive enflading fire upon the rebel works, and also to command the railroad and trestle bridges across the Oostanaula, a desperate effort was made soon after dark to retake it. Heavy columns of infantry with fixed bayonets moved up to the very crest of the hill, but recoiled under the steady fire of the Federal troops, and finally retired in confusion. At 10 p.m. the fighting terminated for the day. The result of the day's work was on the whole satisfactory to Gen. Sherman, as the Federal lines had nowhere been permanently forced back, while on their left and centre the rebels had lost positions of importance.

The night of the 14th was occupied by both armies in strengthening their positions, and the morning of the 15th opened with heavy skirmishing along the Federal centre, under cover of which troops were massed for an assault upon two fortified hills commanding each other, on the enemy's extreme right, which were considered the key to the whole position. For this purpose Gen. Hooker's corps had been shifted to the extreme left, and Gens. Howard's, Schofield's, and Palmer's troops moved to the right to fill up the gap occasioned by the withdrawal of Gen. Hooker. Shortly after 1 o'clock in the afternoon Gen. Hooker sent forward Butterfield's division as the assaulting column, supported by the divisions of Gens. Geary and Williams, and after several unsuccessful attacks the enemy were driven from a portion of their lines, and a lodgment was secured under the projecting works of a lunette, mounting four pieces of artillery. So severe, however, was the fire from rifle-pits beyond and on either side of this work, forming the inner rebel line, that further advance was impossible, and the Federal troops were fain to seek such shelter as was available, and content themselves with holding the position they had gained. Toward the close of the afternoon Gen. Hood's corps made a determined but unsuccessful effort to dislodge them, and subsequently, under cover of the darkness, a number of rebel prisoners were brought up, the ends dug out of the works, and the guns hauled out by means of ropes, under a destructive fire from the rebels. As soon as a breach was made our forces rushed in and captured the lunette after a desperate engagement. The guns seized were twelve-pounders. The flags of the 35th and 38th Alabama regiments were captured, with over two hundred prisoners. While these operations were in progress the enemy's attention was occupied by heavy skirmishing along the whole line.

During the night the enemy quietly abandoned Resaca, leaving behind a four-gun battery and a quantity of stores, and by dawn were well on their way to Kingston, thirty-two miles

south on the railroad. Gen. Thomas's troops immediately occupied the town, and succeeded in saving the road bridge, but the railroad bridge, the most costly structure of the kind between Chattanooga and Atlanta, was destroyed by the enemy, with the exception of the stone piers. The total Federal loss in the two days' fighting was between 4,000 and 5,000 killed and wounded, upward of 2,000 of the latter being so slightly injured that they were returned to duty in two or three weeks. The rebel loss was stated by themselves at 2,500, which is probably not far from the mark. Fighting for the most part behind earthworks, and having the advantage of position, they necessarily suffered less than their opponents. Beside the eight guns and the stores already mentioned, they left about 1,000 prisoners in the hands of the Federals. According to Gen. Sherman nothing saved Gen. Johnston's army at Resaca but the impracticable nature of the surrounding country, which made the speedy passage of troops across the valley from Snake Creek Gap an impossibility. This fact enabled the rebel army to reach Resaca from Dalton along comparatively good roads, constructed beforehand by the foresight of their general. The latter was nevertheless severely criticized for this second abandonment of what was considered a defensible position, notwithstanding that the Richmond newspapers explained that his peculiar forte consisted in drawing an enemy after him, and then overwhelming him by a sudden attack. They also endeavored to derive consolation from a reputed caution of Gen. Scott to a Federal commander: "Beware of Lee advancing, and watch Johnston at a stand; for the devil himself would be defeated in the attempt to whip him retreating," which was extensively quoted in the Southern papers.

Soon after the discovery of Gen. Johnston's retreat, the cavalry divisions of Gens. Stoneman and McCook were thrown forward in pursuit, and during the 16th the army was occupied in crossing the Oostanaula. Gen. Thomas made the passage at Resaca, Gen. McPherson at Lay's Ferry, a few miles to the southwest, while Gen. Schofield, moving to the left of Thomas, crossed the Conasauga and Coosawattee, which unite near Resaca to form the Oostanaula. In this order the army marched southward on roads parallel to the railroad, finding no trace of the enemy until reaching the neighborhood of Adairsville, thirteen miles below Resaca, where Newton's division of the 4th corps had a smart skirmish with the rebel rear guard, who had posted their sharpshooters in an octagon cement building called "Graves House," for the purpose of delaying the advance. By the aid of artillery they were driven out, and on the 18th the 4th corps reached Kingston, four miles beyond which place the enemy were again discovered in considerable force on open ground. At Cassville, five miles east of Kingston, they were known to have constructed strong works; and on the 19th, in

anticipation of a general engagement, Gen. Sherman directed Gen. Schofield to move down toward this place from the north, while Gen. Thomas closed up upon his right, and McPherson marched to Kingston to be in close support of Thomas. Gen. Johnston, however, declined the offer of battle, and during the night retreated across the Etowah, burning the road and railroad bridges behind him. A few days' halt for rest and refreshment was now allowed the army, and as the country north of the Etowah had been completely stripped by Gen. Johnston, it was necessary to await the arrival of supplies by railroad. The latter fortunately had received little injury at the hands of the enemy, and by the energetic labors of the repairing parties, who followed close behind the army, was put in running order to Kingston on the 20th, on which day trains arrived laden with supplies. By this means the army was soon restored to a condition of complete efficiency, and relieved of the necessity of looking after the wounded, who were sent back to Chattanooga. In like manner telegraphic communication with the latter place was kept open as the army advanced.

While these operations were in progress, Gen. Jeff. C. Davis, of Palmer's corps, on the 17th marched southwesterly from Resaca toward Rome, fifteen miles west of Kingston, which place he occupied on the 19th after a sharp fight, gaining possession of several forts, eight or ten guns of heavy caliber, large quantities of stores, and the valuable mills and foundries employed in the service of the Confederate Government.

Gen. Johnston had meanwhile taken a strong position at Allatoona Pass, in the Etowah Mountains, south of the Etowah River, which formed an almost impregnable barrier to a direct advance upon Atlanta by railroad. Gen. Sherman accordingly resorted to the same tactics which had proved so successful at Dalton; and having supplied his wagons with twenty days' provisions, and left garrisons at Rome and Kingston, he put his army in motion on May 23d for Dallas, a town lying about fifteen miles southwest of Allatoona Pass, and eighteen miles directly west of Marietta, a station on the railroad forty miles below Kingston, and twenty-four south of the Etowah River. He expected thus, by threatening Marietta, to compel the evacuation of Allatoona. The country between Dallas and the railroad is of the same impracticable character as that in which previous operations of the campaign had been conducted, being for the most part densely wooded, traversed by ranges of rugged hills, and cut up by frequent ravines. The roads were few and poor. Through this region, admirably adapted for defence, and of which the topography was scarcely known to the Federal general, the advance in the presence of a vigilant enemy had necessarily to be made with much caution, and it will be seen that several days were occupied with manœu-

ring for position and other movements, before any practical results were obtained.

In marching upon Dallas, Gen. McPherson, still holding the Federal right, made a somewhat wide detour to the southwest through Van Wert, while Gen. Thomas took a course nearly due south, having Gen. Schofield on his left flank. The movement had scarcely commenced before it was detected by Gen. Johnston, who having the shorter line to Dallas, marched in the direction of that place to cover the approaches to Marietta. On the 25th Hooker's corps, approaching Pumpkin Vine Creek on the main Dallas road, came into collision with parties of Hood's and Hardee's corps, and a severe engagement took place for the possession of a point known as the New Hope Church, where three roads meet from Ackworth [four miles south of Allatoona by rail], Marietta, and Dallas. By means of earthworks the enemy successfully resisted the advance of Gen. Hooker, and the night closing with a heavy rain storm, no further attempt was made to force the position. In this affair Hooker sustained a loss of about six hundred killed and wounded. Gen. Sherman then ordered McPherson to move up to Dallas, and Gen. Thomas to make a bold demonstration against New Hope Church, while Schofield overlapped the enemy's right wing. Owing to the difficult nature of the country, the 26th and 27th were occupied in perfecting these dispositions, and on the evening of the latter day his line extended in a semicircular direction northeast from Dallas, the enemy having his right resting on the road from Ackworth to Dallas, at a point three miles northeast of New Hope Church, and his left at a point nearly due east of Dallas. Heavy skirmishing attended these manœuvres, but as the density of the surrounding woods rendered the use of artillery impracticable, the casualties were not numerous. On the 28th, just as Gen. McPherson was on the point of closing up to Gen. Thomas in front of New Hope Church, in order to enable a further development of the Federal left wing, he was attacked by a heavy rebel force, whose repeated and desperate, though fruitless assaults had the effect of checking temporarily the contemplated movement. The Federal troops, protected by their breastworks, finally drove the enemy back with a loss of upward of two thousand killed and wounded.

After a brief pause, interrupted only by the customary skirmishing, renewed orders were given for the shifting of the Federal line to the left. The movement was now effected with comparative ease, and on June 1st, the roads to Allatoona and Ackworth being occupied, the cavalry divisions of Stoneman and Garrard were pushed forward to Allatoona Pass, which was carried with slight loss. Orders were immediately given to rebuild the railroad bridge over the Etowah, at Etowah Station, and on June 4th Gen. Sherman moved directly upon Ackworth. This manœuvre compelled Gen.

Johnston to abandon his intrenchments at New Hope Church, and move westward to the railroad to cover Marietta, and on the 6th the Federal army reached Ackworth, where it rested for several days. Allatoona Pass was at once fixed upon as a secondary base, and put in a defensible condition. A well-informed correspondent, summing up the results of the campaign to this date, observes: "We have in a month's time, with a force not very much superior to his, forced the enemy back nearly one hundred miles, obliging him to abandon four different positions of unusual strength and proportions; have fought him six times; have captured twelve guns, three colors, over two thousand prisoners, with considerable forage, provisions, and means of transportation; have placed at least fifteen thousand of his men *hors de combat*, and have destroyed several important foundries, rolling mills, iron works, &c., at Rome, and in the Allatoona Mountains."

On the 8th Gen. Blair reached Ackworth with two divisions of the 17th army corps, which were attached to Gen. McPherson's command, and a brigade of cavalry belonging to Gen. Garrard's division. These accessions compensated for the Federal losses in battle, and the garrisons left at Resaca, Rome, Kingston, and Allatoona, and on the 9th the army, refreshed by three days' much needed rest, and abundantly supplied with stores, moved forward to Big Shanty, the next railroad station south of Ackworth. Between this place and Marietta intervenes a mountainous district of vast natural strength, having three detached and well-defined summits, where Gen. Johnston had made his next stand. Kenesaw Mountain, the most easterly of these summits, is a double-peaked eminence, about 1,200 feet high, lying directly north and northwest of Marietta, and west of the railroad, and sending out a spur for several miles in a northeasterly direction. West of Marietta, on the road to Dallas, is Lost Mountain, and midway between the latter and Kenesaw, half a mile further to the north, is Pine Mountain, a rugged, cone-shaped peak, which may be said to form the apex of a triangle, of which Kenesaw and Lost Mountains constitute the base. The three eminences are connected by several ranges of lesser heights, seamed with ravines, and covered with a dense growth of oak and hickory, and upon their summits the rebels had erected signal stations which commanded an excellent view of all the general operations of the Federal forces. As the latter drew in sight, the most assailable points in this succession of mountain fortresses appeared bristling with cannon, and the spurs were alive with men constructing earthworks, felling timber for obstructions, and otherwise preparing for an obstinate resistance. The rebel front extended westward from the railroad, on which their right rested, about four miles, and comprised several successive lines of intrenchments. They had also some works on the ridge east of the railroad. "The rebel

works," says the correspondent above quoted, "consisted of log barricades, protected by earth thrown against them, with a formidable abatis, and in many places a *chevaux-de-frise* of sharpened fence-rails besides. The thickness of this parapet (which really resembled a parallel) was generally six to eight feet at top, on the infantry line, and from twelve to fifteen feet thick at top where field guns were posted, or where fire from our artillery was anticipated."

The controlling point of the whole region is Kenesaw Mountain, which covers the railroad and the town of Marietta so effectually that a direct advance upon the latter place from the north would be well-nigh impossible. As the rebel lines were drawn, it constituted a stronghold or citadel in a deep reentrant, Pine and Lost Mountains and the connecting ridges being in the nature of outworks, useful in retarding the approach of an enemy, but not absolutely essential as portions of a system of defences. The accounts of prisoners, deserters, and scouts, placed Gen. Johnston's force at nine divisions of seven thousand men each, which was probably somewhat above the mark; in addition to which an auxiliary force of fifteen thousand Georgia militia, called out by Governor Brown, was placed at his disposal. The latter, though comparatively undisciplined, did good service as laborers on fortifications, and were capable of offering considerable resistance behind earthworks. Hardee's corps occupied their right, Polk the centre, and Hood the left. Their cavalry, estimated at fifteen thousand, operated on the flanks, and in the Federal rear.

The order of the Federal advance was somewhat different from that previously observed during the campaign. Gen. McPherson's command was now transferred to the extreme left, and moved toward Marietta, having its right on the railroad, while Gen. Schofield, shifting to the right wing, marched for Lost Mountain. Gen. Thomas kept his old position in the centre, and moved on Kenesaw and Pine Mountains. Gens. Stoneman and Garrard covered the right and left wings with their cavalry, and McCook guarded the communications and rear. From the 9th to the 14th the Federal lines were gradually closed up toward the rebel position, Sherman's first object being to break the line between Kenesaw and Pine Mountains; and on the latter day, during a heavy cannonade by the 4th corps, the rebel Gen. Polk, commanding on Pine Mountain, was killed by the explosion of a shell. On the same night, the rebels, perceiving that Hooker's corps was moving around the base of the mountain to cut off their retreat, abandoned their works without loss of guns or material of war, and on the morning of the 15th the position was quietly occupied by Stanley's division of the 4th corps. A paper was found affixed to a stake, stating, "Here Gen. Polk was killed by a Yankee shell;" and from the reports of deserters it appeared that Gens. Johnston and

Hardee were standing near Gen. Polk when he was struck, and narrowly escaped death.

Gen. Johnston now drew back his centre about a mile, to a strong line of intrenchments in the rugged hills connecting Kenesaw and Lost Mountains, keeping his flanks on these two eminences. The 15th, 16th, and 17th, were occupied with incessant skirmishing, which told upon the spirits and endurance of the Federal army almost as much as a pitched battle. "The enemy," says a correspondent, "seems to have marked out this whole country, from the Allatoona Mountains to the Chattahoochee, with line after line of rifle-pits and intrenchments and fortification. No sooner do we take possession of one formidable line of works than another confronts us, and each seems to be stronger than the preceding." On the extreme right during the afternoon of the 15th, Gen. Schofield carried the first line of the rebel works at the foot of Lost Mountain. During the 17th, the left and centre remained quiet, its line being so far advanced that a general engagement would otherwise have resulted. The right and right centre were pushed forward more than a mile, occupying a heavy line of intrenchments which the rebels had evacuated, and their main line at the foot of Lost Mountain, without serious loss. Toward evening, after much heavy skirmishing, the enemy's left was dislodged from the strong intrenchments at the Lost Mountain and in the rear of Kenesaw, and driven back upon his centre, the Federal army swinging around so as to threaten his flank. The movement occupied the whole day, and was rendered difficult by the thick growth of timber and underwood and the pertinacity of the skirmishers of the enemy. During the 18th, the right crowded the rebel left still further backward. The possession of the Dallas and Marietta road was secured, and the enemy pushed so hard at dusk that the 20th corps was in a line perpendicular to their own. The Federal troops met with considerable loss during the day, as in many places it was necessary to construct opposing works under the fiercest fire, especially from the enemy's sharpshooters; but from extreme right to extreme left the rebel skirmishers were steadily driven, and many of them killed and wounded. Several hundred prisoners were also taken. These made the number taken since the 11th about one thousand.

Apprehending that his position on Lost Mountain was in danger of being enveloped, Gen. Johnston, on the night of the 18th, under cover of the darkness and a violent storm of rain, drew in his left flank toward Kenesaw, which he made his salient, his right wing being thrown back to cover Marietta, and his left behind Nose's Creek, for the purpose of guarding his railroad communication with the Chattahoochee. The abandoned works on Lost Mountain, and the line of breastworks connecting it with Kenesaw, were at once occupied by the Federal troops, and during the 19th the

enemy was steadily pressed at all points. On the evening of that day our left held the base of Kenesaw on its north face, and the first ridge of hills running thence to the northeast, while our right lay to the west and rear of Kenesaw, and within three miles of Marietta. During these operations the rain fell almost incessantly, and the roads were rendered so heavy that a general movement would have been impossible. The most that could be attempted was to press the enemy without cessation, and harass him by constant skirmishing. The fact that under such discouraging circumstances so many strong positions were carried, testifies to the discipline and endurance of the troops.

The operations of the 20th and 21st were of a similar character to those above described, but on the 22d the enemy made a sudden attack upon portions of Gens. Hooker's and Schofield's troops on the Federal right, near what is known as the "Kulp House," and was handsomely repulsed, leaving his dead, wounded, and many prisoners behind him. The Federal centre was now established squarely in front of Kenesaw, but it required so many men to hold the railroad and the line running along the base of the mountain, that but a small force was left with which to attempt a flank movement to the right. So small was it that Gen. Sherman hesitated to push it vigorously toward the railroad, in the rear of Marietta, for fear that it might be altogether detached from the army and exposed to disaster. He therefore contented himself with extending his right along the enemy's flank, hoping that Gen. Johnston would thereby be induced to weaken his centre sufficiently to render an assault in that direction practicable. "Although inviting the enemy at all times," says Gen. Sherman in his official report, "to make such mistakes, I could not hope for him to repeat them after the examples of Dallas and the 'Kulp House;' and upon studying the ground, I had no alternative but to assault his lines or turn his position. Either course had its difficulties and dangers. And I perceived that the enemy and our own officers had settled down into a conviction that I would not assault fortified lines. All looked to me to 'outflank.' An army to be efficient must not settle down to one single mode of offence, but must be prepared to execute any plan which promises success. I waited, therefore, for the moral effect, to make a successful assault against the enemy behind his breastworks, and resolved to attempt it at that point where success would give the largest fruits of victory." The general point selected was the rebel left centre, in the belief that if this should be once forced, a road to the railroad below Marietta would be opened to the assaulting column, the enemy's retreat cut off, and their army overwhelmed in detail. Simultaneous with this an attack was directed to be made on Little Kenesaw by McPherson. The 27th was selected for the movement, and three days were allowed for preparation.

At 6 A. M., on the appointed day, Gen. Blair's (17th) corps, holding the extreme left of Gen. McPherson's line, moved toward the eastern point of the mountain to threaten the enemy's right, while Gen. Dodge's (16th) corps and Gen. Logan's (15th) corps assaulted the northern slope adjoining. The brunt of the attack was borne by three brigades of the 15th corps, which immediately scattered the enemy's skirmishers, and pushing on up the hill with impetuosity, carried part of the rebel rifle-pits. Some of the retreating enemy were captured while endeavoring to escape to a gorge which intervenes between the right and left halves of Kenesaw. Still pressing forward our troops arrived at the foot of a perpendicular cliff thirty feet high, from the crest of which the enemy formed in line of battle, poured a destructive plunging fire, and rolled down huge stones. Seeing it impossible to scale these cliffs our line halted, retired a short distance, and fortified on the extreme right. For the second and more important attack portions of Gen. Newton's division of the 4th corps, and of Gen. Davis's of the 14th corps, were selected. At a given signal the troops rushed forward with buoyant courage, charged up the face of the mountain amidst a murderous fire from a powerful battery on the summit and through two lines of abatis, carried a line of rifle-pits beyond, and reached the works. The colors of several regiments were planted before the latter, and some of the men succeeded in mounting the ramparts, but the deaths of Gens. Wagner and Harker, and the wounding of Gen. McCook, the destructive fire of both musketry and artillery, and the difficulty of deploying the long columns under such fire, rendered it necessary to recall the men. Gen. Newton's troops returned to their original line, while Gen. Davis's 2d brigade threw up works between those they had carried and the main line of the enemy, and there remained. The whole contest lasted little more than an hour, but cost Gen. Sherman nearly three thousand in killed and wounded, while the enemy, lying behind well-formed breastworks, suffered comparatively slight loss. During the day Gen. Schofield had sharp skirmishing with the enemy's left wing, and Gen. Cox's division of the 23d corps pushed forward to a point nine miles south of Marietta and three from the Chattahoochee; but the important fighting was in the centre. The failure of the attack is to be attributed to the fact that Gen. Johnston did not allow himself to be deceived by the lengthened line which Gen. Sherman opposed to him. From his elevated position on the summit of Kenesaw he could see plainly that the main posts still confronted him, and that the flanking movement to his left was not in earnest. Contenting himself, therefore, with sending a single corps to watch the right wing, he held his main body to repel the assault on his centre.

It was not, however, the intention of Gen. Sherman to rest long under the imputation of defeat, and he almost immediately commenced

preparations to turn the enemy's left, amusing Gen. Johnston, meanwhile, by a show of approaching his centre by saps. On July 1st, Gens. Hooker and Schofield advanced to the right some two miles, and on the 2d Gen. McPherson received orders to rapidly shift his whole force from the extreme left to the extreme right of the Federal lines, and push on to Nickajack Creek, which flows into the Chattahoochee, four miles below the railroad bridge. His place on the left, in front of Kenesaw, was occupied by Gen. Garrard's cavalry, while Gen. Stoneman's cavalry moved on his flanks to strike the river near Turner's Ferry, two miles and a half below the railroad bridge. The object of the movement was speedily detected by Gen. Johnston, who at once prepared to evacuate Kenesaw and fall back to the Chattahoochee. On the night of the 2d his rear guard abandoned the works which for upward of three weeks had been so resolutely assailed and defended, and before dawn of the 3d the Federal pickets occupied the crest of the mountain. Orders were immediately given for Gen. Thomas to move forward along the railroad to Marietta, and thence southward to the Chattahoochee, the rest of the army pressing rapidly toward Nickajack Creek to harass the enemy in flank and rear, and if possible to assail him in the confusion of crossing the river. Gen. Sherman himself, accompanying the Army of the Cumberland, entered Marietta at 9 o'clock on the morning of the 3d. During the retreat about two thousand prisoners, principally stragglers, fell into the hands of the Federal troops.

Gen. Johnston was too good a general to leave his movement uncovered, and Gen. Thomas pushing forward in pursuit, found him intrenched behind a fortified line at Smyrna, half way between the river and Marietta, having his flanks protected by Nickajack and Rottenwood Creeks. This, however, was but an advance line, his intention being to make his real stand in a series of works on the left bank of the river, and at the railroad bridge, where he had constructed a strong *tête de pont*. Again a flanking movement to the right was attempted, and with such success that on the night of the 4th Gen. Johnston fell back to the river, across which the main body of his army passed, Gen. Hardee's corps remaining on the right bank. Gen. Sherman then moved up to the Chattahoochee, and on the evening of the 5th Gens. Thomas's and McPherson's troops occupied a line extending from a short distance above the railroad bridge to the mouth of Nickajack Creek, while Gen. Schofield was posted in the rear near Smyrna as a reserve. Cavalry demonstrations were extended as far south as Campbelltown, fifteen miles below the railroad bridge. By these several manoeuvres, and particularly by the shifting of Gen. McPherson's troops to the right, Gen. Sherman aimed to convey to Gen. Johnston the impression that it was his *left* flank that was to be turned; and in pursuance of the same strategy the Fed-

eral general having determined that the enemy's position was unassailable except by a flank movement across the river, amused his enemy by demonstrations south of the railroad bridge, as if he intended crossing there. His real object was, by rapidly shifting masses of troops from extreme right to extreme left, to turn the enemy's right flank, and seize and hold the vital strategic points in that direction.

Gen. Schofield was, accordingly, directed to move due eastward from his position at Smyrna to the Chattahoochee, and to make a crossing near the mouth of Soap Creek, eight miles north of the railroad bridge. This was successfully accomplished on the 7th, with the capture of a gun and a number of prisoners, and a lodgment was effected on high ground on the left bank, and a substantial bridge constructed. At the same time Gen. Garrard occupied Roswell, a town near the Chattahoochee, nearly due north of Atlanta, and about seven miles above Gen. Schofield's crossing, where he destroyed some woollen and cotton mills which had supplied the rebel armies. In accordance with Gen. Sherman's orders he secured the ford at this place until a corps could be sent thither from the Army of the Tennessee on the right wing. On the 9th, while the enemy were amused by feints extending from Power's Ferry, four miles above the railroad bridge, to Turner's Ferry, three miles below it, a crossing was effected at Roswell, and the river firmly bridged; and under cover of the same demonstrations Gen. Howard was enabled to throw a bridge across at Power's Ferry. Gen. Johnston at length took the alarm, and during the night of the 9th gave orders for another retreat. His heavy guns were removed to Atlanta, seven miles distant, Gen. Hardee's corps was safely crossed to the left bank, and at daylight of the 10th the railroad bridge, the road bridge, and the pontoons, were in flames. The rebel army then fell back toward the fortifications of Atlanta, abandoning the whole line of the river, although its left wing kept in the neighborhood of Turner's Ferry, in the expectation of an attack from that quarter. Leaving Gen. Johnston to his delusion, Gen. Sherman rapidly and quietly moved the rest of the Army of the Tennessee behind the line of our forces, to its old position on the extreme left, and busied himself with strengthening his bridges and collecting supplies, which, as early as the 8th, were brought by railroad within a mile of the railroad bridge.

A week's rest was now allowed the army, a sufficient force being detailed to the left bank of the Chattahoochee to secure the several positions there and occupy the works of the enemy. These proved to be of the most formidable character, and had evidently cost many months of labor, the lines extending for upward of five and a half miles along the river, with almost impenetrable abatis in front. The sudden abandonment of them caused more consternation to the enemy than any previous disaster of

the campaign, as it was anticipated that here, in the immediate neighborhood of his supplies, Gen. Johnston could make a long and probably successful stand; or at least keep Gen. Sherman at bay until reinforcements from other parts of the confederacy should arrive. The catastrophe completed the long catalogue of complaints against this general which his enemies had sedulously arrayed before the public, and his removal was clamored for as indispensable to the salvation of the cause. The inhabitants of Atlanta in particular urged that the retreating policy had been followed far enough. It can hardly admit of a doubt, however, that he had conducted the campaign with prudence and skill, and considering his inferiority in numbers to Gen. Sherman, who was always in a condition to outflank him, he had probably delayed the Federal advance as long as it was possible.

On the 17th the whole army was across the Chattahoochee, with the exception of Gen. Davis's division of the 14th corps, left to watch the railroad bridge and the rear, and prepared to move upon Atlanta. The Army of the Cumberland now occupied the right wing and right centre, resting on the river just above the railroad bridge, the Army of the Ohio the left centre, and the Army of the Tennessee the left. In this order a grand right wheel was commenced, the right wing of the Army of the Cumberland serving as the pivot, which, on the evening of the 17th, brought the Federal line into a position about northeast of the railroad bridge, along what is known as the old Peach Tree road. On the 18th the left wing, swinging rapidly around, struck the Georgia Railroad, which connects Atlanta with Augusta, at a point two miles west of Stone Mountain, a vast elevation of granite towering over the surrounding country, fifteen miles northeast of Atlanta. With the aid of Gen. Garrard's cavalry, which moved on his flank, Gen. McPherson broke up a section of about four miles of the road, while Gen. Schofield occupied Decatur, six miles east of Atlanta, and Gen. Thomas brought his troops close up to Peach Tree Creek, a small stream rising five or six miles northeast of Atlanta, and flowing southwesterly into the Chattahoochee, near the railroad bridge. In these manœuvres our extreme left encountered little else than cavalry, supported by a few guns and a very inadequate force of infantry, an evidence that the enemy was still laboring under the delusion that his left and not his right was the real point of attack, and that Atlanta was to be approached from the southwest instead of from the northeast. Under these circumstances Gens. McPherson and Schofield were enabled, on the 19th, to pass with little trouble westward of Decatur, within the naturally strong defensive lines of Nance's and Peach Tree Creeks. Gen. Thomas, moving more directly from the north of Atlanta, found the enemy in larger force, but succeeded on the same day in crossing Peach Tree Creek in front of their intrenched lines.

The Federal line then held the arc of a circle, extending from the railroad between Atlanta and the river to some distance south of the Georgia Railroad, and in a direction north and northeast of Atlanta.

Meanwhile, on the 17th, Gen. Johnston had, in accordance with orders from the confederate war department, turned over his command to Gen. Hood, accompanying the act with the following farewell address to his troops:

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE, }
July 17, 1864.

In obedience to the orders of the War Department, I turn over to Gen. Hood the command of the Army and Department of Tennessee. I cannot leave this noble army without expressing my admiration of the high military qualities it has displayed so conspicuously—every soldierly virtue, endurance of toil, obedience to orders, brilliant courage.

The enemy has never attacked but to be severely repulsed and punished. You, soldiers, have never argued but from your courage, and never counted your fears. No longer your leader, I will still watch your career, and will rejoice in your victories. To one and all I offer assurances of my friendship, and bid an affectionate farewell.

J. E. JOHNSTON, General.

General Hood, on assuming command, issued the following address:

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE, }
July 18, 1864.

SOLDIERS: In obedience to orders from the War Department, I assume command of this Army and Department. I feel the weight of the responsibility so suddenly and unexpectedly devolved upon me by this position, and shall bend all my energies and employ all my skill to meet its requirements. I look with confidence to your patriotism to stand by me, and rely upon your prowess to wrest your country from the grasp of the invader, entitling yourselves to the proud distinction of being called the deliverers of an oppressed people. J. B. HOOD, General.

With this change in commanders commenced a change in the method of conducting the campaign, by which it was expected that the *morale* of the rebel army, weakened by the persistent Fabian policy of Gen. Johnston, would be fully reestablished. The time for retreating had passed when the chief city of western Georgia lay almost in the grasp of Gen. Sherman; and the rebel army, which, to give Gen. Johnston due credit, had been kept in a compact body, and had experienced but insignificant losses of guns or material of war, was to be launched, after their well-known tactics, in fierce assaults upon the invader. With this view the command was given to Gen. Hood, who had an unequalled reputation among their generals for energy and impetuous bravery.

On the 20th the Federal lines converged still more closely around the northern and eastern sides of Atlanta, and as a gap existed between Gens. Schofield and Thomas, Stanley's and Wood's division of Gen. Howard's corps were moved to the left to connect with Gen. Schofield, leaving Gen. Newton's division of Gen. Howard's corps, with inadequate force, to hold an important position on the road leading from Atlanta to Buckhead. This weak point was soon detected by Gen. Hood, who determined to signalize his appointment to the chief com-

mand by an assault which, at one blow, should retrieve the disasters of the campaign. Gen. Sherman also was well aware that his line was vulnerable at this point; and as there were indications during the morning of a concentration of troops on the enemy's right, as if to attack the left, orders were sent to Gen. Newton and the rest of the Army of the Cumberland to close rapidly up in the latter direction. Gen. Newton accordingly pushed forward to a prominent ridge, where, about two o'clock in the afternoon his troops stacked arms and made a temporary halt. Some prisoners, gathered up by the skirmishers, having reported that there was no considerable force of the enemy within a mile and a half, no apprehension of an attack seems to have been felt, and no preparations had been made beyond the accustomed piles of logs and rails, which the Federal troops constructed as a matter of course, whenever halting for any considerable time on new ground in presence of the enemy. Gen. Hood had meanwhile been massing his main body in the woods immediately in front of Gen. Newton and of Gen. Hooker, who was approaching from the right, expecting, by a sudden and overwhelming attack upon the columns while in motion, to cut the Federal army in twain. At 4 o'clock he advanced from his covert without skirmishers, and pushed directly for Gen. Newton's position. Notwithstanding the unexpectedness of his appearance, the Federal troops sprang instantly to their arms, and from behind their breastworks poured deliberate and deadly volleys into the dense masses of the Confederates, who were further kept in check by well-served batteries which Gen. Newton had posted on each of his flanks.

Almost at the instant of the attack on Gen. Newton, Gen. Geary's division of Gen. Hooker's corps was struck by the advancing columns of the enemy and thrown back in some confusion. But quickly rallying, it recovered its ground and kept the enemy in check until Ward's division could arrive to its assistance. The latter met the enemy's charge by a counter charge, and the two columns mingling in the shock of battle, the enemy, after a brief and fierce struggle, were driven back. Further to the right, and next to Geary, Williams' division, though attacked with desperation, stood manfully up to the work, and repulsed with heavy loss every onset of the enemy. After four hours of incessant fighting, the latter retired precipitately to his intrenchments, leaving on the field upward of six hundred dead, one thousand severely wounded, seven regimental flags, and a number of prisoners. His total loss was estimated by Gen. Sherman at five thousand. That of the Federal troops was one thousand nine hundred, of which the greater part fell on Gen. Hooker's corps, which fought wholly on open ground, and bore the brunt of the battle.

During the 21st the enemy kept within his intrenched position, commanding the open valley of Peach Tree Creek, his right beyond the

Georgia railroad to the east, and his left extended toward Turner's Ferry, at a general distance of four miles from Atlanta. In the course of the day a steep and strongly-fortified hill, about five hundred yards in advance of the skirmish line of the extreme Federal left, was gallantly carried by Gen. Leggett's division of the 17th corps, though with a loss of seven hundred and fifty men. Four desperate attempts were made by the division of Gen. Cleburne to regain the position, which completely commanded Atlanta and the two principal roads leading north and south from the city; but the enemy finally retired, baffled and severely crippled, leaving his dead and most of his wounded on the slope of the hill. He also lost about a hundred prisoners. Gen. McPherson immediately threw out working parties to the hill, with the intention of occupying it with strong batteries.

On the 22d the whole advanced line of the enemy was found abandoned, a circumstance which at first led Gen. Sherman to believe that they intended to surrender Atlanta without further contest. Gen. Hood, however, was only preparing to repeat, on a larger scale, the experiment of the 20th. By a show of retreating upon the city he hoped to decoy Gen. Sherman into a rapid advance, and then suddenly, with heavy masses of troops, to strike the Federal army while in motion, at such weak points as should present themselves. "It is now quite evident," says an army correspondent, writing on the 24th, "that the enemy, when they fell back out of their works, did not retire to the inner line around the city at all, though by taking that direction, and showing themselves in large numbers upon their works, they intended to make us believe they had done so. Gen. Hardee's corps, instead, marched during the night away round to the eastward, sweeping entirely the circle of the Federal left wing, and then, as we closed in around the city, and before the left wing had got in position, struck us upon the front, and also upon the flanks." Unsuspecting of this deep laid plan for his discomfiture, Gen. Sherman pushed his troops beyond the abandoned works, and found the enemy occupying in force a line of finished redoubts completely covering the approaches to Atlanta, and busily occupied in connecting these redoubts with curtains strengthened by rifle trenches, abatis, and chevaux-de-frise. This satisfied him that Gen. Hood meant to fight, and he immediately resumed the dispositions previously commenced for pressing the city on its eastern and northern fronts. As the Federal line closed in, the circle which it formed became so contracted, that the 16th corps, Gen. Dodge, which formed the right of the Army of the Tennessee, was thrown out of position, and fell behind the 15th corps, the latter thus closing up with Gen. Schofield, who held the centre. Gen. McPherson accordingly ordered Gen. Dodge to shift his position to the extreme left of the line, and occupy the hill carried by the 17th corps on

the previous day, and which was still held by Gen. Leggett's division. At about 11 A. M., soon after this movement had commenced, Gen. McPherson met the commander-in-chief near the centre of the lines. "He described to me," says Gen. Sherman in his official report, "the condition of things on his flank and the dispositions of his troops. I explained to him that if we met serious resistance in Atlanta, as present appearances indicated, instead of operating against it by the left, I would extend to the right, and that I did not want him to gain much distance to the left. He then described the hill occupied by Gen. Leggett's division of Gen. Blair's (17th) corps as essential to the occupation of any ground to the east and south of the Augusta railroad, on account of its commanding nature. I therefore ratified his disposition of troops, and modified a previous order I had sent him in writing to use Gen. Dodge's corps, thrown somewhat in reserve by the closing up of our line, to break up railroad, and I sanctioned its going, as already ordered by Gen. McPherson, to his left, to hold and fortify that position."

At noon Gen. McPherson rode off to the left, where the enemy appeared to be making a slight cavalry demonstration. He had not been gone half an hour when the desultory skirmishing which had been going on in that quarter all the morning suddenly deepened into a loud crash of musketry, followed by rapid artillery firing, indicating the presence of the enemy in large force. Gen. Hood had in fact secured the opportunity which he desired, and apprehending rightly that a demonstration was least expected on the left flank, had massed Gens. Hardee's and Stewart's corps under the cover of the thick woods which skirt the railroad, and was preparing to attack the 16th and 17th corps while they were getting into position, his forts meanwhile holding the Federal centre and right in check. Gen. Sherman instantly transmitted orders to Gens. Schofield and Thomas to keep the enemy employed on all parts of their front, and the former was directed to hold as large a force as possible in reserve to sustain the left, should aid be needed.

Gen. McPherson, upon reaching the left, found the 16th corps just about moving into position to prolong the flank, and temporarily facing to the left in a direction perpendicular to our main line. Between the right of the 16th and the left of the 17th corps was a wooded space of about half a mile which was not occupied by any troops. Shortly after twelve o'clock the enemy emerged from the dense woods in front of these corps in three solid columns, and marched directly upon the 16th corps for the purpose of turning our whole line. Three desperate assaults were repelled by Gen. Dodge, in the last of which the enemy suffered severe loss from the well-directed fire of the Federal batteries. Finding that the attempt to break the lines had failed at this point, Gen. McPherson

son took advantage of a temporary lull in the fighting to ride through the woods to Gen. Giles A. Smith's division, which held the left of the 17th corps. A report that the enemy in heavy force were moving around the left of the 17th corps, and were pushing in through the gap above mentioned, as existing between it and the 16th (the attack on the 16th corps having, in fact, been a feint to draw attention from the real point of attack), induced him to hasten in that direction. After reaching the gap he gave directions to the only member of his staff who accompanied him, the rest having been sent with orders to different portions of the field, to obtain a brigade from Gen. Logan's command and throw it across the gap, and then, with a single orderly, struck into a cross road leading directly to Gen. Smith's position. Already, however, unknown to him, the enemy's skirmish line had advanced close up to this road, and when it was too late to retrace his steps he found himself within fifty feet of it. The rebel officer in command called upon him to surrender, but he only dashed his horse to the right of the road, and was almost immediately brought to the ground, mortally wounded, by a volley from the skirmishers. His body was for a time in the possession of the enemy, but was subsequently recovered and brought within the Federal lines. Upon hearing of this disaster, Gen. Sherman ordered Gen. Logan to assume command of the Army of the Tennessee.

The brigade (Wangelin's) ordered up from Gen. Logan's corps, arrived in time to partially check the enemy, but could not prevent him from getting a portion of his force in the rear of the 17th corps, while heavy masses of troops, principally from Gen. Stewart's corps, were pushed against the works held by Gen. Leggett on the hill, wrested from Gen. Cleburne the day before, and which they were evidently determined to retake at any sacrifice. Sweeping up in their advance the working party engaged upon the fortifications, the enemy bore heavily against Gens. Smith's and Leggett's divisions, which, attacked in front and rear, were obliged to fire alternately from behind their own breastwork and the old abandoned parapet of the enemy. Gen. Leggett's troops clung firmly to their important position on the top of the hill, against the fortified angle of which the rebels dashed their columns with desperate but fruitless energy. Gen. Smith had meanwhile been compelled to abandon his more exposed lines, but by a skilful movement he gradually withdrew his men, regiment by regiment, to a new line connecting on the right with Gen. Leggett, his left, refused, facing to the southeast. In executing this movement he was obliged to abandon two guns to the enemy. Against this new formation of the 17th corps the enemy could make no impression, but recoiled again and again before the deadly fire of the Federal troops, which mowed down whole ranks at a time, and covered the ground and ditches with dead and

wounded men. A part of the rebel force that pushed for the gap between the 16th and 17th corps renewed the attack upon the right flank of the former, and upon its first advance captured a six-gun battery of the regular army, which was moving along unsupported and unapprehensive of danger. Gens. Sweeney's and Fuller's divisions soon checked the enemy's advance, and finally drove him back in confusion with the loss of many prisoners. At a critical period of the battle several of Gen. Sweeney's regiments were found to be without ammunition; but as it was indispensable that they should hold their position, their commander ordered them to meet the enemy with the bayonet, whereupon the latter broke and fled to the rear. At about half-past three o'clock the enemy desisted from his attack on our left flank, having gained no ground and suffered enormous losses, for which his capture of eight guns ill compensated.

Meanwhile two divisions of Gen. Wheeler's cavalry, with a section of artillery, took a wide circuit to the east and fell upon Decatur, now three miles in our rear, where Col. Sprague, with three infantry regiments, and a battery, was guarding a number of wagon trains filled with commissary and ammunition supplies. By a skilful disposition of his small force, Col. Sprague held the enemy in complete check until every wagon except three was sent to the rear of Gens. Schofield and Thomas, when he also fell back nearer the main body, having inflicted considerable damage upon the enemy and secured a number of prisoners. Gen. Wheeler's unopposed approach to Decatur was owing to the absence of Gen. Garrard's cavalry on a raid southeast of Atlanta.

About 4 p. m. a pause occurred in the battle, occasioned by Gen. Hood's massing troops for an assault upon Gen. Logan's (15th) corps, temporarily commanded by Gen. Morgan L. Smith, which held the right of the Army of the Tennessee behind substantial breastworks, immediately adjoining the 17th corps. At half-past 4 p. m., while just enough of an attack was maintained against the extreme left to occupy the attention of the troops in that quarter, a heavy force two lines deep marched directly toward the left of the 15th corps, driving before it a couple of regiments of skirmishers and capturing two guns. Protected by their works, Gen. Lightburn's brigade, which held this part of the line, for half an hour kept the enemy at bay by well-directed discharges from a battery of 20-pounder Parrotts; but a second strong rebel column now approached, which scarcely flattered beneath the volleys which ploughed its ranks in long furrows, and presently, to add to the perplexity of the situation, a third column was seen pouring in at the rear through a deep cut in the Georgia railroad. Finding that to hold their position would insure capture, Gen. Lightburn's troops retired in considerable confusion to the second line of breastworks, five hundred yards from

the main line, and the abandoned works, with two batteries, fell into the hands of the enemy. The position gained by the latter, if allowed to be held by them, threatened such serious disaster that Gen. Sherman sent orders to Gen. Logan, which had already been anticipated by that general, to make the 15th corps regain its lost ground at any cost. In aid of this movement he posted certain batteries from Gen. Schofield's corps where they could shell the enemy and the works beyond, so as to prevent reinforcements. Just as the enemy were preparing to turn the captured Parrotts upon the inner Federal line, the 15th corps, supported by portions of Gen. Schofield's troops, advanced with loud cheers upon them; and after a desperate struggle, in the course of which both Federals and rebels at times fought hand to hand across the narrow parapet, the latter were driven out of the works and the guns retaken. Their retreat was accelerated by repeated discharges of grape and canister among their crowded ranks which caused an awful carnage. With this repulse the battle terminated.

This was by far the bloodiest battle yet fought in Georgia; and notwithstanding the complete defeat of the enemy at all points, the Federal army sustained an irreparable loss in the death of Gen. McPherson, described by Gen. Sherman as "a noble youth, of striking personal appearance, of the highest professional capacity, and with a heart abounding in kindness that drew to him the affections of all men." The heroic conduct of the Army of the Tennessee during the whole battle was in no slight degree owing to the desire to avenge the fall of their commander. The total Federal loss on the 22d was 3,722, of whom much the greater portion were killed and wounded. The enemy's dead alone in front of our lines numbered 2,200 from actual count, and of these 800 were delivered to the enemy under flag of truce. Their total loss in killed was computed by Gen. Logan at 3,240. Upwards of 3,000 prisoners, including 1,000 wounded, and many commissioned officers of high rank, beside 18 colors and 5,000 small arms, fell into the hands of the Federals. The enemy of course removed many of their dead and most of their wounded. Owing to the closeness and desperation of the conflict, the proportion of wounded to killed was much less than usual—probably not more than two to one—which would make their loss in wounded about 6,500, and their total loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, more than 12,000.

As an important feature in his campaign, Gen. Sherman had contemplated, in addition to offensive operations against the enemy in the field, a series of expeditions against the several railroads by which supplies or reinforcements were brought to Atlanta. The first line of rebel communications selected to be broken was the railroad system connecting Atlanta with the southwest, comprising the Atlanta and West


Point and the West Point and Montgomery roads; and on July 10, in accordance with orders long previously issued by Gen. Sherman, a body of 2,000 Federal cavalry, under Gen. Rousseau, started from Decatur, Ala., for Opelika, a station on the latter of these roads, in eastern Alabama, whence a road diverges east to the important manufacturing town of Columbus, Geo., and thence to Macon. On the 13th Gen. Rousseau crossed the Coosa near the Ten Islands, routing a body of Alabama cavalry; passed rapidly through Talladega; skirmished again with the enemy at the crossing of the Tallapoosa; and on the 16th struck the West Point and Montgomery road at Loachapoka, ten miles west of Opelika. From this point to Opelika the railroad was well broken up, and the bridges and culverts destroyed, beside three miles of the branch toward Columbus and two toward West Point. Gen. Rousseau then turned north, and brought his command in safety to Marietta on the 22d, with a loss of less than thirty men.

The next operation was to more thoroughly disable the Georgia railroad. This had been broken up between Decatur and Atlanta as the army closed around the city; but as Gen. Sherman already contemplated prolonging his right toward the west and south of the town, and possibly abandoning his hold on the railroad, it became necessary to render the latter unavailable to the rebels. Gen. Garrard was therefore detached on the 21st, and ordered to proceed with his cavalry to Covington, forty-one miles east of Atlanta, and destroy the railroad bridges over the Yellow and Uleopauhatchee Rivers, branches of the Ocmulgee. He returned in safety on the 24th, having completely destroyed the two bridges, of which that over the Yellow River was 550 feet in length, and the other 250 feet, and broken up the railroad for seven miles between the two. He also burned three trains of cars, numerous depots, minor bridges and culverts, 2,000 bales of cotton, a new and extensive hospital building at Covington, and a considerable quantity of commissary and quartermaster's stores, and brought in with him several hundred prisoners and negroes and many horses. He lost but two men in the expedition.

Having rendered the Georgia road useless to the enemy Gen. Sherman next turned his attention to the Macon and Western Railroad, connecting Atlanta with Macon, and the only avenue left for the conveyance of stores and ammunition to the rebel army. For the purpose of effectually crippling this, he organized his cavalry in two large bodies, to move in concert from each wing of the army, while simultaneously with this movement the Army of the Tennessee was to be shifted by the right toward East Point, a station six miles south of Atlanta, where the Atlanta and West Point and Macon and Western Railroads diverge from a common track. Gen. Stoneman was transferred to the left flank, and assumed command of his own

cavalry and Gen. Garrard's, comprising an effective force of 5,000 men, while Gen. McCook, on the right flank, received his own command and the cavalry brought by Gen. Rousseau, amounting in the aggregate to 4,000 men. This joint force Gen. Sherman supposed was fully adequate to look after Gen. Wheeler's rebel cavalry, and to accomplish the work allotted to it, which was to rendezvous at Lovejoy's station on the Macon road, thirty miles south of Atlanta, on the night of July 28th, and there make such a complete destruction of the road as would lead to the speedy abandonment of Atlanta. At the moment of starting, Gen. Stoneman asked permission, after fulfilling his orders, to proceed with his own command to Macon and Andersonville, and release the Federal prisoners of war confined at those places. After some hesitation Gen. Sherman consented, stipulating, however, as a condition precedent, that the railroad should be effectually broken up and Wheeler's cavalry put *hors de combat*.

On the 27th the two expeditions started forth, Gen. Stoneman making for McDonough, a town about ten miles east of Lovejoy's, and sending Gen. Garrard to Flat Rock to cover his movement; and Gen. McCook keeping down the right bank of the Chattahoochee. Gen. Stoneman, however, almost immediately turned off toward the Georgia Railroad, which he followed as far as Covington, whence he struck due south, and to the east of the Ocmulgee, for Macon, distant sixty miles, in the neighborhood of which he arrived on the 30th. A detachment was sent east to Gordon, a station on the Georgian Central Railroad, where eleven locomotives and several trains loaded with quartermasters' stores were destroyed, together with several bridges between that place and Macon. But as he learned that the prisoners in Macon had on the previous day been sent to Charleston, Gen. Stoneman decided to return at once by the way he had come, without attempting to reach Macon or Andersonville. On the even-



ing of the 30th he turned northward again, skirmishing on the way; and on the morning of the 31st, when about twenty miles from Macon, encountered a heavy force in his front. The country being unfavorable for cavalry operations, he dismounted a portion of his command, and threw them forward as skirmishers, but soon found himself surrounded. After various fruitless attempts to make head against the enemy, he gave directions to the greater part of his force to break through the opposing lines, and escape in the readiest manner possible, while he, with several hundred men and a section of artillery, occupied the attention of the enemy. He was finally overpowered and compelled to surrender. Of his three brigades one arrived safely within the Federal lines, one was attacked and somewhat scattered on the way back, and the third was captured with him. Gen. Garrard meanwhile, after waiting at Flat Rock for orders from Stoneman until the 29th, moved toward Covington, and learning that he had gone south from that point, returned to his position on the left flank of the army.

Gen. McCook, after reaching the neighborhood of Rivertown on the Chattahoochee, crossed on pontoons and made for Palmetto Station on the Atlanta and West Point Railroad, twenty-five miles south of Atlanta, where he destroyed a section of the road. He thence moved eastward upon Fayetteville and burned five hundred wagons belonging to the rebel army, besides killing eight hundred mules and capturing several hundred quartermasters' men, and reached Lovejoy's on the night of the 28th. Here he destroyed a section of the Macon and Western Railroad, but, hearing nothing from Stoneman, and finding his progress eastward barred by a constantly accumulating force of the enemy, he turned off to the southwest, and at Newman, a station on the Atlanta and West Point Railroad fifteen miles south of Palmetto, encountered a rebel infantry force coming up from Mississippi to Atlanta. After a severe fight with superior numbers he finally cut his way out, with the loss of five hundred men and all his prisoners, and reached the Chattahoochee, whence he arrived safely within the Federal lines. The damage done by the several expeditions scarcely compensated for the severe losses sustained by Gens. Stoneman and McCook, amounting to upward of fifteen hundred. Owing to the failure of Gen. Stoneman to concentrate with Gen. McCook at Lovejoy's, the communications with Atlanta were only temporarily interrupted, and the enemy gained at least a month's respite from their final catastrophe.

While the cavalry raid was in progress, the Army of the Tennessee was, pursuant to instructions, drawn out of its intrenchments on the left flank and moved *en echelon* to a position on the extreme right, the right flank being held by Gen. Logan's corps. This movement was directed by Gen. Howard, who on the

27th, by appointment of the President, assumed the command vacated by the death of Gen. McPherson. The line was thus prolonged due south, facing east, and south of Proctor's Creek. Apprehending that Gen. Hood might again improve the opportunity to attack the Federal army while in motion, Gen. Sherman on the 28th disposed of Gen. Davis's division of the 14th corps so that it might be within easy supporting distance of the flank of Gen. Howard's new line, in the event of a strong rebel demonstration in that quarter. The enemy was not slow to perceive that Gen. Sherman was gradually swinging around toward the Macon road, and to oppose the movement massed his troops in the same direction. About noon of the 28th Gen. Stewart's corps came out from Atlanta by the Bell's Ferry road, and, forming on open ground, advanced in long parallel lines upon Gen. Logan's troops, fortunately sheltered behind the customary breastworks of rails, expecting to find his flank "in air." For upward of four hours a series of desperate attacks were made upon Gen. Logan's position, which were uniformly repelled with loss. Again and again the rebel columns were brought up to the breastworks, only to recoil shattered and bleeding before the steady volleys of musketry and the incessant discharges of grape and canister by which they were assailed. The few officers and men who reached the rail piles were either killed or taken prisoners. Shortly after 4 o'clock the enemy retired, leaving his killed and wounded in our hands, and having experienced a total loss estimated by Gen. Sherman at five thousand. The Federal loss was under six hundred. By some inadvertency Gen. Davis's division failed to come up to the support of Gen. Logan, whereby an opportunity was lost to strike the assailing rebel columns in flank, and probably to put them to a disastrous rout.

About this time Gens. Hooker and Palmer resigned the command of their corps, and were succeeded, the former by Gen. Slocum, and the latter by Gen. Jeff. C. Davis. Gen. Slocum, however, being absent at Vicksburg, the command of the 20th corps was temporarily assumed by Gen. A. S. Williams. Gen. D. S. Stanley also succeeded Gen. Howard in command of the 4th corps.

Failing to dislodge Hood from Atlanta in this way, Gen. Sherman next resorted to a further extension of his right, in the hope of flanking him in that direction. The 23d corps, supported by the 14th, was accordingly, on the 5th and 6th of August, transferred from the left to a position somewhat below Utoy Creek, a small affluent of the Chattahoochee, where it joined on Gen. Logan's right and formed our right flank. Demonstrations of more or less importance were made against the enemy's works during the prolongation of the right, but everywhere he was found well protected behind an admirably constructed line of defences, within which was a second line, comprising a series of redoubts of great thickness of parapet and good

command, connected throughout by a continuous infantry parapet, covered by abatis, cheveaux-de-frise, and other impediments of the most approved kind. This inner line of works completely enveloped Atlanta, and thence extended for six miles along the railroad track to East Point, previously described as jointly used by the Atlanta and West Point and Macon and Western Roads, thus covering the latter. The Federal army, instead of threatening the city on the north and east, was now so shifted from its first position that, while the extreme left covered the northern approaches to Atlanta, the extreme right was southwest of it, running parallel to the railroad. The Federal lines were drawn at an average distance of two and a half miles from the city, and between them and the rebel works intervened a narrow belt of rough and wooded country, the scene of constant skirmishing between the opposing forces. Thus Gen. Hood, though in inferior force to Gen. Sherman, having the advantage of interior lines, and acting strictly on the defensive behind almost impregnable works, seemed able to hold his position for an indefinite period. He had recently been reinforced by some veteran troops and by a body of several thousand Georgia militia, and had also added considerably to his fighting material by arming and organizing laborers, teamsters, and quartermasters' men, whose places were supplied by negroes.

A survey of the situation satisfied Gen. Sherman that Gen. Hood's lines could only be carried at a fearful sacrifice of life, and that in order to reach the Macon Road and control the supplies of Atlanta, a new movement by the right flank, in which nearly the whole army should participate, must be attempted. He accordingly determined to withdraw one corps to the intrenched position at the railroad bridge over the Chattahoochee, to protect communication with his base, and with his remaining troops to march rapidly to the southwest and south of the city, and crossing the two railroads, break them up in such a manner that immediate repairs would be impossible. The movement thus resolved itself into a raid, as the term is understood in modern military parlance, on a truly gigantic scale, and, if successful, would probably cut off Atlanta for months from its supplies and compel its evacuation. It involved, in brief, to use Gen. Sherman's own words, "the necessity of raising the siege of Atlanta, taking the field with our main force, and using it against the communications of Atlanta, instead of against its intrenchments." By the 16th of August his plans were completed; but, before commencing to put them in execution, he ascertained that Gen. Wheeler, with nearly the whole force of rebel cavalry, had moved round in a northeasterly direction to cut his communications between Marietta and Chattanooga. Thinking that in the absence of Gen. Wheeler the Federal cavalry might perhaps accomplish the task he had marked out for the whole army, he temporarily

suspended his orders and directed Gen. Kilpatrick, recently returned to duty, to move across the railroads and tear them up thoroughly. Gen. Kilpatrick started on the 18th with a force of five thousand men, struck the Atlanta and West Point Road at Fairburn and the Macon road at Jonesboro, and Lovejoy's; but, being harassed by the enemy at each place, could effect no permanent damage. He finally returned on the 22d by way of Decatur, bringing one hundred prisoners, three flags, and one piece of artillery.

This satisfied Gen. Sherman that his original plan must be adhered to, and preparations for carrying it out were pressed with renewed activity. A battery of 4½-inch rifled guns was meanwhile put in position, and by its well-directed discharges impressed the enemy with the belief that regular siege operations were in progress, thus aiding to mask the new movement. It also materially interrupted the running of the rebel supply trains on the Macon road, and was the cause of several conflagrations in Atlanta. Notwithstanding the latter, the enemy held resolutely to their forts, with the evident intention of suffering the city to perish rather than abandon their position. On the night of the 25th, every thing being in readiness, and the wagons loaded with fifteen days' provisions, the 4th and 20th corps, occupying the extreme left, were moved quietly out of their intrenchments, and marched, the former to a position in the rear of the Army of the Tennessee, and the latter to the railroad bridge over the Chattahoochee and the adjacent ferries, which it was appointed to guard. On the succeeding night the 4th corps was moved southward toward Red Oak and Fairburn stations, on the Atlanta and West Point road, twelve or fifteen miles south of Atlanta, followed by the Army of the Tennessee, and on the morning of the 27th the whole front of the city was uncovered, except that portion occupied by the 23d corps, which alone remained within its intrenchments. In like manner the 23d corps was withdrawn from its intrenchments and formed the left of the new line, of which the Army of the Cumberland held the centre, and the Army of the Tennessee the right. These operations were viewed with undisguised wonder by the rebel troops from within their fortifications, and seemed to give color to the belief that Gen. Sherman had commenced a retreat. A skirmish line sent out toward the bridge, after the withdrawal of Gens. Thomas and Howard, encountered the 20th corps intrenched behind a strong *tête de pont*, and returned more bewildered if possible than before.

On the morning of the 28th, the Armies of the Cumberland and the Tennessee lay between Fairburn and Red Oak in a line facing east and north. The day was devoted to a thorough destruction of the West Point Railroad between these points, and some distance above. "It was done," says Gen. Sherman, "with a

will. Twelve and a half miles were destroyed, the ties burned, and the iron rails heated and tortured by the utmost ingenuity of old hands at the work. Several cuts were filled up with trunks of trees, with logs, rock and earth, intermingled with loaded shells prepared as torpedoes, to explode in case of an attempt to clear them out." On the 30th the army was again in motion in a southeasterly direction, aiming to strike the Macon Railroad from Rough and Ready to Jonesboro. Gen. Hood now began to understand the object of Gen. Sherman's movement; but still ignorant, apparently, that nearly the whole Federal army was moving upon his communications, he contented himself with sending Gens. Hardee and S. D. Lee's corps to Jonesboro, where they intrenched, remaining in Atlanta with Gen. Stewart's corps and the militia. Gen. Howard, marching due east from Fairburn, arrived within half a mile of Jonesboro on the evening of the 30th; but encountering Gens. Hardee and Lee, he halted for the night in a strong position, and proceeded to throw up intrenchments. The remainder of the army, moving *en echelon* to the left, did not succeed in reaching the railroad.

Meanwhile the 15th corps, having seized a prominent hill which formed the key to the enemy's position, took post in the centre of the Army of the Tennessee, the 16th somewhat retired, holding the extreme right, and the 17th the left. The 15th corps spent the night in intrenching, and early next day, before the right and left flanks had taken up their advanced position, the enemy burst in masses on the 15th corps, but were steadily and repeatedly repulsed, losing several general officers, including Major-Gen. Anderson, mortally wounded, and five colonels and majors (wounded) taken prisoners, besides upward of three thousand rank and file killed, wounded, and captured. The Federal loss was slight, as the men fought behind breastworks. It was observed that the rebel attacks lacked the enthusiasm and dash which had characterized the severe assaults before Atlanta. During the 31st the 23d and 4th corps reached the railroad near Rough and Ready, and commenced destroying it north and south from that point, in the same thorough manner which had characterized their operations on the West Point road.

Upon the repulse of the enemy on the afternoon of the 31st, Gen. Sherman directed Gen. Howard to hold him in his fortifications until the remainder of the army could close in upon him. The 14th corps only, having a comparatively short distance to travel, succeeded in getting up to Jonesboro on September 1st, the other two being too far from the field, and too much embarrassed by the difficult character of the country and the want of good roads, to move with rapidity. At 4 p. m. the 14th corps, which had taken position on the left of the Army of the Tennessee, was ordered to assault the enemy's works, Gen. Sherman fearing that, if he waited for the arrival of Gens. Schofield and

Stanley, darkness might intervene, and the enemy escape without a fight. The troops steadily advanced under a withering fire of musketry and artillery, and after a desperate conflict of two hours drove the enemy from their works, capturing two batteries—one of them Loomis' battery, captured at Chickamauga, some battle flags, and a large number of prisoners, including Gen. Govan and the greater part of his brigade, forming part of the celebrated "fighting division" of Gen. Cleburne. Darkness now setting in, Gen. Hardee was enabled to fall back seven miles to Lovejoy's, where he intrenched himself in a naturally strong position. Had Gens. Stanley and Schofield succeeded in coming up in season, he would in all probability have been overwhelmed and forced to capitulate.

Meanwhile, in Atlanta on the 1st, all was excitement and consternation, as it gradually transpired that the main body of the Federal army lay between the city and Gen. Hardee. Gen. Hood at once gave orders for the evacuation of his works, and the destruction of such stores and ammunition as could not be removed. The removal of all the supplies and ammunition that the transportation facilities of the army would permit commenced early in the morning, and was continued throughout the day. Large quantities of provisions were also distributed to the people, and the several bodies of troops, as they were withdrawn from the defences and went through the city, were allowed access to the public stores. The rolling stock of the railroads, consisting of about one hundred cars and six engines, was concentrated near the rolling mill before dark, by which time all the troops had passed through, with the exception of the rear guard, left to prevent straggling. The cars were then laden with the surplus ammunition, and together with the locomotives, depots, and store houses, and every thing, in fine, which would be of use to the Federal army, fired about midnight. The flames lit up the heavens for many miles, and the explosion of the ordnance trains was distinctly heard by the army in front of Jonesboro, and by Gen. Slocum at his position on the Chattahoochee. The latter sent out a heavy reconnoitring column at daybreak on the 2d, which, pushing forward without opposition, entered the city at 9 o'clock, where it was met by the mayor, who made a formal surrender, at the same time requesting protection for non-combatants and private property. This having been freely granted, Gen. Ward's division marched into the city with drums beating and colors displayed, and the national flag was raised over the Court House amidst hearty cheers. Eleven heavy guns were found in the fortifications, beside a number subsequently exhumed; and among the additional spoils were three uninjured locomotives, three thousand muskets in good order, a quantity of tobacco, and other stores. Of the valuable machinery in the workshops part had been removed to

Augusta and Macon, and part destroyed. "We have," says Gen. Sherman, in his despatch announcing the capture of Atlanta, "as the result of this quick, and, as I think, well-executed movement, twenty-seven guns, over three thousand prisoners, and have buried over four hundred rebel dead, and left as many wounded that could not be removed. The rebels have lost, besides the important city of Atlanta and their stores, at least five hundred dead, twenty-five hundred wounded, and three thousand prisoners; whereas our aggregate loss will not foot up fifteen hundred. If that is not success I don't know what is."

Of the losses in killed, wounded, and missing, sustained by the Federal army up to this period, the following table, based upon the most trustworthy information at present attainable, may be considered to give a fair estimate:

Skirmishing from Chattanooga to Resaca.....	1,200
Battle of Resaca.....	4,500
Skirmishing from Resaca to Allatoona.....	500
Battles around Dallas.....	8,000
Battle of Kennesaw Mountain, July 27th.....	3,000
Lesser contests around Kennesaw, June 9th to July 1st	4,500
Skirmishing between Kennesaw and the Chattahoochee	1,000
Battle of July 20th.....	1,900
" of July 22d.....	3,700
" of July 28th.....	600
Skirmishing from July 17th to August 28th.....	3,000
Fighting at Jonesboro, August 31st and Sept. 1st.....	1,500
Losses in cavalry raids.....	2,000
	<u>30,400</u>

Of the total number, less than one-sixth come under the head of missing. The loss in cannon was fifteen pieces—ten in the battle of July 22d, three taken from Stoneman, and two abandoned by McCook. Notwithstanding these casualties, amounting to nearly a third of the force with which he set out from Chattanooga, Gen. Sherman was enabled to report, after the fall of Atlanta, that by the arrival of reinforcements, recruits, furloughed men and convalescents, he had maintained his original strength. Of the rebel losses it is more difficult to form an estimate, but the following is believed to be reasonably correct:

Loss in skirmishing from Chattanooga to Atlanta....	6,000
Battles at Resaca.....	2,500
" around Dallas.....	3,500
Battle of Kennesaw Mountain.....	1,000
" of July 20th.....	5,000
" of July 22d.....	12,000
" of July 28th.....	5,500
Lesser contests around Atlanta.....	1,500
Battles at Jonesboro.....	5,000
	<u>42,000</u>

The enemy lost more than twenty general officers, killed and wounded, according to their own showing, besides from forty to fifty pieces of cannon, of which eight were 64-pounders, and over 25,000 stand of small arms. Their loss in colors was also much greater than that of the Federals.

Gen. Hood, upon abandoning Atlanta, directed his march toward McDonough, whence moving west he succeeded in forming a junction with Gens. Hardee and Lee. On the 2d Gen. Sherman followed in Gen. Hardee's traces, but finding him intrenched in a position of great strength, and learning the capitulation of the

city, he desisted from further attack, and on the 4th gave orders for the army to proceed by easy marches in the direction of Atlanta. On the 8th the Army of the Cumberland encamped around the city, that of the Tennessee about East Point, and that of the Ohio at Decatur. Atlanta itself was held by Gen. Slocum's (20th) corps.

Previous to the departure of the cavalry under Gen. Wheeler, on their raid against the railroad communications of Gen. Sherman, as mentioned above, the latter had enjoyed a comparative immunity from such demonstrations. This was mainly the result of the skilful dispositions which he had made for guarding the road between Atlanta and Chattanooga. In the latter place he had also wisely accumulated a sufficient quantity of stores to render him in a measure independent of Nashville, in the event of any interruption of travel between the two places. He consequently felt little immediate uneasiness upon hearing of the departure of Gen. Wheeler, but rather congratulated himself that he was at a critical moment superior to the enemy in cavalry. Gen. Wheeler left Atlanta soon after the miscarriage of Gen. Stoneman's raid, with a mounted force of six thousand men, and moving around to the north-east, struck the Western and Atlanta road near Adairsville, just midway between Atlanta and Chattanooga. Here he succeeded in capturing nine hundred beef cattle. He next approached the road at Calhoun, nine miles north of Adairsville, where he committed some damage, and on August 14th made his appearance at Dalton, of which place, "to prevent the effusion of blood," he demanded the immediate and unconditional surrender. Col. Leibold, who held the town with five hundred or six hundred men, replied that he had "been placed there to defend the post, but not to surrender." Apprising Gen. Steedman, in command at Chattanooga, of his danger, he kept Gen. Wheeler at bay until the next day, when reinforcements arrived from that place, by whose aid the enemy were driven off in confusion. Gen. Wheeler then passed up into East Tennessee, leaving the Federals to repair at their leisure the damage he had done, and in a few days the railroad was again in good running order between Atlanta and Chattanooga. He subsequently destroyed a considerable portion of the road between Chattanooga and Knoxville, and moving west during the latter part of August and first week of September, made strenuous efforts to interrupt railroad and telegraph communication between Chattanooga and Nashville; but being pursued by Gens. Rousseau, Steedman, and Granger, he was speedily driven toward Florence, and thence into Northern Alabama. The damage committed by him between Chattanooga and Atlanta was so slight, that Gen. Sherman, writing from the latter place on September 15th, was enabled to say, "Our roads and telegraphs are all repaired, and the cars run with regularity and speed."

The news of the capture of Atlanta reached

Washington on Sept. 2d, and immediately elicited the following expression of thanks from President Lincoln :

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, Sept. 2.

The national thanks are tendered by the President to Maj.-Gen. Sherman and the gallant officers and soldiers of his command, before Atlanta, for the distinguished ability, courage, and perseverance displayed in the campaign in Georgia, which, under Divine Power, resulted in the capture of the city of Atlanta.

The marches, battles, sieges, and other military operations that has signalled this campaign, must render it famous in the annals of war, and have entitled those who have participated there, to the applause and thanks of the Nation.

(Signed)

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

Orders were also given for the firing of national salutes at the principal arsenals, and the 11th of September was appointed a day of solemn national thanksgiving for the signal successes of Gen. Sherman in Georgia, and of Admiral Farragut at Mobile. The following is Gen. Sherman's congratulatory address to his troops :

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISS.,

IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GA., Sept. 8. }

Special Field Orders No. 68.

The officers and soldiers of the Armies of the Cumberland, Ohio, and Tennessee, have already received the thanks of the nation through its President and Commander-in-Chief; and it now remains only for him who has been with you from the beginning, and who intends to stay all the time, to thank the officers and men for their intelligence, fidelity, and courage displayed in the campaign of Atlanta.

On the first of May our armies were lying in garri-son, seemingly quiet, from Knoxville to Huntsville, and our enemy lay behind his rocky-faced barrier at Dalton, proud, defiant, and exulting. He had had time since Christmas to recover from his discomfiture on the Mission Ridge, with his ranks filled, and a new commander-in-chief, second to none of the Confederacy in reputation for skill, sagacity, and extreme popularity.

All at once our armies assumed life and action, and appeared before Dalton; threatening Rocky Face we threw ourselves upon Resaca, and the rebel army only escaped by the rapidity of its retreat, aided by the numerous roads with which he was familiar, and which were strange to us.

Again he took post at Allatoona, but we gave him no rest, and by a circuit toward Dallas and subsequent movement to Ackworth, we gained the Allatoona Pass. Then followed the eventful battles about Kenesaw, and the escape of the enemy across Chattahoochee River.

The crossing of the Chattahoochee and breaking of the Augusta road was most handsomely executed by us, and will be studied as an example in the art of war. At this stage of our game our enemies became dissatisfied with their old and skilful commander, and selected one more bold and rash. New tactics were adopted. Gen. Hood first boldly and rapidly, on the 20th of July, fell on our right at Peach Tree Creek, and lost.

Again, on the 22d, he struck our extreme left, and was severely punished; and finally again, on the 28th, he repeated the attempt on our right, and that time he must have been satisfied, for since that date he has remained on the defensive. We slowly and gradually drew our lines about Atlanta, feeling for the railroads which supplied the rebel army and made Atlanta a place of importance.

We must concede to our enemy that he met these efforts patiently and skilfully, but at last he made the mistake we had waited for so long, and sent his cavalry to our rear, far beyond the reach of recall. Instantly our cavalry was on his only remaining

road, and we followed quickly with our principal army, and Atlanta fell into our possession as the fruit of well-concerted measures, backed by a brave and confident army.

This completed the grand task which had been assigned us by our Government, and your General again repeats his personal and official thanks, to all the officers and men composing this army, for the indomitable courage and perseverance which alone could give success.

We have beaten our enemy on every ground he has chosen, and have wrested from him his own Gate City, where were located his foundries, arsenals, and workshops, deemed secure on account of their distance from our base, and the seeming impregnable obstacles intervening. Nothing is impossible to an army like this, determined to vindicate a Government which has rights wherever our flag has once floated, and is resolved to maintain them at any and all costs.

In our campaign many, yea, very many of our noble and gallant comrades have preceded us to our common destination, the grave; but they have left the memory of deeds on which a nation can build a proud history. Gens. McPherson, Harker, McCook, and others dear to us all, are now the binding links in our minds that should attach more closely together the living, who have to complete the task which still lies before us in the dim future.

I ask all to continue as they have so well begun the cultivation of the soldierly virtues that have ennobled our own and other countries. Courage, patience, obedience to the laws and constituted authorities of our Government; fidelity to our trusts, and good feeling among each other; each trying to excel the other in the practice of those high qualities, and it will then require no prophet to foretell that our country will in time emerge from this war, purified by the fires of war, and worthy its great founder, Washington. W. T. SHERMAN, Maj.-Gen. Com'ng.

Upon arriving in Atlanta, Gen. Sherman determined that the exigencies of the service required that the place should for the present be appropriated exclusively for military purposes, and orders were immediately issued for the departure of all civilians, both male and female, excepting those in the employment of the Government. The following conveys the intentions of Gen. Sherman :

HEADQUARTERS POST OF ATLANTA, }

ATLANTA, GA., Sept. 5, 1864. }

General Order No. 3.

All families living in Atlanta, the male representatives of which are in the service of the Confederate States, or who have gone south, will leave the city within five days. They will be passed through the lines and go south.

All citizens from the North, not connected with the army, and who have not authority from Maj.-Gen. Sherman or Maj.-Gen. Thomas to remain in the city, will leave within the time above mentioned. If found within the city after that date, they will be imprisoned.

All male residents of this city, who do not register their names with the city Provost-Marshal within five days and receive authority to remain here, will be imprisoned. WM. COGSWELL,

Col. Commanding Post.

A truce of ten days was accordingly proposed, in a letter from the Federal general to Gen. Hood, then encamped near Lovejoy's, to which the latter made the following reply :

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE, }

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF, Sept. 9, 1864. }

Major-Gen. Sherman, Comm'g U.S. forces in Georgia :
GENERAL: Your letter of yesterday's date, borne by James W. Ball and James R. Crew, citizens of

Atlanta, is received. You say therein: "I deem it to be to the interest of the United States that the citizens residing in Atlanta should remove," etc. I do not consider that I have any alternative in the matter. I therefore accept your proposition to declare a truce of ten days, or such time as may be necessary to accomplish the purpose mentioned, and shall render all the assistance in my power to expedite the transportation of citizens in this direction. I suggest that a staff officer be appointed by you to superintend the removal from the city to Rough and Ready, while I appoint a similar officer to control their removal further south; that a guard of 100 men be sent by either party, as you propose, to maintain order at that place; and that the removal begin next Monday.

And now, sir, permit me to say that the unprecedented measure you propose, transcends in studied and ingenious cruelty all acts ever before brought to my attention in the dark history of war.

In the name of God and humanity I protest, believing that you will find you are expelling from their homes and firesides the wives and children of a brave people.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. B. HOOD, General.

Official: McA. HUMMETT, Lieutenant, etc.

Accompanying the above letter was one addressed to Col. Calhoun, Mayor of Atlanta, as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE, }
September 2, 1864. }

Hon. James M. Calhoun, Mayor:

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter touching the removal of the citizens of Atlanta, as ordered by Gen. Sherman. Please find inclosed my reply to Gen. Sherman's letter. I shall do all in my power to mitigate the terrible hardships and misery that must be brought upon your people by this extraordinary order of the Federal commander. Transportation will be sent to Rough and Ready to carry the people and their effects further South.

You have my deepest sympathy in this unlooked for and unprecedented affliction.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. B. HOOD, General.

The following is Gen. Sherman's reply to Gen. Hood:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, }
IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GA., Sept. 10, 1864. }

Gen. J. B. Hood, Commanding Army of the Tennessee, Confederate Army:

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this date at the hands of Messrs. Ball and Crew, consenting to the arrangements I had proposed to facilitate the removal south of the people of Atlanta, who prefer to go in that direction. I inclose you a copy of my orders, which will, I am satisfied, accomplish my purpose perfectly. You style the measure proposed "unprecedented," and appeal to the dark history of war for a parallel as an act of "studied ungenerous cruelty." It is not unprecedented; for Gen. Johnston himself very wisely and properly removed the families all the way from Dalton down, and I see no reason why Atlanta should be excepted. Nor is it necessary to appeal to the dark history of war, when recent and modern examples are so handy. You, yourself, burned dwelling-houses along your parapet, and I have seen to-day fifty houses that you have rendered uninhabitable, because they stood in the way of your forts and men.

You defended Atlanta on a line so close to the town, that every cannon-shot, and many musket-shots from our line of intrenchments, that overshot their mark, went into the habitations of women and children. Gen. Hardee did the same at Jonesboro, and Gen. Johnston did the same, last summer, at

Jackson, Miss. I have not accused you of heartless cruelty, but merely instance those cases of very recent occurrence, and could go on and enumerate hundreds of others, and challenge any fair man to judge which of us has the heart of pity for the families of "brave people." I say it is a kindness to those families of Atlanta to remove them now at once from scenes that women and children should not be exposed to; and the brave people should scorn to commit their wives and children to the rude barbarians, who thus, as you say, violate the laws of war, as illustrated in the pages of its dark history.

In the name of common sense, I ask you not to appeal to a just God in such a sacrilegious manner—you who, in the midst of peace and prosperity, have plunged a nation into civil war, "dark and cruel war," who dared and badgered us to battle, insulted our flag, seized our arsenals and forts that were left in the honorized custody of a peaceful Ordnance Sergeant, seized and made prisoners of war the very garrisons sent to protect your people against negroes and Indians, long before any overt act was committed by the "to you" hateful Lincoln government, tried to force Kentucky and Missouri into the rebellion in spite of themselves, falsified the vote of Louisiana, turned loose your privateers to plunder unarmed ships, expelled Union families by the thousand, burned their houses, and declared by act of Congress the confiscation of all debts due Northern men for goods had and received. Talk thus to the marines, but not to me who have seen these things, and will this day make as much sacrifice for the peace and honor of the South as the best-born Southerner among you. If we must be enemies, let us be men, and fight it out as we propose to-day, and not deal in such hypocritical appeals to God and humanity. God will judge me in good time, and He will pronounce whether it be more humane to fight with a town full of women, and the families of a "brave people" at our backs, or to remove them in time to places of safety among their own friends and people.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. T. SHERMAN, Maj.-Gen. Com'g.

The following is the truce agreed upon between the two generals:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION, MISSISSIPPI, }
IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GA., Sept. 10, 1864. }

Special Field Order No. 70.

1. Pursuant to an agreement between Gen. J. B. Hood, commanding the Confederate forces in Georgia, and Maj.-Gen. W. T. Sherman, commanding this Army, a truce is hereby declared to exist from daylight of Monday, September 12, until daylight of Thursday, September 22—ten (10) full days—at a point on the Macon Railroad known as Rough and Ready, and the country round about for a circle of two (2) miles radius, together with the roads leading to and from, in the direction of Atlanta and Lovejoy station, respectively, for the purpose of affording the people of Atlanta a safe means of removal to points south.

2. The Chief Quartermaster at Atlanta, Col. Easton, will afford all the facilities he can spare to remove them, south all the facilities he can spare to remove them, comfortably and safely, with their effects, to Rough and Ready station, using cars and ambulances for that purpose; and commanders of regiments and brigades may use their regimental and staff teams to carry out the object of this order; the whole to cease after Wednesday, 21st inst.

3. Maj.-Gen. Thomas will cause a guard to be established on the road out beyond the camp ground, with orders to allow all wagons and vehicles to pass that are used manifestly for this purpose; and Maj.-Gen. Howard will send a guard of one hundred men, with a field officer in command, to take post at Rough and Ready during the truce, with orders, in concert with a guard from the Confederate army of like size, to maintain the most perfect order in that vicinity

during the transfer of these families. A white flag will be displayed during the truce, and a guard will cause all wagons to leave at 4 P. M. of Wednesday, the 21st instant, and the guard to withdraw at dark, the truce to terminate the next morning.

By order of Maj.-Gen. W. T. SHERMAN.
L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp.

The civic authorities made a final appeal to Gen. Sherman to revoke or modify his order, which, with his reply, is here appended:

ATLANTA, GA., September 11, 1864.

Major-General W. T. Sherman :

SIR: The undersigned, Mayor, and two members of Council for the City of Atlanta, for the time being the only legal organ of the people of the said city to express their wants and wishes, ask leave most earnestly but respectfully to petition you to reconsider the order requiring them to leave Atlanta. At first view it struck us that the measure would involve extraordinary hardship and loss, but since we have seen the practical execution of it, so far as it has progressed, and the individual condition of many of the people, and heard the statements as to the inconvenience, loss, and suffering attending it, we are satisfied that the amount of it will involve in the aggregate consequences appalling and heart-rending.

Many poor women are in an advanced state of pregnancy; others having young children, whose husbands, for the greater part, are either in the army, prisoners, or dead. Some say: "I have such a one sick at my house; who will wait on them when I am gone?" Others say: "What are we to do; we have no houses to go to, and no means to buy, build, or rent any; no parents, relatives, or friends to go to." Another says: "I will try and take this or that article of property; but such and such things I must leave behind, though I need them much." We reply to them: "Gen. Sherman will carry your property to Rough and Ready, and then Gen. Hood will take it thence on;" and they will reply to that: "But I want to leave the railroad at such a place, and cannot get conveyance from thence on."

We only refer to a few facts to illustrate, in part, how this measure will operate in practice. As you advanced, the people north of us fell back, and before your arrival here a large portion of the people here had retired south; so that the country south of this is already crowded, and without sufficient houses to accommodate the people, and we are informed that many are now staying in churches and other out-buildings. This being so, how is it possible for the people still here (mostly women and children) to find shelter, and how can they live through the winter in the woods? no shelter or subsistence; in the midst of strangers who know them not, and without the power to assist them much if they were willing to do so.

This is but a feeble picture of the consequences of this measure. You know the woe, the horror, and the suffering cannot be described by words. Imagination can only conceive of it, and we ask you to take these things into consideration. We know your mind and time are continually occupied with the duties of your command, which almost defers us from asking your attention to the matter, but thought it might be that you had not considered the subject in all of its awful consequences, and that, on reflection, you, we hope, would not make this people an exception to mankind, for we know of no such instance ever having occurred—surely not in the United States. And what has this helpless people done, that they should be driven from their homes, to wander as strangers, outcasts, and exiles, and to subsist on charity?

We do not know as yet the number of people still here. Of those who are here, a respectable number, if allowed to remain at home, could subsist for several months without assistance; and a respectable

number for a much longer time, and who might not need assistance at any time.

In conclusion, we most earnestly and solemnly petition you to reconsider this order, or modify it, and suffer this unfortunate people to remain at home and enjoy what little means they have.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES M. CALHOUN, Mayor.

E. E. RAWSON, }
S. C. WELLS, } Councilmen.

GEN. SHERMAN'S REPLY.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE }
MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, }
ATLANTA, GA., September 12, 1864. }

James M. Calhoun, Mayor, E. E. Rawson, and S. C. Wells, representing City Council of Atlanta :

GENTLEMEN: I have your letter of the 11th, in the nature of a petition, to revoke my orders removing all the inhabitants from Atlanta. I have read it carefully, and give full credit to your statements of the distress that will be occasioned by it, and yet shall not revoke my order, simply because my orders are not designed to meet the humanities of the case, but to prepare for the future struggles in which millions, yea, hundreds of millions of good people outside of Atlanta have a deep interest. We must have Peace, not only at Atlanta, but in all America. To secure this we must stop the war that now desolates our once happy and favored country. To stop war we must defeat the rebel armies that are arrayed against the laws and Constitution, which all must respect and obey. To defeat these armies we must prepare the way to reach them in their recesses provided with the arms and instruments which enable us to accomplish our purpose.

Now, I know the vindictive nature of our enemy, and that we may have many years of military operations from this quarter, and therefore deem it wise and prudent to prepare in time. The use of Atlanta for warlike purposes is inconsistent with its character as a home for families. There will be no manufactures, commerce, or agriculture here for the maintenance of families, and sooner or later want will compel the inhabitants to go. Why not go now, when all the arrangements are completed for the transfer, instead of waiting till the plunging shot of contending armies will renew the scene of the past month? Of course I do not apprehend any such thing at this moment, but you do not suppose that this army will be here till the war is over. I cannot discuss this subject with you fairly, because I cannot impart to you what I propose to do, but I assert that my military plans make it necessary for the inhabitants to go away, and I can only renew my offer of services to make their exodus in any direction as easy and comfortable as possible. You cannot qualify war in harsher terms than I will.

War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it; and those who brought war on our country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out. I know I had no hand in making this war, and I know I will make more sacrifices to-day than any of you to secure peace. But you cannot have peace and a division of our country. If the United States submits to a division now, it will not stop, but will go on till we reap the fate of Mexico, which is eternal war. The United States does and must assert its authority wherever it has power; if it relaxes one bit to pressure it is gone, and I know that such is not the national feeling. This feeling assumes various shapes, but always comes back to that of Union. Once admit the Union, once more acknowledge the authority of the National Government, and instead of devoting your houses, and streets, and roads, to the dread uses of war, I, and this army, become at once your protectors and supporters, shielding you from danger, let it come from what quarter it may. I know that a few individuals cannot resist a torrent of error and passion such as has swept the South into rebellion; but you can point out, so that we may know those

who desire a Government and those who insist on war and its desolation.

You might as well appeal against the thunder-storm as against these terrible hardships of war. They are inevitable, and the only way the people of Atlanta can hope once more to live in peace and quiet at home is to stop this war, which can alone be done by admitting that it began in error, and is perpetuated in pride. We don't want your negroes, or your horses, or your land, or anything you have, but we do want and will have a just obedience to the laws of the United States. That we will have, and if it involves the destruction of your improvements we cannot help it. You have heretofore read public sentiment in your newspapers, that live by falsehood and excitement, and the quicker you seek for truth in other quarters, the better for you.

I repeat, then, that, by the original compact of government, the United States had certain rights in Georgia, which have never been relinquished and never will be; that the South began war by seizing forts, arsenals, mints, custom-houses, &c., &c., long before Mr. Lincoln was installed, and before the South had one jot or tittle of provocation. I myself have seen in Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Mississippi, hundreds and thousands of women and children fleeing from your armies and desperadoes, hungry and with bleeding feet. In Memphis, Vicksburg, and Mississippi, we fed thousands upon thousands of the families of rebel soldiers left on our hands, and whom we could not see starve. Now that war comes home to you, you feel very different; you deprecate its horrors, but did not feel them when you sent car-loads of soldiers and ammunition, and moulded shell and shot, to carry war into Kentucky and Tennessee, and desolate the homes of hundreds and thousands of good people, who only asked to live in peace at their old homes, and under the Government of their inheritance.

But these comparisons are idle. I want peace, and believe it can only be reached through Union and war; and I will ever conduct war purely with a view to perfect and early success.

But, my dear sirs, when that peace does come, you may call on me for anything. Then will I share with you the last cracker, and watch with you to shield your homes and families against danger from every quarter. Now you must go, and take with you the old and feeble, feed and nurse them, and build for them in more quiet places proper habitations to shield them against the weather until the mad passions of men cool down, and allow the Union and peace once more to settle on your old homes at Atlanta.

Yours in haste,

W. T. SHERMAN, Maj.-Gen.

In another communication to the Mayor Gen. Sherman ordered the latter to announce to the citizens:

The government will furnish transportation south as far as Rough and Ready; north, as far as Chattanooga. All citizens may take their movable property with them. Transportation will be furnished for all movables. Negroes who wish to do so may go with their masters; other male negroes will be put in Government employ, and the women and children sent outside the lines.

For the purpose of contributing to the comfort of those who were under orders to remove, an extension of the truce was subsequently obtained. The difficult and delicate task of superintending the departure of these persons was not effected without charges of cruelty and peculation against the Federal officers, with which for several weeks the Southern press teemed. Gen. Sherman, in a letter of Sept. 25, says: "The truth is, that during the truce 446 families were moved south, making 705 adults, 860 children, and 470 servants, with 1,651 pounds of furniture and household goods on the average to each family, of which we have a perfect recollection by name and articles."

CHAPTER XL.

Reorganization of the Army of the Potomac—Plans of Gen. Grant—Advance of the Army under Gen. Grant—Crosses the Rappahannock—First Day's Battle—Position of the Armies at Night—Burnside's Reserve brought on the Field—Subsequent Battles—March to the Left—Battles at Spottsylvania Court House—Thanksgivings at the North—Disposal of the Wounded.

THE Army of the Potomac, under Gen. Meade, in its reorganization was reduced to three corps, as stated on previous pages. Maj.-Gen. Warren was assigned to the command of the 5th army corps. The consolidation of divisions and arrangement of brigades was made as follows: The commanding officer of the 1st division of the old 5th corps was ordered to consolidate the three brigades into two brigades, to be designated as the 1st and 2d brigades, 1st division, 5th army corps. The old 2d division, 5th corps, was consolidated into one brigade, and designated as the 3d brigade, 1st division, 5th corps, commanded by Brig.-Gen. R. B. Ayres. The old 3d division, 5th corps, remained as the new 3d division, 5th army corps. The 2d brigade of the 3d division, 1st army corps, was transferred to the

2d division, 1st army corps, and this division afterwards designated as the 2d division, 5th army corps. The 1st brigade of the 3d division, 1st army corps, was transferred to the 1st division, 1st army corps, and this division afterwards designated as the 4th division, 5th army corps. The designating flags of the old 3d brigade, 1st division, 5th army corps; of the old 2d division, 5th army corps; of the old 2d brigade, 2d division, 5th army corps, and of the 3d division, 1st army corps, were ordered to be turned in to the corps quartermaster.

The following was the assignment of general officers to commands in the consolidated corps:

1—Brig.-Gen. J. S. Wadsworth, commanding 4th division.

2—Brig.-Gen. S. W. Crawford, commanding 3d division.

lated. Free schools must be organized and sustained for a time in part by northern capital. Loyal presses, too, must be established, and the social structure renovated and placed upon its new basis of freedom, order, and law. While this change was going on, though superintended mainly, and supported in part by persons who had previously resided in the regions to be reclaimed, aid would be required for some time from those sections which had not been despoiled by the ravages of war. To the various local refugee societies letters were addressed, and their coöperation, counsel, and suggestions sought. These organizations welcomed with great cordiality the new movement, and united with it as branches, or entered into harmonious coöperation with it. The American Union Commission, as thus organized, had its headquarters in New York city, but included auxiliaries in Boston, Baltimore, Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago, Cairo, Memphis, Nashville, Charleston, and other points. Its officers were Rev. Joseph P. Thompson, D. D., President; Rev. Lyman Abbott, Corresponding Secretary; H. G. Odi-orne, Esq., of Cincinnati, Western Secretary; H. M. Pierce, LL.D., Recording Secretary; A. V. Stout, Esq. (President of Shoe and Leather Bank), Treasurer; and an Executive Committee of six members. Its fundamental article, approved, as was the whole work and purpose of the Commission, by the Government, stated that it "is constituted for the purpose of aiding and coöperating with the people of those portions of the United States which have been desolated and impoverished by the war, in the restoration of their civil and social condition upon the basis of industry, education, freedom, and Christian morality.

About the 1st of October, 1864, the Commission was fully organized for its work, and found at first abundant occupation in relieving the immediate necessities of homeless refugees, who were brought from the South in Government transports and landed upon the wharves in the most destitute condition. Nearly 100,000 were

thus thrown upon the charity of the benevolent during seven or eight months of 1864-'65. The Commission gathered them into barracks or "homes" at St. Louis, Cairo, Louisville, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, New York, and other points in the North, fed, clothed, and provided them with medical care, and where it was possible procured for them places, where, by their own industry, they could obtain a livelihood. Experience in other organizations proved that the retention of large numbers in camps and barracks in a state of idleness, was injurious alike to their health, their morals, and their subsequent efficiency, and hence the Commission sought as speedily as possible to place all who were able to work in situations where they might obtain their bread by their labor. The extraordinary campaigns of General Sherman, and the sudden collapse of the rebellion, rendered a different system necessary in the Seaboard States. It was neither practicable nor desirable to bring the thousands who flocked into Savannah, Charleston, Wilmington, Newbern, Goldsborough, Petersburg, and Richmond, to the North. They must be aided in their dire necessity at home, and as soon as practicable assisted to sustain themselves. Provisions were accordingly shipped to Savannah, Charleston, Newbern, Richmond, and other points, and careful and trustworthy agents despatched with them to see to their honest and faithful distribution. Pauperism, or the dependence upon charity without effort at self-help, was sternly discouraged; the cities were districted, and the applicants visited at their homes.

The Commission disbursed in money and clothing from its New York office in six months, \$70,000, and the various auxiliary boards probably fully as much more. (The Boston Branch expended \$32,000.) Schools were opened in Richmond and other cities of the South. Seeds and agricultural implements were also furnished to the impoverished people of the Southern States, that they might be able to resume their long interrupted industry.

CHAPTER XLV.

Position of Gen. Sherman at Atlanta—Position of Gen. Hood: his Movements—Operations of Gen. Forrest—The failure to interrupt the Federal Communications—Plans of Gen. Sherman—His Orders—Distribution of his Army—Advance of the Left Wing—Excitement in Georgia—Advance of the Right Wing—Reaches the Ogeechee—Demonstration toward Augusta—Advance between the Ogeechee and Savannah Rivers—Scouts reach the Coast—Reduction of Fort Mollister—Investment of Savannah—Its Evacuation—Further Proceedings.

DURING the month of September, the Federal army in and about Atlanta were allowed to rest from the fatigues of active military duty, and many were sent home on furlough. The railroad was employed to its utmost capacity to bring forward supplies and recruits, and much was done in the construction of bar-

racks, and in strengthening the defences of Atlanta. All this seemed to indicate Gen. Sherman's intention to make the city a base for further operations southward, and to hold it with a powerful garrison. From his recent experience of the facility with which a cavalry force could temporarily interrupt his long line