

swept down the river by the rapid current, and were only saved from drowning by cavalymen and the boatment stationed below the ford for the purpose of rescuing such as might lose their footing, did not seem in the slightest degree to dampen their ardor.

The command was in camp every night at the point designated by the commanding general at an earlier hour than that named in his instructions to me.

Notwithstanding the severity of the march, I have never seen so few stragglers. The conduct of the officers and men in each engagement with the enemy was equally gratifying. The Second Division on Sunday held its line until forced to retire by the appearance of the enemy in its rear. The First Division maintained its position until long after every round of ammunition had been exhausted.

I cannot designate any particular regiment as worthy of special commendation without doing injustice to others, nor can I, with justice, name any of my officers as having particularly distinguished themselves where all did so well. Every one of the general officers discharged his full duty.

I am greatly indebted to General Pleasonton [cavalry leader] for his services on our march from Kelly's Ford to Chancellorsville. He was with me constantly, and greatly assisted me not only by his knowledge of the country, but his experience in conducting a march of this nature.

The members of my staff—Lieut. Col. H. C. Rodgers, Maj. E. W. Guindon, Capts. William W. Moseley and William G. Tracy—each did his duty to my entire satisfaction, in the performance of which the latter was very severely wounded. I am also indebted to Capt. C. F. Morse, provost-martial; Capts. F. W. Butler and I. Thickstun, signal officers, and Lieut. E. Diven, aide-de-camp to General [Nathaniel J.] Jackson, and G. L. Birney, acting assistant quartermaster, who acted during all engagements as volunteer aides.

To other members of my staff—Lieut. Col. S. H. Sturdevant, commissary of subsistence; Lieut. Col. W. R. Hopkins, and Surg. J. McNulty—I am greatly indebted for the able manner in which they discharged the duties of their several departments.

I have to lament the loss of many valuable officers, all of whom were killed in the discharge of their duties. Among them was Colonel Stainrook, One hundred and ninth Pennsylvania; Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, Third Wisconsin; Major Chapman, Twenty-eighth Pennsylvania; Captain Hampton, Hamton's battery, and Lieutenant Crosby, commanding Battery F, Fourth U. S. Artillery.

For further details, I beg leave to refer you to the accompanying reports of my division, brigade and regimental commanders.

I annex a sketch showing the positions occupied by my command on the 1st, 2d, and 3d of May, and inclose a list of the killed, wounded and missing, from which it appears that the loss of the corps was 2,883. [A revised statement shows the loss at 2,822]. Of those reported missing, a large number have been brought in to day, wounded. Many others are

known to have been captured in attempting to reach their original lines on Saturday night, after the rout of the Eleventh Corps.

My command consists of but two small divisions, the Third (Whipple's) Division having been temporarily detached for special service by virtue of Special Orders, No. 303, Headquarters Army of the Potomac, and having never been permitted to rejoin my corps.

My losses, as stated above, were, therefore, about 30 per cent. of my entire effective force.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. SLOCUM,

*Major-General Commanding.*

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS, A. A. G., *Army of the Potomac.*<sup>43</sup>

## CHAPTER XVII

### BEGINNING OF THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN

There was much for General Slocum to do after the return of his command to Stafford Court House. The picket duty was resumed throughout its long lines. The work of replenishing his depleted ranks, with new recruits or chance companies and regiments from the near defenses of Washington, was at once entered upon with all of its many details too numerous to even mention here. He was insistent upon knowing by personal inspection that all of these details received the attention his orders required. The labor of proper adjustments, and the bringing of new troops of the different arms to the high standard of discipline required, gave no time for listlessness among the officers or men. Dress parades were frequent, and valuable as conducive to proper pride and self respect, individually and collectively. General Slocum possessed the faculties necessary to secure a very high standard of excellence among his men in all soldierly qualities and, at the same time, to secure and retain their respect and confidence.

The larger part of the Army of the Potomac remained encamped at Falmouth, Virginia, again watching the enemy across the Rappahannock, sending out detachments of cavalry to checkmate the enemy's cavalry and other detachments, and changing, often strengthening, pickets and guards in different places throughout the wide extent of country under its possible range.



The strength of General Slocum's XIIth Corps June 1, 1863, was reported briefly as follows: Officers, 530; infantry, 9,401; wagon horses, 897; mules, 1,480; army wagons, 365; two-horse wagons, 12; ambulances, 94; cavalry horses, 102; artillery horses, 397. Total number of animals, 2,876.

It became evident the latter part of May that the enemy had about completed preparations for a movement from Fredericksburg; and early in June some of his larger commands moved up the south side of the river. There were evidences of another invasion of Maryland.

At 10.15 P. M. June 3rd, there was issued by Hooker, yet commanding general, to each corps commander by orderly or telegraph according to distance, a special order to have reveille at daylight the next morning, and each command to stand at arms for half an hour after, the horses of each battery harnessed, and everything in readiness for any movement that might be ordered. The commands were to be then dismissed and directed to be ready for further orders.

The 6th of June Generals Slocum and Howard were called on to each send detachments of 500 infantry—one or two regiments according to completeness—with pack-mules all prepared to be absent several days on special service, the destination and details of which were not given to the detachments. In compliance with this call General Slocum sent the Second Massachusetts and Third Wisconsin regiments to report to General Adelbert Ames at Spotted Tavern for service with General Alfred Pleasonton's Cavalry Corps, which was about to operate against Confederate J. E. B. Stuart's cavalry. The engagements with the enemy at Beverly Ford of the Rappahannock, Fleetwood, and Brandy Station, resulted June 9th in which the enemy was crippled and the object of the expedition was attained.

Slocum's guards replaced those of Howard at the bridges and railway near Stafford Court House June 12th. The 13th Slocum moved his corps by way of Dumfries and across the Occoquan Creek. General Hooker also started toward Washington this day. The 14th and 15th the hospital tents and other camp equipment near Slocum at Potomac Creek and Bottoms were, under his orders, taken to the proper places for protection pre-

paratory to continuing the movement of his corps toward the enemy at 3 o'clock A. M. June 17th.

Keeping the Union army between Washington and the enemy was yet imperative; and only detachments were moved until the enemy was well away from Fredericksburg. General Slocum was on the advance line and was closely followed by the Reserve Artillery. June 18th his march again began at 3.30 A. M. with course to Vienna, Freedom Hill, and Leesburg. He met difficulty in crossing Goose Creek, the water being high and the ford muddy and in bad condition generally.

Slocum was to hold Leesburg, open communication with fords of the Potomac within prudent distance, and hold them also against the enemy. Bridges were needed; and he was apprised of the sending of trains, including those conveying bridges. He was also apprised of the movements of different commands of Union, and Confederate, troops, all for mutual understanding and support. The importance of great alertness and facility of communication to guard against sudden attacks of the enemy in all forms including guerrillas, and the avoidance of clashing between different bodies of Union troops, necessitated the establishment of telegraph lines, signal stations, and courier lines, in order that all his troops could readily communicate with his headquarters, and he with other headquarters. The details of such varied and general service was particularly fatiguing. The enemy's cavalry was this day, June 18th, at Point of Rocks destroying railway trains on the north side of the Potomac about equidistant between Leesburg below and Harper's Ferry above. General Howard with his XIth Corps, now at Goose Creek, was ordered to be subject to the command of General Slocum; also other Union troops now on the north side of the Potomac.

The commanding general issued orders June 18th forbidding editors of newspapers to publish the position of his headquarters, and the position of Union troops unless engaged in battle.<sup>45</sup> June 19th was a very busy day with General Slocum, notwithstanding his loss of sleep the two previous nights. Reports to the commanding general's headquarters regarding the fords of the Potomac above and below, with repetition of reasons why certain ones were not desirable; receiving and transmitting reports re-



garding the presence, or absence at certain places, of the enemy, and the positions of the Union troops, while keeping oversight of the work of his own corps, all contributed much to his fatigue; but he reported his position and command sufficient for local defense, including the river fords in hand, but not for all fords inquired about, particularly against large forces of guerrillas and others of the enemy. He recommended a bridge at Edwards' Ferry for convenience, and as being a good defensive position.

Three soldiers of General Williams' 1st Division deserted. They were pursued, caught, and at once tried before a military court according to the rules of war. This court sentenced them to be shot at noon. The condemned men were engaged during the forenoon in writing to their friends. Two were apparently penitent. Their division was paraded as witnesses of the execution, and the entire corps, excepting those soldiers necessarily on picket and guard duties, was formed in hollow square in a large field near the encampment. All officers were present. An army wagon containing three coffins, followed by a closed ambulance containing the prisoners, came upon the field. The boxes were placed beside the open graves and the prisoners were seated upon them. A chaplain made an impressive prayer, and the twenty-four executioners did the work of justice, while the unmerciful enemy was not far away. The division, which these men deserted in its time of need, then marched by their fallen comrades; and the corps resumed its duties.<sup>46</sup>

Two signal officers reported June 20th to General Slocum for duty; and they proved themselves efficient and valuable aids. Communication was now opened by flag signals between General Slocum's headquarters and those of General Reynolds' 1st Corps then at Guilford Station; with General Howard's XIth Corps then at Trappe Rock; also by signal telegraph with Maryland at Poolesville, Sugarloaf Mountain, Point of Rocks, and Maryland Heights. These signal officers also made reconnoissances under Slocum's orders.

Part of the XIIth Corps was now reported as occupying three redoubts constructed by the enemy, one of which protected the approaches to Edwards' Ferry. The position was a strong one, and Slocum was yet improving it. The large command of the Confederate General Ewell, with whom General

Slocum had later to contend, was reported as near Winchester. The engineers reported regarding progress in the bridges across the Potomac River and Goose Creek.

Upon receiving inquiry June 21st from army headquarters regarding the enemy at great distance, General Slocum reported that he had no information, and that he had no cavalry for reconnoissance. He was thereupon informed that General Pleasanton had been directed to send him a regiment of cavalry for use in scouting the country between Bull Run and the Blue Ridge Mountains. The engineers reported the completion this day of the Edwards' Ferry bridge across the Potomac, it being 1,340 feet in length. A contraband (freed slave) was brought before the General and he reported the whereabouts of several Confederate commands including that of Ewell. A deserter from Longstreet's corps was also brought in and he confirmed the negro's report that Longstreet's and other corps of the enemy were in the Blue Ridge Mountain Gaps, and Ewell in Maryland. General Slocum further reported from Leesburg to army headquarters that with more artillery he could keep secure all the fords of the Potomac below Edwards' Ferry. The next day Hooker suggested to Slocum that he could get batteries from Howard's corps if artillery was needed before cavalry was obtained to escort the artillery reserves to him.

Further reports to Slocum June 23rd confirmed the presence of the enemy, Longstreet's strong command at least, near Snicker's Gap, which yet showed Slocum's position an advance one. Upon the advancement of the enemy toward Maryland, further inquiries came to Slocum about midnight regarding Potomac fords between the enemy and Washington; and he was prepared to report satisfactorily at once.

Another regiment of cavalry was received June 24th, which enabled Slocum to ascertain regarding the movements of the enemy in the Shenandoah Valley as well as east of the Blue Ridge Mountains. He was also further reinforced by another brigade of infantry, which increased his recent accessions three thousand men or more.

General Slocum's headquarters now increased in importance as a center for receiving and transmitting reports, orders, and communications generally. General Howard's XIth Corps was



moved forward to cooperate according to Slocum's directions. June 25th General Reynolds' Ist Corps, Sickles' IIIrd Corps, and the XIth Corps, were advanced toward Harper's Ferry. Slocum was able this day to declare certain rumors regarding location and strength of the enemy to be exaggerations. Orders continued to be received for the movement of different Union corps.

Having detached sufficient forces June 26th, to hold Leesburg and the bridges and fords until the arrival of General Mead's Vth Corps, General Slocum marched his XIIth Corps from Leesburg, Virginia, at 3 o'clock A. M., crossed the Potomac by the upper bridge at Edwards' Ferry, turned to the left up the river, crossed the Monocacy River near its mouth, and proceeded up the Potomac to Trammelstown near Point of Rocks. Most of his detachments that had been left behind were soon relieved and overtook the main body at this place.

General Slocum's march the 27th was continued to Knoxville, Maryland, and he there received at night, directions from the commanding general to be ready to march light at 4 o'clock next morning with ambulances, but with small if any trains; that Colonel Charles R. Lowell, Jr., then at Poolesville, would report to him for service with a regiment of cavalry; also two brigades of troops from General William H. French's command to join Slocum at 6 A. M., at Harper's Ferry; and that further communication would be sent in the night. This dispatch from General Hooker bore date June 27th, 8 P. M. Soon after its reading, another dispatch came from the same source countermanding the previous one, and directing that Colonel Lowell report to General French at Harper's Ferry; and that General Slocum with his XIIth Corps should march to army headquarters, at Frederick, Maryland.

These were the last orders, command or countermand, issued by Major-General Joseph Hooker as commanding general of the Army of the Potomac. His plan was to place General Slocum in command of a force sufficient to effectually keep between the Confederate army, then in Maryland, and its base of supplies, harassing its rear during its advancement, and to hold its retreat when checked by other parts of the Union army on its front and flank, in order that the entire invading enemy might be captured.

The authorities in Washington, who kept informed of every important movement, objected to the removal of the garrison from Harper's Ferry and, as Hooker thought, undertook to hamper him in other ways; and he resigned the command of the army.

President Lincoln immediately accepted his resignation and ordered Hooker to report at once to Washington, thus taking him away from the army at once.

## CHAPTER XVIII

### BEGINNING OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG

The authorities at Washington were as alert regarding their commanding generals as they were regarding the movements of the enemy. Hooker had done well in putting the Army of the Potomac in good condition for the field, as he had done before the Chancellorsville Campaign. But his superiors began to fear, if not to observe, erratic actions that excited anew their remembrance of the sad results at Chancellorsville. They knew the anxiety of the corps commanders; and it could not have been otherwise than that Hooker at times had grave apprehensions of himself. In this new campaign he had apparently been very considerate toward General Slocum and, at the turning point of the campaign, placed him in command of a force, and in position, commensurate with his deserts and where he could be largely independent of Hooker's commands or want of proper commands. Slocum was determined not to be again entrapped by Hooker, as he was at Chancellorsville, and he rejoiced at Hooker's resignation, which was undoubtedly providential.

The Washington authorities were fully prepared for the change of commanding general and a courier was at once hastened to Frederick to place Major-General George G. Meade of the Vth Corps in full command of the Army of the Potomac; and the next morning, June 28th, Meade issued his first general order accordingly.

General Slocum arrived at Frederick with his command about 2 P. M. of the 28th and, to aid in guarding this town during the night against any possible dash of the enemy's cavalry he extended his command during the afternoon from General Reynolds' Ist Corps on the Middletown Road to Zimmerman's by



Ballinger's Creek, and there connected with General Hancock's IIInd Corps.

Marching orders against the enemy were issued that evening for 4 A. M. June 29th. At that hour Slocum proceeded, passed through Ceresville, Walkersville, and Woodsborough, to Taneytown, Maryland. The Reserve Artillery was to precede Slocum and to encamp for the night between Middleburg and Taneytown. General Henry H. Lockwood was to report his command to General Slocum and march with him. Slocum had early reported to Meade that there were a great number of soldiers from different corps lying about the streets of Frederick in a very drunken condition when he marched his command through the town; and he suggested the necessity of a cavalry force being sent back to bring them to their commands.

The XIIth Corps continued its former northeasterly course June 30th. Slocum's cavalry had a skirmish with the enemy's cavalry, which did not materially delay his march to Littlestown and Westminster, Pennsylvania. This day he passed General Sickles and his IIIrd Corps. General Slocum kept close study of the country as a necessary rule of war; and now, being near strong commands of the enemy, he was specially alert to avoid being attacked unawares, night or day in his troops or trains bearing supplies. The evening of this day he received a dispatch from Meade, requesting him to take command of the Vth Corps in addition to his present command.

General Slocum's course of march July 1st was changed to a north-westerly direction to the village of Two Taverns, situated about five miles southeast of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.

The circular issued this day from the commanding general's headquarters, informed the generals of the different corps that, if the enemy assumed the offensive and attacked he should be held in check long enough to withdraw wagon trains, then the Union force should withdraw to a line of battle in the general direction of Pipe Creek, a tributary of the Monocacy River, and a few miles south of the Pennsylvania State line. In this case General John F. Reynolds was to take command of the Union Left to be composed of Reynolds' Ist Corps, Sickles' IIIrd Corps, and Howard's XIth Corps; and General Slocum was to assume command of the Union Right Wing to be composed of Meade's

Vth Corps now under General George Sykes, and of General John S. Sedgwick's VIth Corps, all in addition to Slocum's own XIIth Corps. General W. S. Hancock with the IIInd Corps was to be held as reserve. The region of Pipe Creek was surveyed by the Army Engineers for the battle-field, embracing a line of battle about twenty-five miles in extent, and the points of vantage were chosen for the Union forces. A very important party, however, the enemy, was not consulted regarding the Pipe Creek field, and the battle rather accidentally, or incidentally, ensued at Gettysburg many miles distant.

Had the enemy desired a general battle with the Army of the Potomac he would have sought it in Virginia nearer his base of supplies and before it was recruited after Chancellorsville. The enemy's desire was, rather, to levy tribute on one or more wealthy northern cities sufficient to gain recognition and greater favors from European nations, as well as prestige nearer home; and, probably, he was no more anxious for a general battle than was Meade.

The morning and afternoon of July 1st, Slocum received dispatches from Meade informing him of the enemy's gathering at Gettysburg, of their engagement there with part of the Left Wing, and referring him to the circular before mentioned, for his guidance. But the enemy, like the widely scattered Union forces, was drawn part by part into the Battle of Gettysburg by the desire to help the comrades already there engaged.

The skirmishing began about nine or ten o'clock A. M., the Confederates thinking that they sighted militia which could soon be scattered, as had been the case with them for several days. But here they first met part of General Reynolds' scattered corps. Unfortunately for the Union force engaged, General Reynolds, an active, strong officer, was killed early in the attack. His loss resulted in the confusion of his outnumbered men from his, and their own, great loss. This was a bad beginning for the Union cause. General Howard arrived at Gettysburg late in the morning, and at 12.15 P. M. his XIth Corps began to arrive, and the rear arrived at about 1.30 P. M. More of the enemy arriving about the same time, a second engagement began about 2.00 P. M.<sup>23</sup>

General Howard, justly alarmed, had sent to Slocum for







the Union headquarters at the Cemetery where he, by right of seniority, assumed command of all the Union forces then at Gettysburg, which included the shattered 1st and XIth Corps, with the afternoon's reinforcements of the IIIrd Corps under Sickles, and his own XIIth Corps, 'thus making secure the Union position, which before offered an easy prey to the Confederates.'<sup>33</sup>

General O. O. Howard of the XIth Corps, who was in a high state of perturbation, received Slocum as a deliverer. After many years had elapsed he said in a public address that: 'It would require the entire history of Gettysburg to fairly portray Slocum's part there. After securing the Cemetery on that eventful night he and I slept side by side at the Cemetery Gate. Together we there met Meade who arrived about three o'clock in the morning of the 2nd of July.'<sup>32</sup>

The Union troops rested on their guns during the night. Reinforcements of the enemy arrived in the evening in large numbers but they made no attack. The Union general commanding, Meade, arrived at Cemetery Ridge early in the morning from Taneytown, Maryland.

Upon viewing the situation by daylight, Thursday morning July 2nd, General Meade commenced forming his line on the extreme Union right for the purpose of descending to the plain below Culp's Hill, one of the most important parts of the region, and there attacking the enemy's left. General Slocum was chosen to make this attack. After careful examination of this region in all of its parts Slocum thought Meade's plan impracticable and unwise, and so reported to him. General Gouverneur K. Warren, Chief Engineer of the army, was directed to consider this question and, after his careful examination, he agreed with Slocum's report.<sup>33</sup>

Slocum was then stationed on Culp's Hill in command of the entire Right Wing, which place he at once intrenched and made secure, plenty of timber and rock being at hand. Rock Creek at the base of the Hill separated Slocum's pickets from those of the enemy. The Vth Corps, also under Slocum's command, was but a few miles away, having marched well into the night. It began to arrive about 7 A. M. and two divisions were stationed as reserve.

In the afternoon the enemy opened his cannon on all parts of the Union line, that upon the left being at first most severe, and Slocum's Vth Corps was sent to that part of the field. The enemy's artillery fire at the Union center was mainly to prevent reinforcements being moved along the line, but it was not fully effective for that purpose.

Howard's XIth Corps, shattered by the vigorous onslaughts of the enemy the first day of the battle, appeared to be resting quietly as the enemy's bombardment nearly ceased. At this time General Early, of Ewell's corps, in front of the Union right, decided to take action by sending two brigades about dark up the narrow ravine leading to the stone wall behind which part of Howard's men were posted; and who were aroused before all the enemy had time to climb over the wall. A sharp contest drove the enemy back, the troops of Slocum on Culp's Hill helping. Slocum's artillery had more than held its own against that of the enemy until called away by Meade; also his skirmishing line of small arms in aid of Howard's men.

The general commanding the Union army had become so fully absorbed on the Left Wing as to ignore the Right Wing further than to use it as a source of supply of reinforcements for the Left. He called for General Slocum's entire XIIth Corps, all of the troops remaining on the Right, to be sent to the Left. This order was met by Slocum's statement that it could not be spared. Meade, however, could see only the Left, and was importunate. Slocum sent his First Division to answer the call. This part of Slocum's men drove the enemy from the woods at Little Round Top and recaptured three pieces of artillery formerly captured by the enemy before the arrival of Slocum's men. Meade again insisted upon more men from Slocum's command. Again Slocum hesitated, as Meade called for the abandonment of a most important position to the enemy; and the generals of his second division united with Slocum in a statement to Meade that the strong lines of the enemy seen in the morning were yet opposing them, and the enemy's advance on them was imminent. Meade, in his excitement at the Left, again called for the remaining part of Slocum's XIIth Corps, and Slocum warmly requested that at least a division should remain to attempt to hold the position; but Meade was obstinate



and would consent to leave but a brigade when he already had more troops massed on the left than he could there use.

General Meade's reluctant consent to leave but one small brigade of Slocum's men to protect the Right Wing, barely saved the Army of the Potomac from being overwhelmed in an irretrievable disaster.<sup>25</sup> Slocum's name and ability were equal, however, to victory both at the Right Wing, also at the Left Wing where Meade passed all of his time.

With the small number of troops remaining to him on the Right, Slocum rose equal to the emergency confronting him, and confronting the Union as well. He was well seconded by his able and obedient brigade general, George S. Greene. The force remaining at Culp's Hill now consisted of only five regiments of infantry composed of only 1,350 men. These regiments were: The 60th New York under Colonel Abel Godard; the 78th New York, Colonel Herbert von Hammerstein; 102nd New York, Colonel Lewis R. Stegman; 137th New York, Colonel David Ireland; and the 149th New York, Colonel Henry A. Barnum. These regiments will be again recorded later in this book as among the best and most efficient of soldiers.

With this small body of troops General Slocum attempted to occupy the vacancy in the breastworks, left by their departing comrades, by extending their line to the right one man deep with intervals between each one. Before this movement could be accomplished his skirmishers were driven in by the oncoming enemy. Major-General Edward Johnson's division of Lieutenant-General R. S. Ewell's II<sup>nd</sup> Confederate Corps, was the nearest to General Slocum's front and, when he saw the depleted condition of Slocum's line, he was sent with his division of four brigades to capture Slocum's one small brigade, not half as large as each one of Johnson's brigades.

When the enemy was within easy range of Slocum's men each one, as directed, chose his man. The volleys that followed in rapid succession, withered the enemy's lines, each one causing him to seek refuge in the woods in his rear to reform. The enemy thus advanced repeatedly to dislodge or capture Slocum's men and to gain their breastworks, but without success, the strong works being a great protection to the assailed and the means of direful disaster to the assailants. The Confederate

General George H. Steuart's brigade at last overlapped the right of Slocum's wing, and Steuart led his men into the breastworks there vacated by Slocum's men when sent to Meade's support. This gave Steuart's men opportunity to fire on the flank of Colonel Ireland's regiment, and this regiment was withdrawn to the rear under cover of the darkness now come; and it reformed in line at right angle to its former line, thus facing the enemy. At this time small reinforcements of 350 men from the 1st, and 475 from the XI<sup>th</sup> Corps arrived, and they, with the darkness of the night now pervading made yet darker by the smoke of the guns, enabled Slocum's men to hold their position during the night.

This sturdy defense of Culp's Hill by General George S. Green's brigade of Slocum's men, was one of the most remarkable achievements at the Battle of Gettysburg. The 60th New York Regiment captured two flags. After discharging their guns at close quarters, thus thinning and confusing the nearby enemy, several Union soldiers jumped over the breastworks and took several of the flag-bearing enemy prisoners with their flags. Colonel David Ireland's 137th New York Regiment lost 137 of its number, viz.: 40 killed including four officers; 87 wounded, and 10 captured or missing. It suffered more than any other of Slocum's regiments.

The Second Maryland Confederate Infantry advanced further on Culp's Hill than any other of the combatting enemy; and this point is now marked by a monument.

The Confederate General Johnson left part of his division to hold the position won, and with strong reconnoitering force he moved cautiously up the valley of the run in rear of Culp's Hill, going even as far as the Baltimore Pike, within 400 yards of the Union reserve artillery, ammunition and other supply trains, and on the line of retreat of the Union army, as well as in its rear. Even Meade's headquarters were but little distant from them. The stillness at this point was alarming, and Johnson remarked to his staff, 'this is too easy; I believe the Yanks have set a trap for us.' They hastily retraced their steps to their comrades in Slocum's breastworks, where they arrived about midnight, and there passed the night.<sup>48 51</sup>

Notwithstanding the fact that the Confederates had much of their own way July 1st, the first day of the Battle of Gettys-



burg, and that a few of their men broke through the Union line the afternoon of July 3rd, in their gallant but hopeless charge on the center, the advance of the Confederates on Culp's Hill against, and on the right flank of, the Union Right Wing the evening of July 2nd, advancing as they did to the rear of the Union army unmolested by the grace of the Union commanding general Meade, and then sleeping calmly during the night in the Meade-vacated Union breastworks, we must declare General Johnson's position as the real 'high tide' or 'high water mark' of the Confederates' opportunity in the Battle of Gettysburg.

The great difference between the commanding generals at Gettysburg appears to have been, with Lee not to improve his chances of success by getting away from his line of retreat; while Meade trusted his trains, ammunition, and his highly treasured line of retreat to the care of General Slocum and then forcefully took Slocum's men to another part of the field leaving the approach to his treasures open to the enemy.

Lieutenant-General R. S. Ewell's Corps was composed largely of Thomas J. (Stonewall) Jackson's men. Every careful reader of the full story of the Civil War knows what General Jackson would have been doing with them that afternoon and evening had his life been spared at Chancellorsville. One of his marvelous detours around Culp's Hill would have cut off Meade's carefully planned retreat, captured his supply trains, and would have routed, if not captured, the Union army.<sup>22 48</sup>

## CHAPTER XIX

### COUNCIL OF WAR. CONFEDERATES DEFEATED

The commanding general, Meade, the evening of the second day's battle, called his corps commanders to a council of war at his headquarters. Twelve generals were present including Meade, his chief of staff Butterfield, Warren the chief engineer who was wounded and slept during the meeting, and A. S. Williams of Slocum's XIIth Corps. General Sickles of the IIIrd Corps, who was wounded and unable to be present, was represented by his division commander Brigadier-General Birney. Hancock and Brigadier-General John Gibbon represented the IInd Corps.

General Meade presented three questions for settlement. The first related to retiring the Union army from Gettysburg to a place nearer the base of supplies; the second related to the advisability of attacking the enemy or awaiting his attack; and the third regarding the time of attack, if attack was decided upon. These questions evoked considerable discussion. None was satisfied with the condition of affairs, few favored retiring from Gettysburg, and all who spoke first favored delay. As in all professional councils the senior in rank, General Slocum in this instance, was the last one called on for his opinion. With evident displeasure from having been unnecessarily deprived of the most of the soldiers of his command to the great detriment of his Right Wing, as well as thereby the endangering of the entire army, General Slocum's reply was at once terse and emphatically "Stay and Fight It Out." This injunction was, however, quickly followed by what was really a demand that his XIIth Corps, at least, be at once restored to him that he might at day-break the next morning attack the enemy opposing his front, drive him back, and at least preserve the full and proper lines of his Wing.

The rough minutes in part of this historic council have been preserved, and formulated as follows, namely:

Minutes of Council, July 2nd, 1863:

Page 1, Questions asked:

1. Under existing circumstances is it advisable for this army to remain in its present position, or to retire to another nearer its base of supplies?
2. It being determined to remain in present position, shall the army attack or wait the attack of the enemy?
3. If we wait attack, how long?

Page 2, Replies:

- Gibbon: 1. Correct position of the army, but would not retreat.  
 2. In no condition to attack, in his opinion. 3. Until he moves.  
 Williams: 1. Stay. 2. Wait attack. 3. One day.  
 Birney: Same as General Williams.  
 Sykes: Same as General Williams.  
 Newton: 1. Correct position of the army, but would not retreat.  
 2. By all means not attack. 3. If we wait it will give them a chance to cut our line.

Page 3:

- Howard: 1. Remain. 2. Wait attack until 4 P. M. to-morrow. 3. If don't attack, attack them.

Hancock: 1. Rectify position without moving so as to give up field.



2. Not attack unless our communications are cut. 3. Can't wait long; can't be idle.

Sedgwick: 1. Remain [2.] and wait attack. [3.] At least one day.  
Slocum: Stay and fight it out.

[On the back, of the first page of the sheet]:

Slocum, stay and fight it out. Newton thinks it a bad position; Hancock puzzled about practicability of retiring; thinks by holding on, inviting, to mass forces, and attack. Howard favor of not retiring. Birney don't know. Third Corps used up and not in good condition to fight. Sedgwick, doubtful whether we ought to attack. Effective strength about 9,000, 12,500, 9,000, 6,000, 8,500, 6,000, 7,000. Total, 58,000.

Colonel George Meade deposited the original sheets of the Minutes of this Council of War with the Pennsylvania Historical Society, Philadelphia.<sup>22 50</sup>

General Slocum's emphatic stand, and his desire to take the initiative, infused like spirit in the other commanders and won their hearty approval, whereupon the council closed.<sup>50</sup> Slocum at once set to work to recall the parts of his XIIth Corps that had been called to the support of the Union left, and, at midnight they were positioned to cover the line of the Baltimore Pike, his leading column coming on soon after the Confederate General Johnson's reconnoitering force retraced its steps; but neither knew of the other's proximity, Slocum having had no men with which to picket the ground, and thinking that Johnson remained in the breastworks with his men. Slocum's artillery arm was also carefully strengthened and positioned, and all arms had definite orders from him to assault the enemy as soon as he could be seen in the morning.

The enemy opposing Slocum was also strongly reinforced during the night by Smith's brigade from General Early's division, and Daniel's, and O'Neal's brigades from Rodes' division, of Ewell's Corps, all numbering 12,000 men or more, strong, a far larger force than Slocum's. Ewell also held several brigades in reserve.

Thus opposed by a far superior force, Slocum did not await the enemy's convenience, but opened the battle at early dawn; and the roar of his heavy guns aroused all the other parts of both armies which remained quiet as though on tiptoe of anticipation; Lee, apparently with full confidence in Ewell to take care of his left; and Meade, apparently with equal confidence in Slo-

cum whether he had sufficient troops, and support, or not. The battle that ensued was not only the longest of all engagements at Gettysburg, seven hours duration, but it displayed some of the most brilliant fighting of the entire war. Slocum's artillery was the more advantageously placed, and gave the enemy a destructive cross fire which threw him into confusion and compelled him to seek shelter in the woods for reforming his lines. When he again approached, his ranks were met by Slocum's men who had also been reformed to meet them with small arms' cross fire as well as by artillery. But the enemy was composed of similar veterans who had been tutored by a like disciplinarian, and they were possessed with the same determination to make favorable record, and they fought accordingly.

About nine o'clock in the morning the Second Maryland Confederate Infantry, which had held the highest point attained in the night, made a bold and desperate attempt to storm a part of the summit and get lodgment in Slocum's commanding position; but it was quickly repulsed with the loss of its Colonel and half of its men. This ambitious regiment was opposed by the First Maryland Regiment of Slocum's men, neighbors against neighbors. A half hour later Ruger's division of Slocum's troops was swung around to the right taking the enemy in flank and 'rolling' his forces up the opposing ridge in grand form. Now was the looked for opportunity by Slocum's men of General Geary's division. They sprang forward with loud cheers, impetuously assailed the enemy remaining in the Union breastworks to their right, drove him back and, supported by the 1st Division which constructed the works, this part of the enemy that did not meet death or capture, hastily retreated to the woods. At 11 o'clock Slocum was again in full possession of the lines of the Right Wing of the Army, and the enemy was more distant from his front than they were the day before.

Of the losses in Slocum's battle, those of the enemy were reported as 2,015 in Johnson's command, and those of the three additional brigades of other divisions of Ewell's Corps were not definitely reported. Slocum's losses were 1,156. More than 500 prisoners were captured from the enemy.

Slocum did not use all of his command at Gettysburg in this battle. Parts of the Vth and VIth Corps were not em-



ployed. As soon as his front regiments were short of ammunition they were relieved by others, passed to the rear where they gathered fresh supply, cleaned their guns, and were then returned to the front, their cheers ringing clear and loud. Many cases of heroism could be enumerated as occurring on both sides, the Union and the Confederate, for Americans were battling against Americans, and each side had to reckon with no weak foe.

Much has been written about the contests at Gettysburg on the Union Left and Center; but comparatively little has been written about the contests on the Union Right—of the most important work done by Slocum there, and of the opportunities and possibilities of the enemy there the afternoon and first part of the night of July 2nd from the unwitting, arbitrary action of General Meade in depriving the Right Wing of its sadly needed defenders. General Oliver O. Howard, after time for mature thought said: "The most impressive incident of the great battle of Gettysburg was Slocum's own battle. I was awakened from my bed in the Cemetery the morning of the 3rd of July at day-break by the startling roar of Slocum's guns. Slocum's resolute insistence the afternoon of July 2nd and his organized work and battle of the ensuing morning, in my judgment prevented Meade's losing the battle of Gettysburg. It was a grand judgment and action of Slocum's; a step all-important and essential to victory."<sup>22</sup>

General George S. Greene who so gallantly stood by General Slocum's commands and personally inspired his brave brigade with Slocum's ne'er give up tenacity, afterwards wrote: "To the discernment of General Slocum who saw the danger to which the army would be exposed by the movement ordered by Meade to deplete the Right Wing the afternoon of July 2nd, and who took the responsibility of modifying the orders which he had received from Meade, is due the honor of having saved the army from a great and perhaps fatal disaster."<sup>22</sup>

Between 10 and 11 o'clock A. M. July 3rd, "everything looked favorable with General Slocum's command on the right," wrote General Henry J. Hunt, Chief of Artillery, in reporting his inspection of the battle-field, "and I crossed over to Cemetery Ridge to see what might be going on at other points. Here a magnificent display greeted my eyes. Our whole front for two


miles was covered by [the enemy's] batteries already in line or going into position. They stretched, apparently in one unbroken mass, from opposite the town on our right to the Peach Orchard, which bounded the view to the left, the ridges of which were planted thick with cannon. Never before had such a sight been witnessed on this continent, and rarely, if ever, abroad. What did it mean? It might possibly be to hold that line while its infantry was sent to aid Ewell [to break through Slocum's Right Wing] or to guard against a counter-stroke from us; but it most probably meant an assault on our center, to be preceded by a cannonade in order to crush our batteries and shake our infantry; at least to cause us to exhaust our ammunition in reply, so that the assaulting troops might pass in good condition over the half mile of open ground which was beyond our effective musketry fire."<sup>22</sup>

Orders were issued along the Union front, beginning with Slocum's Right Wing, to withhold fire, for the conserving of ammunition until it was developed where best results could be obtained. The enemy's 138 cannon soon opened along his entire line "the severest artillery fire that I had ever witnessed" wrote General Slocum in his Official Report. This great effort of the enemy caused Slocum concern regarding his men who were obliged to seek sheltered places as much as practicable from the great flight of solid shot and shell.

Following the cannonading the enemy assaulted the Union left center, and Slocum moved his 1st Division of the XIIth Corps to the support of that part of the field. This was the last great effort of the enemy, and he was roundly beaten; after which comparative quiet prevailed during the night.

The enemy kept strong picket and front lines before Slocum's position during this night of July 3rd; but early next morning it was reported that he was withdrawing. Slocum's line was at once advanced, and it occupied the enemy's Rock Creek defenses without opposition. General Slocum also ordered forward General Ruger's brigade of his 1st Division of the XIIth Corps, and accompanied it in person in a reconnoissance of the country for several miles to the eastward, and returning to the northward and westward they passed through the Village





THE EQUESTRIAN STATUE OF MAJOR GENERAL HENRY WARNER SLOCUM  
On Culp's Hill, Battle-field of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, with its surroundings. Looking Southwestwardly.  
Erected by the State of New York, 1902

of Gettysburg. Reconnoissances westward and southward also showed that the enemy had fully retreated.

In the meantime burying the dead was continued until about one thousand of the Confederate killed were buried in front of Slocum's position. Many others had been buried by their comrades. Several thousand small arms were collected, and many others were left scattered around this part of the field when the calls to other service were sounded.

Soon after midday July 4th, a most remarkable thunder storm burst over the battle-field and the country for many miles around. The rain fell in sheets which soon formed torrents in every depression, washing away everything movable. The darkness was intense between the lightning flashes. This storm, however, did not prevent Confederate General John B. Imboden's, and the other forces of the enemy's continued preparations for retreat, according to General Lee's directions. Imboden's forces gathered the wagon trains, and ambulances, loaded those of their wounded thought able to ride, and started towards Chambersburg; the most rapidly moving, and probably the saddest of all the sad columns of the retreating Confederates.<sup>22</sup>

The earlier reports of losses in the Battle of Gettysburg showed those on the Union side to be: 2,834 killed, 13,790 wounded, and 6,643 missing. No accurate account of the enemy's loss could be obtained. One early account from Union source reads that 4,500 of his dead were buried by Union soldiers, that 26,500 wounded were left on the field, and that 13,621 prisoners not wounded were captured. That there were taken from the enemy 41 standards of colors, 3 cannon, and 24,973 small arms.<sup>53</sup> Another report gives the enemy's loss as low as 20,000 which is, probably, as much too low as the preceding number is too high. A later report, which is probably as accurate as can be obtained, reads: Union, killed, 3,155; wounded, 14,529; missing, 5,365; total, 23,049. Confederate, killed, 3,903; wounded, 18,375; missing, 5,425; total, 28,063.<sup>114</sup>

Many great characters in history have left notable sentiments indicative of one or more of their prominent characteristics which should be preserved as texts to be treasured as remind-



ers, and incentives, for the youth, and even throughout the lives of most people.

General Slocum's terse declaration to the Council of War in the dark hour of the Battle of Gettysburg of STAY AND FIGHT IT OUT should early be instilled into the mind and effort of every child, youth, and adult, and repeated at every halting or wearisome stage of worthy endeavor.

As General Slocum declared in that near-desponding council, so would the battle have ended—for the preservation of the Union, or for the victory of the Confederate States. His unhesitating pronouncement gave new hope, vigor, and expectation to his wavering audience of generals; and his prompt and emphatic work during the night, and his prompt and vigorous battle at daybreak, saved the Union army from direful defeat, probably resulting in disruption of the Union.

## CHAPTER XX

### THE PURSUIT OF THE RETREATING ENEMY

The commanding general, Meade, has been much criticised, and censured, regarding his tardy beginning and slow pursuit of the enemy from the field of Gettysburg battle. Neither the right nor left wing commander, nor the commander of any corps, is proper subject of criticism for this, as each and all, in movement, were subject at all times to the order of the commanding general of the army. Each evening every corps commander received, from the headquarters of the army, description of the course and action to be taken by his corps the next day, with such details as would enable the commanding general to know at all times the position of all his forces.

From early in the morning of the retreat, Union cavalry detachments were around to harass the beaten and retreating foe. Sunday, July 5th, different corps of infantry started in pursuit of him, particularly the largest and least battle exhausted VIth Corps, under direct orders of General Meade. General Slocum, now to act on the Union left that he might be in position for best getting in front of the enemy, marched to Littleton, Pennsylvania, July 5th with his command now composed of the XIIth and IInd Corps and, strictly according to Meade's orders re-

mained there two days. He resumed the march at 4 A. M. of July 7th, and continued to Walkersville, Maryland, a distance of twenty-nine miles through much rain and mud, with soldiers yet much fatigued with former marchings, the excitement and strain of a great battle, and many without shoes. They passed through Frederick the 8th, and to the neighborhood of Jefferson. The evening of this day Slocum was directed to relieve some Pennsylvania militia then at Crampton's Pass, and to send them to their brigade to the northward.

The reader should bear in mind that great excitement prevailed throughout the northeastern States when the Confederate Army of Virginia began the invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania the latter part of June, and that great efforts were made, especially by Ohio, Pennsylvania, Maryland, New York, and New Jersey, to enlist volunteers for the protection of these States particularly. Martial Law was declared in Maryland and Pennsylvania. The last named State was divided into two Military Departments, that of the Monongahela, to embrace the western part of this State and eastern Ohio, with headquarters at Pittsburg; and the Department of the Susquehanna, to embrace the eastern part of the State, with headquarters at Harrisburg. Major-General Darius N. Couch, a veteran of good repute, was assigned to the command of this last named Department. Maryland had headquarters at Baltimore. Large numbers of men volunteered in these Departments, for local protection mainly. A general call by the Washington authorities also brought large enlistment for United States service. To illustrate the inefficiency of many of these new recruits in emergency like this invasion, a report of Brigadier-General William F. Smith is here given; and it may show to many why the enemy was not caught while on his retreat. General Smith was a very efficient officer who had seen much service as a division commander with McClellan during his Peninsular Campaign, in the Battle of the Antietam, and elsewhere. During the Gettysburg Campaign he was in charge of the Pennsylvania militia south of the Susquehanna River. His report to General Meade July 8th, 1863, from Waynesborough, Pennsylvania, was as follows: "My command arrived here to-day and, finding General Neill here, I have encamped so as to render him all possible assistance till definite



instructions are sent to me. My command is an incoherent mass and, if it is to join the Army of the Potomac, I would suggest that the brigades, five in number, be attached to old divisions, and thus disperse the greenness. They cannot be maneuvered, and as a command is quite helpless, excepting in the kind of duty I have kept them on in the mountains. I have here about four thousand men, and I suppose two thousand have straggled away since we left Carlisle. General Knipe is the only one I have with me who is at all serviceable, and he is anxious to get back to his own brigade in the XIIth Corps [of General Slocum's command]. I am utterly powerless, without aid and in the short time allotted, to infuse any discipline into these troops, and for the reasons given above make the suggestion as being for the best interests of the service."<sup>54</sup> No experienced officer had any desire for such recruits in his command, particularly for short service enlistments, excepting from necessity for filling his ranks depleted by battle, expiration of term of enlistment, or chronic disability; but such necessity was of frequent occurrence during the Civil War.

General Slocum crossed South Mountain July 9th through Crampton's Pass, and dispatched the crude force of Pennsylvania Militia northward as desired. The men of Slocum's command were all deeply interested in the Pass here so signally cleared of the invading enemy the previous year, by some of their number now present, and their commander. Encampment was made for the night at Rohrer'sville. July 10th the march led through Keedysville, and through the Antietam Battle-field, to Bakersville, where cavalry pickets of the enemy were met. Line of battle was here formed, skirmishers were advanced, and the enemy retreated before them. The next day the march was through the Village of Fair Play and to Jones' Cross Roads, evidently not far from the main body of the escaping foe. The position Slocum was here ordered to take, he reported to Meade as wholly untenable, as being commanded by the enemy from heights in two positions then occupied by the Confederates who were liable to cut off Slocum's trains. He was then given permission to change his position as thought by him best. July 12th and 13th were passed in endeavor to definitely locate the foe, he then being somewhere beyond Marsh Run, the low, broad banks

of which were now covered by water from the recent heavy rains. The 12th of July, a part of Slocum's IIInd Division of the XIIth Corps had a skirmish with the foe and captured one hundred and ten prisoners. All of Slocum's men were here, as ever elsewhere, ready for more active work. They were now in the vicinity of Williamsport, Maryland, and of the enemy who desired to cross the Potomac River at this point.

Meade now called his corps commanders to a council, which he opened with the statement that he had no definite knowledge of the position of the enemy; and then he asked his generals, "Shall we, without further knowledge of the position of the enemy, make an attack?" To this question Generals Howard, Pleasanton, and Wadsworth answered in the affirmative; and Generals Sedgwick, Slocum, Sykes, French and Hays answered in the negative, they desiring further information. Meade then made general remarks about the necessity of doing something, and all seconded such effort. A reconnoissance in force was ordered for 7 o'clock the next morning, July 14th, all to be in readiness for a general engagement with the enemy. Reconnoissances were made in the meantime and the enemy's hastily formed intrenchments were examined in outline.

General Slocum's Ist Division of the XIIth Corps advanced at an early hour next morning to open the battle. Meeting no opposition, his men moved into the enemy's position of the evening before, finding only the enemy's trail leading to the Potomac River, across which he had escaped into Virginia.

The XIIth Corps was reinforced July 14th by the 142nd New York Regiment, and the 177th Pennsylvania, volunteers. The next day all of Slocum's men marched to Sandy Hook near Harper's Ferry, with orders for clothing and other supplies. This necessary work required three days.

Slocum marched his command July 19th across the Potomac by pontoon bridge at Harper's Ferry, and through Loudoun Valley to the vicinity of Hillsborough, where it encamped for the night. His XIIth Corps was attacked this day by a detachment of the enemy's cavalry which escaped without doing or receiving much harm. The IIInd Corps, however, being somewhat separated from Slocum at this time, lost some men as prisoners with the enemy.



The march was resumed to Snickersville, and Slocum there guarded Snicker's Gap through the Blue Ridge Mountains until the 23rd, when he marched to Ashby's Gap to remain over night; but at four o'clock in the afternoon order came to move forward to Markham's Station, near Manassas Gap, where they arrived late at night. At three in the morning the command moved through Markham to Linden. At midday Slocum was directed to return through Markham, and to encamp at Piedmont. This countermarch was due to the activity of the enemy to gain advantage of the closely following pursuers. Slocum's command was subjected to great fatigue by the long and late marches with condition of constant preparedness for action against the enemy. Straggling or disorder of any kind was not permissible at any time, however, and what little there was occasionally, received severe punishment if done when the enemy was near. Complaint was made at this time to General Geary of Slocum's IIInd division, that two of his men had entered a lone woman's house and carried away bedding, wearing apparel, and other articles not allowable in the regulations for foraging. Reparation was made as far as possible, and the thieves were entered upon the roster as dismissed in disgrace; and they were drummed out of camp by their former comrades with the rogues' march.<sup>56</sup>

General Slocum's march July 25th led through Rectortown and White Plains to Thoroughfare Gap, and the next day through Greenwich and Catlett's Station to Warrenton Junction.

The march was continued July 31st to Kelly's Ford of the Rappahannock River, where General Slocum positioned the most part of his XIIth Corps out of sight of the enemy, and sent the IIIrd Brigade of his IIInd Division of this corps to Ellis Ford below to take similar position. Discovering a detachment of North Carolina Cavalry across the river at Kelly's Ford, Slocum sent the 66th Ohio Regiment of Infantry across in boats and the enemy was scattered. He then protected the Union engineers while they built a bridge at this Ford.

Another order from the general commanding directed Slocum to hold the Rappahannock against the enemy from Wheatley's Ford to Ellis' Ford with his XIIth Corps and with the IIInd Corps which was yet under his command.

In the official account of the Organization of the Army of the Potomac July 31, 1863, General Slocum's XIIth Corps is recorded as follows:

Major-General Henry W. Slocum's Headquarters, with escort of the 10th Maine Regiment (four companies), Captain John D. Beardsley.

First Division, Brigadier-General Alpheus S. Williams; First Brigade, Brigadier-General Joseph F. Knipe, with the following Regiments: 5th Connecticut, Colonel Warren W. Packer; 20th Connecticut, Colonel Samuel Ross; 3rd Maryland, Colonel Joseph M. Sudsbury; 123rd New York, Colonel Archibald L. McDougall; 145th New York, Colonel Edward L. Price; and the 46th Pennsylvania, Colonel James L. Selfridge. Brigadier-General H. H. Lockwood's brigade joined this Division July 2nd, and was assigned as the Second Brigade. On July 19th General Lockwood, with the Maryland regiments of his brigade, was transferred to Harper's Ferry. Third Brigade, Brigadier-General Thomas H. Ruger, with the following regiments: 27th Indiana, Colonel Silas Colgrove; 2nd Massachusetts, Colonel William Cogswell; 13th New Jersey, Lieutenant-Colonel John Grimes; 107th New York, Colonel Niram M. Crane; 150th New York, Colonel John H. Ketcham; and the 3rd Wisconsin, Colonel William Hawley.

Second Division, Brigadier-General John W. Geary; First Brigade, Colonel Charles Candy, with the following regiments: 5th Ohio, Major Henry E. Symmes; 7th Ohio, Colonel William R. Creighton; 29th Ohio, Colonel William T. Fitch; 66th Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Eugene Powell; 28th Pennsylvania, Captain John Flynn; and the 147th Pennsylvania, Major John Craig. Second Brigade, Colonel George A. Cobham, Jr.; with the following regiments: 29th Pennsylvania, Colonel William Richards, Jr.; 109th Pennsylvania, Major John A. Boyle; and the 111th Pennsylvania, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas M. Walker. Third Brigade, Brigadier-General George S. Greene, with the following regiments: 60th New York, Colonel Abel Godard; 78th New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert von Hammerstein; 102nd New York, Major Gilbert M. Elliott; 137th New York, Colonel David Ireland, and the 149th New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Robert S. Van Voorhes.

Artillery Brigade, Captain John D. Woodbury; with the First New York Light, Battery M, Lieutenant Charles E. Winegar; Pennsylvania Light, Battery E, Captain Charles A. Atwell; Fourth United States, Battery F, Lieutenant Edward D. Muhlenberg; and the Fifth United States, Battery K, Lieutenant David H. Kinzie.

This report was abstracted as a tri-monthly return as follows: Present for duty July 31st, officers, 445; enlisted men, 7,328; aggregate present, 8,950; infantry officers, 412; enlisted men, 6,925; artillery officers, 12; enlisted men, 370 and 20 pieces of artillery.

These reports show the sad depletion of General Slocum's command by battle, expiration of term of enlistment, and by detachment for special service, the latter being a great compli-



ment to his discipline. The general reported the command in good condition excepting shortage of artillery horses notwithstanding great effort to supply the need.

The II<sup>nd</sup> Corps, under Slocum during Lee's retreat from Gettysburg, was yet with (near) the XII<sup>th</sup> Corps at Kelly's Ford with an effective force of 8,263 including officers.

## CHAPTER XXI

### THE RAPPAHANNOCK. NEW YORK DRAFT RIOTS

Two Confederate deserters were brought before General Slocum's Assistant Adjutant-General August 2<sup>nd</sup>, they having been sent by Slocum's General Geary stationed at Ellis' Ford. They reported two regiments of Confederate cavalry and four cannon at Ely's Ford six miles down the Rappahannock from Ellis' Ford.

On August 3<sup>rd</sup> Meade reported to Slocum, and other corps commanders, that the enemy was along Mountain Run, with Lee's headquarters at Stevensburg, a few miles from Culpeper. The same day dispatches were sent to the same commanders that the enemy was moving southward toward Orange Court House, also stating that the bridge held by Slocum at Kelly's Ford might be needed at any moment to carry across Slocum's command, the XII<sup>th</sup> and II<sup>nd</sup> Corps, to pursue the enemy; and that provision should be made to protect the bridge after its present use.

General Slocum crossed the Rappahannock the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> of August; and his orders became strict that no one should be permitted to pass through his lines without his written permission. This order caused some complaint from part of Pleasonton's free-riding cavalry.

General James B. Gordon's division, recently under General Slocum, but now in the XI<sup>th</sup> Corps, was detached August 5<sup>th</sup> and sent to Morris Island, South Carolina, by way of Alexandria, and an ocean transport. There had been not a little dissatisfaction among the subordinate officers of the XI<sup>th</sup> Corps since the routing it received from the enemy at Chancellorsville, and particularly after its first day's sad experience at Gettys-

burg, both of which reverses had given the corps a bad reputation, probably unjustly as the reflection was mainly on the large number of Germans in the corps, who were brave men. A few days before this date, August 5<sup>th</sup>, it seemed probable that the three divisions of the XI<sup>th</sup> would be divided among the other corps, Gordon, and a goodly part of the other disaffected troops, desiring to go with Slocum's corps. General Oliver O. Howard, commander of the XI<sup>th</sup> Corps, was favorable to any disposition of his men that the authorities at Washington thought best. This kindly disposition of Howard won for him friends, and the corps name with its commander was retained, and its quota was soon filled with other troops for service in Tennessee.

General Slocum's XII<sup>th</sup> Corps had present, August 8<sup>th</sup>, on special duty, 31 officers, and 787 enlisted men. The part within the Army of the Potomac numbered 95 officers and 1,102 enlisted men. Temporarily out side of this army, 54 officers and 286 men on duty; with leave of absence 24 officers and 332 men. The sick and those with wounds at this time numbered 118 officers and 3,450 men. There were also, absent without leave 4 officers and 214 men. Of officers absent without leave, other corps records showed at this time 16, 18, 20, 25, 27 and 33 of officers, respectively; and of enlisted men absent without leave, 471, 306, 604, 629, 483 and 402.<sup>55</sup> These figures speak well for Slocum's hold upon his men, notwithstanding his most strict discipline.

The Army Union Signal Station reported August 10<sup>th</sup>, that the enemy's camp smoke was plainly visible, and it extended from the vicinity of Raccoon Ford of the Rapidan River due south from Watery Mountain, the principal number being east of Clark's, and Pony Mountain, south of Stevensburg and between Culpeper and Raccoon Ford.

The Abstract from the Tri-monthly return of the Army of the Potomac for August, showed Slocum's XII<sup>th</sup> Corps to number, as present for duty, 404 officers, and 7,125 enlisted men, the aggregate of those present being 8,887. Of infantry present equipped for duty there were 369 officers and 6,735 enlisted men; artillery, 11 officers and 361 men, with 20 cannon. Aggregate present and absent, 14,477.

The enemy captured a Union wagon train near Annondale.



Virginia, August 11th, and he was otherways seeking in every direction to harass the Union forces, particularly those nearest Washington, hoping thereby to call the Union troops northward.

At this time there came indications of a change in the Army of the Potomac, and in the Confederate Army of Virginia as well, on account of reverses on each side in the Department of the Tennessee, and threatened draft riots in New York City. General Meade was called to Washington to aid in the consideration of these questions and, before starting, he called General Slocum to remain at the headquarters of the army during his absence. Slocum placed General A. S. Williams, commander of the 1st Division of the XIIth Corps, in charge of his command and, August 13th, the day of Meade's call, Slocum took charge of the Army Headquarters, the exact situation of which it was not permissible to mention in writing when the army was in the field.

The next day there were Union scouting expeditions among the Blue Ridge Mountains west of Bull Run, Virginia, and to Winchester in the Shenandoah Valley. The enemy's Vine Tree Signal Station was captured this day. At seven p. m. a division of the Vth Corps, and the Vermont Brigade of the VIth Corps, were ordered to Alexandria by railway from Warrenton Junction.

General Pleasonton of the Cavalry Corps reported August 14th regarding certain reported movements of the enemy, and asked for important changes of position of the Union Cavalry, and of other corps. Slocum, as temporary commander of the Army, would not sanction the proposed changes of the several corps, and of the cavalry only in part, with statement that readiness to meet emergency should constantly be maintained. General Humphreys, Chief of Staff, was directed to so report to Pleasonton.

The enemy became even more active in his expeditions; and more troops were dispatched to Alexandria, a part of the command of General Ruger of Slocum's corps being among the number. Then followed a Union scouting party from Centerville to Aldie, Virginia, continuing until the 19th of August.

General Meade returned from Washington August 15th, and General Slocum then returned to his headquarters of the XIIth Corps.

It had been found necessary to fill the quota of soldiers required from New York City by draft. The work of conscription was interfered with, and soon stopped, by riotous opposition, a mob holding control of the city several days late in July. It was decided by the Department of War to send troops to that city from the Army of the Potomac, to protect the officers while completing the draft. August 16th about 10,000 troops, including those of Slocum's command under his General Thomas H. Ruger then at Alexandria, went aboard of ocean transports for New York City. General Slocum's troops for this important expedition were composed of the following regiments: The 14th and 27th Indiana; 2nd Massachusetts; 5th Michigan; the 4th, 5th, 7th, 29th, 66th, and 126 Ohio; and the 3rd Wisconsin. General Meade wrote to H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief, Washington, that he had sent his best troops, and some of his best officers.

General Ruger reported to Brigadier-General Edward R. S. Canby, at the United States Military Station on Governor's Island, New York Harbor, and he was assigned to the command of Canby's IIInd Brigade composed mostly of Slocum's men. General Canby issued a circular from his headquarters of United States troops in New York City and Harbor, August 17th, containing excellently worded instructions to officers and their troops, and as notification to the citizens also, well calculated to protect all orderly and well-meaning citizens and soldiers alike. The first paragraph of this circular reads, that: "The duties of these troops are limited to the defense of the forts and the protection of public property, and of the officers of the General Government in the performance of their legal duties. The duty of maintaining order, and protecting the properties and rights of private individuals, devolves upon the municipal and State authorities, but the troops of the United States will be held in readiness to render any assistance that may be called for by proper authority, or be rendered necessary by the inability of the civil authorities to accomplish these ends."

The presence of these troops had the desired effect. The conscription proceeded along the Hudson River as well, part of Slocum's men attending the draftings at Kingston, and elsewhere; and good order was maintained without bloodshed. The



troops enjoyed the pleasant excursion, and were returned to their corps at Kelly's Ford of the Rappahannock the evening of September 12th.

Major-General G. K. Warren succeeded Brigadier-General William Hays August 16th in command of the IIInd Corps. The 20th of August, Warren reported to General Pleasanton of the cavalry, that the enemy was in large force opposite the United States Ford of the Rappahannock, and that it was believed that 'our army' was retiring on Centerville or Washington—this rumor arising from the sending of part of Slocum's troops, with a few others, to Alexandria for New York City. This report was sent to Meade's headquarters, and thence to General Slocum.

During the long continued, monotonous, and tiresome picket line duty, many enlisted men became tired of army life, and an occasional desertion was reported. Two deserters from Slocum's IIInd Division were captured and, after due military trial, they were convicted of the crime, and sentenced to death from the guns of their comrades. Unfortunately the aim of the first firing squad was not direct and steady, and it was necessary to call forward the reserve squad to complete the penalty. August 18th Slocum's IIInd Division was again paraded, by its General Geary, to attend like execution of a young Maryland deserter; also on the 25th for like execution of a soldier of the 145th New York Regiment of Volunteers for the same crime.

The Confederate cavalry continued very active, and small detachments occasionally made long detours. Unfortunately the Union picket lines occasionally showed gaps of as many as four miles, from the commanding general withdrawing troops, which permitted the watchful enemy to pass through unmolested; and much work was required thereby of the Union cavalry to prevent the marauders doing great harm. August 22nd there was a skirmish with such marauders at Stafford Court House, and the next day another at Coyle's Tavern near Fairfax Court House; also another the next day at Hartwood Church toward Kelly's Ford.



## CHAPTER XXII

## GETTYSBURG REPORTS. LETTERS. CRITICISMS

The official reports of the Battle of Gettysburg were variable. The report of General Slocum regarding the battle, and of his part in the pursuit of the enemy, is placed in this connection as most likely to interest the general reader. It is like all of his expressions, very modest. There is nothing therein of the carping or faultfinding spirit; nothing reflecting seriously on his commanding general—there were numerous others to do this—and nothing but praise for the officers and men of his command, for all had been apt pupils of his discipline and requirements. He did not even offer any criticism of Meade's dilatory march after the retreating enemy—obeying his orders, as was his duty to do, even when he thought that something different would be better. He was a deep and, so far as possible, a practical sympathizer with the soldiers of his command. His report refers to their fatiguing duties, fulfilled uncomplainingly, and it refers more regretfully to their short rations, namely:

Report of Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum, U. S. Army, commanding Twelfth Army Corps.

Hdqrs. Twelfth Corps, Army of the Potomac,  
August 23, 1863.

GENERAL: I have the honor of submitting the following report of the operations of the Twelfth Corps, and such other troops as were placed under my command, between June 28 and July 26:

The Twelfth Corps was at Knoxville, Md., on the morning of June 28, from which place it marched at 6 A. M., and arrived near Frederick City at 2 P. M. of the same day.

The march was resumed at 7 A. M. on the following day, and although nearly the entire army was obliged to move through the city in its march northward, and great delay was necessarily caused by the obstruction of the roads by baggage-wagons, &c., still the corps marched 23 miles, performing most of it during a heavy rain-storm.

On the 30th the march was resumed at 5 A. M., and the corps encamped for the night about 1 mile beyond Littlestown, Pa., on the road leading from that place to Hanover.

On the morning of July 1, the corps was moved to Two Taverns, and remained at that place until information was received that the First and Eleventh Corps were engaged at Gettysburg, when the march was at once resumed, and, agreeably to suggestion from General Howard, the First Division was put in position on the right of our line, near Rock Creek. The



Second Division was moved forward as rapidly as possible, and placed, pursuant to orders from General Hancock, on the extreme left of the line.

The corps remained in this position until the following morning, when, by direction of the commanding general [George G. Meade], the Second Division was moved to the right of our center, and placed in the woods east of the turnpike, between Rock Creek and the crest of the hill held by our troops under Brigadier-General Wadsworth.

The Fifth Corps [also under command of General Slocum] arrived at 5 A. M. on July 2, and, by direction of the commanding general, was placed in line on the right of the Twelfth Corps.

At about 8 A. M. this corps (the Fifth) and the First Division of the Twelfth Corps were moved to the left and across Rock Creek, the First Division taking position on the right of the Second, with its right resting on the creek. (See map annexed).

As soon as the corps was established on its new line, a strong force was detailed for the construction of breastworks and abatis, which subsequently proved of great value, as they enabled us at a critical moment to detach portions of the command to other points of the line. The Fifth Corps was massed between the extreme right and left of the line occupied by the army, and held in readiness to move to the support of any part of the line. About half an hour before the attack on our left, this corps (the Fifth) was moved by order of the commanding general to the support of that part of the line. This attack was made by the enemy in strong force, and with great spirit and determination. Had it been successful, the result would have been terribly disastrous to our army and to the country. The arrival of the Fifth Corps at the point of attack at so critical a moment afforded it an opportunity of doing service for the country the value of which can never be overestimated. Of the manner in which this opportunity was improved, I need not speak. The long list of its killed and wounded attests more clearly than language can the valor of its officers and men.

As soon as the attack on our left was commenced, the First Division and two brigades of the Second Division, Twelfth Corps, were ordered to that part of the line. The First Division moved at once, and arrived in time to assist in repelling the assault. The two brigades of the Second Division under Brigadier-General Geary, by some unfortunate and unaccountable mistake, did not follow the First Division, but took the road leading to Two Taverns, crossing Rock Creek. Immediately after the First Division and the two brigades of the Second Division had moved from their intrenchments, the enemy attacked the remaining brigade of the corps left to hold the line. This brigade was under command of Brigadier-General Greene, and the attack commenced before he had succeeded in extending his command so as to occupy the part of the line previously occupied by the troops sent to the support of our left. Although General Greene handled his command with great skill, and although his men fought with gallantry never surpassed by any troops under my command, the enemy succeeded in gaining possession of a portion of our intrenchments.

After a severe engagement of nearly three hours duration, General Greene remained in possession of the left of our line of works, while the right, which had previously been held by the First Division, was in possession of the enemy. During this engagement, General Greene was re-enforced by three regiments from the First Corps, and three from the Eleventh Corps, all of which did good service. Immediately after the repulse of the enemy on the left, the First Division was ordered to return to its position on the right, and General Geary, with the two other brigades of the Second Division, was ordered back to his original position. It was nearly midnight before this movement was fully completed.

Orders were at once issued for an attack at daybreak, for the purpose of regaining that portion of the line which had been lost. The artillery of the Twelfth Corps, consisting of Battery F, Fourth U. S. Artillery; Battery K, Fifth U. S. Artillery; Battery M, First New York, and Knap's Pennsylvania battery, was placed in position during the night by Lieutenant-Colonel Best, and opened the battle at 4 A. M. on the following morning, and during the entire engagement all these batteries rendered most valuable aid to our cause.

The enemy had been re-enforced during the night, and were fully prepared to resist our attack. The force opposed to us, it is said, belonged to the corps under General Ewell, formerly under General Jackson, and they certainly fought with a determination and valor which has ever characterized the troops of this well-known corps. We were re-enforced during the engagement by Shaler's brigade, of the Sixth Corps, and by two regiments from General Wadsworth's division, of the First Corps, and also by Neill's brigade, of the Sixth Corps, which was moved across Rock Creek, and placed in position to protect our extreme right. All these troops did excellent service.

The engagement continued until 10.30 A. M., and resulted in our regaining possession of our entire line of intrenchments and driving the enemy back of the position originally held by him; and in capture of over 500 prisoners in addition to the large number of wounded left on the field, besides several thousand stand of arms and three stand of colors. Our own loss of killed and wounded was comparatively light, as most of our troops were protected by breastworks.

The portion of the field occupied by the enemy presented abundant evidence of the bravery and determination with which the conflict was waged. The field of battle at this point was not as extended as that on the left of our line, nor was the force engaged as heavy as that brought into action on that part of the line. Yet General Geary states that over 900 of the enemy's dead were buried by our own troops and a large number left unburied, marching orders having been received before the work was completed.

Soon after the repulse of the enemy at this point, he opened from his entire line the severest artillery fire that I have ever witnessed. The losses of the Twelfth Corps from this fire were however, light, and when the



fire ceased, and was followed by an assault from his infantry on the left of the line, the entire command was in readiness to move to the support of our troops at that point. The First Division was moved, and reached the scene of conflict in time to have rendered assistance if required. They were not, however, called into action, the enemy being driven from the field by the troops already in position.

On the following morning, July 4, I moved forward with one brigade (General Ruger's), and found the enemy had retired from our immediate front.

The next day the Twelfth Corps marched to Littlestown.

On July 7th, the march was resumed at 4 A. M., and although many of the men were destitute of shoes, and all greatly fatigued by the labor and anxiety of a severely contested battle, as well as by the heavy marches which had preceded it, still, a march of 29 miles was made this day.

On the following day the command passed through Frederick, and halted for the night near Jefferson.

On the 9th we crossed South Mountain at Crampton's Pass, and encamped near Rohrer'sville.

On the 10th we marched to Bakersville, and on the 11th to Fair Play.

The 12th and 13th were spent in endeavoring to ascertain the position of the enemy in our front, which we found great difficulty in accomplishing. Marsh Run extended along the position held by the enemy in our front, and at this time it was passable only at the bridges, the heavy rains having raised the water much beyond its usual depth, and caused it to overrun the marsh land in our front.

During the night of the 13th, the enemy recrossed the Potomac.

On the 15th, I marched the command to Sandy Hook, near Harper's Ferry, with orders to procure clothing and other supplies as soon as possible, and hold it in readiness to cross the river.

Three days were spent in procuring supplies, and on the 19th the corps crossed the river, and encamped for the night near Hillsborough.

On the following day the command marched to Snickersville, and remained there, guarding the pass in the Blue Ridge, until the 23d, when it was moved to Ashby's Gap, at which point it arrived at 2 p. m., and made preparations to encamp for the night; but at 4 P. M. I received orders to move forward at once to Markham's Station, near Manassas Gap, and the march was immediately resumed, the troops arriving near the station late at night.

At 3 A. M. on the 24th marched through Markham to Linden. At 12 M. on the same day returned, via Markham, and encamped at Piedmont.

On the 25th, marched to Thoroughfare Gap, and on the 26th to Warrenton Junction.

The enemy commenced the movement toward Pennsylvania early in the month of June. My command left its camp near Aquia Creek on the 13th of the same month. From that day until its arrival at Warrenton Junction, on July 26, it was constantly engaged in services of the most fatiguing

nature. Marches of from 25 to 30 miles per day were frequently performed. We were constantly in the presence of the enemy, and even while remaining in camp for a day or two, nothing like rest or relaxation from care and anxiety was known.

The complete ration allowed the soldier was not issued to him a single day during the entire campaign. It cannot be surprising that, under these circumstances, officers as well as men were greatly exhausted on our arrival at Warrenton.

The conduct of the entire command during this campaign was such as entitles it to the gratitude of the country, and justifies me in the indulgence of a deep and heartfelt pride in my connection with it. At Gettysburg, when we were brought into conflict with the entire force of the enemy, although every one felt convinced that we were greatly his inferior in point of numbers, yet all seemed to realize the vast responsibility thrown upon our army and the fearful consequence which must result from our defeat, and every one was nerved to the task, and entered upon the duties devolving upon him with a spirit worthy of the highest praise. Their confidence in the final result of this important battle was greatly increased by the fact, which soon became apparent to all, that in this battle, at least, all our forces were to be used; that a large portion of the army were not to remain idle while the enemy's masses were being hurled against another portion.

My own corps during this conflict was moved from one point of the line to another, and all of those thus moved had the satisfaction of knowing that, where the battle was waged by the enemy with the greatest fury, there our troops were concentrated, ready and eager to meet them.

My staff officers discharged their duties during the campaign to my entire satisfaction. Supplies were furnished by all the different departments as liberally and with as little delay as could have been anticipated under the circumstances.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. SLOCUM,

Major-General of Volunteers, commanding.

BRIG. GEN. S. WILLIAMS,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac."

General Meade's report of the Battle of Gettysburg was not received by Slocum until after his transfer to the Army of the Cumberland; and so many of his subordinate officers were making so many complaints of its errors of omission and of commission, that he felt compelled to write to Meade for their correction. This letter entered into the Official Records as an Addenda. General Meade replied in an apparent spirit of justice in some particulars, without committing himself to a full redress. General Slocum's letter reads as follows:



## ADDENDA.

Hdqrs. Twelfth Corps, Army of the Cumberland,  
Tullahoma, Tenn., December 30, 1863.

MAJ. GEN. GEORGE G. MEADE,  
Commanding Army of the Potomac.

GENERAL: I inclose herewith the report of General T. H. Ruger of operations of the First Division, Twelfth Corps, at the battle of Gettysburg, together with the report of his brigade and regimental commanders. General Ruger, with a large portion of his division, was ordered to New York City soon after the battle [to quell riots there], and immediately after his return from New York the corps was ordered to this department. The report of General Williams and myself were delayed with the hope of receiving General Ruger's report in time to forward with them.

I deeply regret the necessity which compelled me to send my report and that of General Williams unaccompanied by any report of the operations of the First Division, for although an account of the operations of this division was given in the report of General Williams, who commanded the corps during the battle, I think the absence of Ruger's report may account for some of the errors contained in your report as to the operations of the Twelfth Corps.

I inclose a letter from General Williams, calling my attention to these errors, to which I respectfully invite your attention, and if anything can be done at this late day to correct these errors, I trust you will do it. Your report is the official history of that important battle, and to this report reference will always be made by our government; our people, and the historian, as the most reliable and accurate account of the services performed by each corps, division and brigade of your army. If you have inadvertently given to one division the credit of having performed some meritorious service which was in reality performed by another division, you do an injustice to brave men and defraud them of well-earned laurels. It is an injustice which even time cannot correct. That errors of this nature exist in your official report is an indisputable fact.

You give great credit to Lockwood's brigade for services on the evening of July 2, but state that his brigade was a portion of the First Corps, while it never at any time belonged to that corps, but was a portion of the Twelfth Corps, and was accompanied in its operations on the evening of July 2 by General Williams in person. A portion of this brigade (the One hundred and fiftieth New York) is still in General Williams' division.

I copy the following statement from your report:

During the heavy assault on our left, portions of the Twelfth Corps were sent as re-enforcements. During their absence, the line on the extreme right was held by a very much reduced force. This was taken advantage of by the enemy, who, during the absence of General Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps advanced and occupied part of the line. On the morning of the 3rd, General Geary, having returned during the night, attacked at early dawn the enemy, and succeeded in driving him back and reoccupying his former position. A spirited contest was maintained all the morning along this part of the line. General Geary, re-enforced by Wheaton's brigade of the Sixth Corps, maintained his position, and inflicted severe losses on the enemy.

From this statement it would appear that Geary's division marched to the support of your left; that Williams' division did not; that his (Williams') division, or a portion of it, was guarding the intrenchments when the enemy gained possession; that General Geary returned, and with his division drove the enemy back; that the engagement on the following morning was fought by Geary's division, assisted by Wheaton's brigade. This I know is the inference drawn from your history of those operations by every person unacquainted with the truth. Yet the facts in the case are very nearly the reverse of the above in every particular, and directly in contradiction to the facts as set forth in the report of General Geary, as well as that of General Williams. Geary's division did not march even in the direction of your left. Two of his brigades, under his immediate command, left the intrenchments under orders to move to the support of your left, but through some unfortunate mistake he took the road leading to Two Taverns. Williams' entire division did move to the support of your left, and it was one of his brigades (Lockwood's) under his immediate command, which you commend, but very singularly accredit to the First Corps.

Greene's brigade, of the Second Division, remained in the intrenchments, and the failure of the enemy to gain entire possession of our works was due entirely to the skill of General Greene and the heroic valor of his troops. His brigade suffered severely, but maintained its position, and held the enemy in check until the return of Williams' division. The 'Spirited contest maintained by General Geary, re-enforced by Wheaton's brigade,' was a contest for regaining the portion of our intrenchments held by the enemy, and was conducted under the immediate command of General Williams, and was participated in by the entire Twelfth Corps, re-enforced not by Wheaton's but by Shaler's brigade.

Although the command of the Twelfth Corps was given temporarily to General Williams by your order, and although you directed him to meet at the council with other corps commanders, you fail to mention his name in your entire report, and in no place allude to his having any such command, or to the fact that more than one corps was at any time placed under my command, although at no time after you assumed command of the army until the close of this battle was I in command of less than two corps. I have now in my possession your written orders, dated July 2, directing me to assume command of the Sixth Corps, and, with that corps and the two then under my command (the Fifth and Twelfth), to move forward and at once attack the enemy.

I allude to this fact for the purpose of refreshing your memory on a subject which you had apparently entirely forgotten when you penned your report, for you have not failed to notice the fact of General Schurz and others having held, even for a few hours, commands above that previously held by them. I sincerely trust that you will endeavor to correct as far as possible the errors above mentioned, and that the correction may be recorded at the War Department.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. SLOCUM, Major-General of Volunteers, Commanding.<sup>38</sup>



At a memorial service held under the auspices of Rankin Post, No. 10, Grand Army of the Republic, at Plymouth Church, Brooklyn, New York, April 29th, 1894, Major-General Oliver O. Howard spoke of Major-General Slocum in part as follows: "General Slocum's Gettysburg letter to General Meade in the interest of his [Slocum's] corps commander, General A. S. Williams, a letter demanding the correction of Meade's first report, is about the best literary production of the war. The whole letter is the key to General Slocum's character—strong, clear, incisive and absolutely truthful. That letter has become the history of Gettysburg from Culp's Hill to McAllister's Hill. To appreciate it fully one must know that rocky, rough, woody region which will ever be a rival of the jagged Round Tops and the death-dealing Devil's Den. But for Slocum the waters of the Rebellion would have passed around the heights, and the 'high-water mark' would not have been found on that Cemetery crest."

Yet later General Slocum wrote to his confidential correspondent at Syracuse, New York, Judge LeRoy H. Morgan, more sharply criticising Meade's continued shortcomings, and giving some true sidelights on several events of general historical interest. Just before this last letter there were several publications that appeared to emanate from Meade; and there were yet other intimations that Slocum construed as not justifiable and should not enter, or remain in history without being controverted. This letter reads as follows:

Headquarters Twelfth Corps, Army of the Cumberland,  
Tullahoma, Tenn., January 2, 1864.

MY DEAR SIR:

I presume you have read Meade's Report of the Battle of Gettysburg. I can imagine the feeling its perusal has caused you. I have not met a sensible man who has read it, either soldier or civilian, who has not felt disappointed on reading it. It purports to be the official history of the most important contest of modern times—a contest in which our troops fought with a valor and determination never before exhibited—and the only evidence in the entire report which tends to prove this heroism is contained in the closing sentence, "our losses were very severe, amounting to 23,186." Your disappointment must have been greater from the fact that the true history of the operations on the right had already been made known to you by me, and Meade's report is a plain contradiction of almost every statement I have ever written to you. It is in direct conflict with my official

report, and the reports of all my subordinate commanders. My first impulse on reading his report was to ask for a court of inquiry. I was prompted to this course not so much from personal consideration, as from a desire to have justice done to General Williams and his division.

Although Meade professed the warmest friendship for me, and the utmost confidence in me, not only during the entire battle, but at all times subsequent to it while I remained in his army, yet in his report he utterly ignores me. That he did repose this confidence in me, and that he placed the right wing entirely under my control, I have abundant written evidence now in my possession. In proof of this I enclose a copy of an order sent me during the battle, showing that he had sent part of Sedgwick's corps to me, and that without visiting me or my portion of the line, he wished me to place it in a central position where he could use it as soon as I could spare it. I also enclose a copy of an order received at ten twenty A. M., July second, directing me to move from the strong position we then held, and with the Fifth and Twelfth Corps, then under my command, and the Sixth which was hourly expected, to attack the enemy. The latter order was not obeyed because every general officer consulted on the subject deemed it unwise to leave the almost impregnable position we then held.

I send you copies of these orders to convince you that although my name is not mentioned in the report, yet I really occupied the position and had the commands mentioned in my former letters. At no time was I in command of less than two corps during the entire campaign, and during all the battle the right wing was entrusted entirely to me—a position to which my rank entitled me. Williams commanded the Twelfth Corps, and was at all times during the battle treated as a corps commander by Meade. He was invited by him to the council with other corps commanders, and yet no mention is made of this fact in the report. Nor is Williams' name or that of his division to be found in it.

I finally gave up the idea of asking for a court of inquiry, knowing that the interest of the service could not be promoted by such course. I wrote a letter to Meade, however, asking him to correct his report, a copy of which I enclose.

There is much secret history connected with the Gettysburg campaign which will some day be made public. The proceedings of a secret council of the corps commanders held the night before the enemy crossed the river was at once divulged, and the remarks of Meade, Warren and Pleasonton published to the world in full. It was for the interest of Meade that this publication should be made; and there is no doubt that publicity was given to it with his consent, if not through his direct instrumentality. There were other councils, however, the proceedings of which were not made public and which never will be published with the consent of Meade.

On the evening of July second a council was called, and each corps commander was asked his opinion as to the propriety of falling back toward Washington that night. The majority opposed it, and after the vote was taken Meade declared that "Gettysburg was no place to risk a battle;" and



there is no doubt but for the decision of his corps commanders, the army on the third of July would have been in full retreat. The 4th of July, 1863, instead of being a day of rejoicing throughout the North, would have been the darkest day ever known to our country. This piece of history can be verified by the records of that council kept by Butterfield, and cannot have been forgotten by any officer present.

On the fourth of July nearly every corps commander urged an immediate movement, but my corps was kept three days in idleness. In the meantime the enemy reached Hagerstown, took up his new line, and had abundant time to fortify. At the council held on the thirteenth of July, by which "Meade was overruled," the following question was proposed to each officer, viz.: "Shall we, *without further knowledge of the position of the enemy*, make an attack?"


Previous to putting the question, Meade answered that he could get no knowledge of the position of the enemy. This announcement, together with the peculiar phraseology of the question, indicated the decision the commanding general anticipated. He offered no remarks until a vote was taken, and the question answered in the negative. He then made some general remarks about "the necessity of doing something," which was approved by all. Having 'placed himself right on record' as the politicians would say, he retired. This record he at once used to sustain himself at the expense of his brother officers, although the action of these officers was precisely what he desired and anticipated it would be when he framed the question.

You may think this a hard charge to bring against a soldier, but I believe I am fully justified in making it. There are circumstances which I will make known to you when we meet which will convince you that I have not done him injustice.

As long as this war continues I shall pursue the course I have thus far followed. I shall ask for no court, enter into no controversy, write no letters. But when the danger has passed from us many facts will come to light, giving to the public a better knowledge of the real history of this war than can be obtained through the medium of such reports as that written by General Meade.

Very respectfully,  
Your Obedient Servant,  
H. W. SLOCUM.

HON. L. H. MORGAN, Syracuse, N. Y.



## CHAPTER XXIII

### THE RAPIDAN. RESIGNATION. TO TENNESSEE

General Slocum was called to Washington for consultation with the War Department August 31st. A change was about to occur that would take him to distant fields of action, and his absence from his command was prolonged for a short visit to his family. He returned to the front September 13th. During his absence the command of the XIIth Corps devolved again upon General A. S. Williams of the 1st Division.

Some pickets of Slocum's IIInd Division were fired at by a small body of the enemy September 1st near Ellis's Ford. Help was rallied, and the enemy was driven away with loss to him. Generally the XIIth Corps had little other than quiet picket work during Slocum's absence.

General Kilpatrick crossed the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg September 1st; and the 13th General Pleasonton crossed at Kelly's and other fords, with most of the Union cavalry under Buford, Kilpatrick, and Gregg; and they pressed the Confederate cavalry, under Stuart, back to Brandy Station and Culpeper Court House, and thence across the Rapidan. Pleasonton's men captured three cannon and 120 prisoners. Otherwise the loss on both sides was small.

On September 14th the other corps commanders were notified of the successes of Pleasonton's Cavalry Corps, and they were also notified to be in readiness to advance and hold the position gained. The 16th Slocum advanced his XIIth Corps to Stevensburg, and thence to Raccoon Ford of the Rapidan, which he carefully examined, and it was found impracticable as a crossing, the approaches being marshy and the enemy commanding every approach in force. He passed down the river to Morton's Ford where, he thought, a crossing might be forced; but such crossing would result in much loss of life. Following the river, Slocum further reported that Stringfellow's Ford offered the most practicable crossing of all the fords examined.

Contrabands (negroes freed from slavery by the President's Emancipation Proclamation) flocked around Slocum, as usual, and from them, and from different other sources, he learned that the Confederate General Longstreet and his corps were sent to



Tennessee September 9th, indications of which action of the enemy had been noted as important, and making necessary for the sending of Union reinforcements to General Rosecrans commanding there.

The Signal Service of both armies was now more active in the region of the Rapidan and the heights nearby, at Pony Mountain and Clark's Mountain particularly. The movement of the enemy was reported, which led to a sharp skirmish the 19th near Raccoon Ford. An intercepted dispatch of the enemy indicated plans for an expedition, which caused General Meade to issue a circular to the Union corps commanders that, until further orders, their troops should carry in their knapsacks five days' bread and small rations, including salt, in addition to the subsistence stores they were required under existing orders to carry in their haversacks.

While being a strict disciplinarian, General Slocum was naturally kind and always disposed to look favorably upon every meritorious explanation or excuse for laxity or shortcomings. He was seldom disappointed in his estimate of men. When not overburdened with cares, or fatigue, he could be approached by any of his soldiers; and they found in him an ever open ear, and every practicable relief. Such statements unsolicited, have been brought to the writer by those who had been so befriended. The general, however, uniformly maintained the dignity of his rank as he saw it, and as he ever respected like dignity and self respect in others. The following story shows his treatment of a soldier who treated him indecorously: "About the middle of September the battalion broke camp and moved to the Rapidan River, near Raccoon Ford. While on this march an incident occurred which afforded much merriment for the officers and men attached to headquarters. General Slocum and staff had halted at a certain spot for lunch, when a lieutenant of the United States Artillery, slightly intoxicated, rode up to General Slocum, dismounted, threw his arms about the general's neck and exclaimed, 'Oh! Slocum! You're a hunky boy!' Such a breach of military discipline might not have been very remarkable in some of the armies, but it was an almost unheard of affair in the Army of the Potomac. It is needless to say that it was promptly punished by keeping the offending officer in arrest

until he amply apologized. The Lieutenant furnished the battalion with a phrase which the men delighted to repeat, not so much for the fun of the thing as for the completeness with which it expressed their feelings towards the general."<sup>59</sup>

Meade reported to Washington September 22nd, the interception of a Confederate dispatch reporting a battle in Tennessee between Confederate General Bragg's command, and General Rosecrans' Union army, in which, the dispatch read, Bragg captured twenty cannon, and two thousand and five hundred prisoners. But the authorities at Washington had already heard of the Battle of Chickamauga, and they already realized that they had been too slow in reinforcing that field, and in several other particulars.

There being at this time no serious condition of affairs regarding the Army of the Potomac, it was decided to detach the XIth and XIIth Corps of this Army, and to send them to Tennessee as rapidly as possible.

The War Department called to Washington the head officers of the Baltimore and Ohio Railway Company, and this company, also the Louisville and Nashville Railway Company, and their connecting lines through Indianapolis, gave up all other business for the transporting of these two army corps, their artillery, horses, ambulances, and army wagons, to the relief of General Rosecrans. All of these railways and their equipment during this work were taken under military surveillance and dictation.

When the commanding general of the Army of the Potomac was called on to detach General Slocum and his corps for this journey, he replied by telegram to Halleck that they were on duty in front of the enemy and could not be withdrawn and gotten ready for the journey in the time named. On September 24th, however, Meade notified Slocum that his corps would be relieved by the Ist Corps, and that he should march his command to Brandy Station where trains would be found in readiness for him.

By Special Orders of the War Department, Major-General Joseph Hooker was assigned to the command of the XIth and XIIth Corps, September 24th. At ten p. m. of this day, Hooker addressed a letter to Slocum regarding the movement of his command. This letter was received by Slocum the next day a



little before noon. He made no reply to Hooker; but he immediately wrote and dispatched the following letter instead:

Brandy Station, September 25, 1863.

His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN,  
President of the United States.

SIR: I have just been informed that I have been placed under command of Major-General Joseph Hooker. My opinion of General Hooker both as an officer and a gentleman is too well known to make it necessary for me to refer to it in this communication. The public service cannot be promoted by placing under his command an officer who has so little confidence in his ability as I have. Our relations are such that it would be degrading in me to accept any position under him. I have therefore to respectfully tender the resignation of my commission as Major-General of Volunteers. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. SLOCUM,  
Major-General of Volunteers."

President Lincoln would not accept General Slocum's resignation; and they compromised the delicate situation so that he would be separated from Hooker. Slocum was further assured that other arrangements would be made as soon as practicable to his entire satisfaction.

Slocum and his corps met the appointment at Brandy Station September 25th. He here received dispatch from Meade stating that cars could not be there this day as desired and, inasmuch as the movement of his troops had been seen by the enemy, he should that evening march to Bealeton Station, and there secret his troops from the observation of the enemy's signal station on Clark's Mountain. This command was reported to the railway officials, accordingly, that Slocum was at Bealeton Station with 280 horses, and that ten cars would be required for baggage. On the twenty-seventh Slocum was requested by the authority at Washington to designate an officer to remain there until October 5th, to take charge of all officers and men of the XIth and XIIth Corps returning from furloughs, or exchanged with the enemy, also the recovered sick, and stragglers, and to go with them to rejoin their commands. Notice was, thereupon, inserted in the Washington daily newspapers for such soldiers to report to the officer detailed by Slocum.

The railway official at Bealeton reported to the Honorable E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War that, at 9.35 P. M. of the 27th

he had on cars all of General Slocum's men at that place excepting 3,300. At 11.35 P. M. of the same day it was reported from the Alexandria station that Slocum's artillery arm would march to Washington, and there take the Baltimore and Ohio Railway.

General Slocum kept near his men on this long military journey. He would pass on ahead to be present at each important point and to personally note the condition of affairs generally on the arrival of the troops. The only conveyances that could be provided for most of the rank and file by the railway companies, consisted of the ordinary freight cars of the box type, with plain boards across for seats. The Baltimore and Ohio Company made liberal openings along the sides for light and open air.

At Benwood, West Virginia, the troops made their first change of cars. They walked over a pontoon bridge prepared for them across the Ohio River at this place. General Slocum was there to receive them, to see them safely across and that their wants were fully met there, and for further progress. He was enthusiastically received by his men on all such occasions. To his general question, 'how are you standing the journey?' one Indianian replied, 'we would feel better about passing through Indiana if we had some money.' Upon further inquiry Slocum learned that the 27th Indiana Regiment had not received any money recently; and he promised to hasten payment. That evening Colonel Silas Colgrove, of this regiment, was informed that his men would receive their pay that night at Zanesville, Ohio; and they were kept awake most of the night by the paymasters. General Slocum also arranged for the Indiana men to remain one day at Indianapolis to meet their friends who were informed of their coming. At another station, Slocum was politely approached by a young soldier who desired a furlough for one day that he might stop off at his home town. A little inquiry elicited the fact that this soldier had been constantly in service more than two years. Slocum told him that he could not give anyone a furlough at this time; and he then proceeded to give the young man all the comfort he could, by saying to him: "If I had served in your regiment over two years without being home once, or absent from duty a single day, and was passing through my own home town, I would certainly stop for just a little while on my own responsibility. And I will say this



much, if you conclude to do so, and should get into trouble over it, I will do all I can to help you out."<sup>81</sup> This soldier made a short visit to his home, and reported for further service in good time.

As usual on public occasions, and particularly when public servants need food and cheer, numerous ladies, both young and old, greeted the soldiers at every stopping place, and their presence, with fruit and various other articles of food, patriotic songs, and other words of cheer, greatly relieved the monotony and fatigue of the long journey. Ohio and Indiana were loyal States, and loyal soldiers directly from the front in the enemy's country appealed warmly to their interest and sympathy. At Centerville, Indiana, nearby the Quaker City of Richmond, young ladies from the seminary gathered at the railway stations, 'sang many songs, and spoke many cheering words.' Many young soldiers exchanged names and addresses with young women in these States, and they later received loyal literature, and letters, which inspired to greater regard for their services to their country, and to their Creator. Doubtless, much of the dreariness of camp and picket duties was modified and attachments for life grew from acquaintances thus formed. The writer now frequently meets an excellent man whose father was one of these soldiers.

The cars of the Ohio Central Railway were found dark and unventilated; and call at once arose among the soldiers for the axes of their camp equipment. With a few of these necessary articles in hand, all of the light and air required were soon obtained. From Indianapolis the journey of most of the men was through Columbus, Seymour, and Jeffersonville.

The last of the large shipment of Slocum's men and horses, was made October 2nd, when the first contingent was passing through Nashville, Tennessee. The ammunition and small arms, and the regiments of infantry which were entitled to increased allowance for conscripts, were starting by trains from Alexandria, October 3rd.

A Union army wagon train of 350 was burned and many mules were killed about this time by the enemy in Tennessee, which raised anew the apprehensions of the railway officials and operatives, and even greater circumspection was exercised

regarding the trains bearing these corps and their equipment.

Colonel Innes, Superintendent of Military Roads south of Nashville, telegraphed October 5th that everything was unfavorable for forwarding troops; that the road had been broken in at least two places by the enemy south of Murfreesborough, and that 10,000 of the enemy's cavalry were there with artillery. By order of General Slocum, Innes was forwarding all troops to Murfreesborough and holding the artillery at Nashville. A dispatch from Louisville October 6th, stated that all the troops had arrived at Nashville excepting those with the artillery and horses, which were held subject to the orders of Commanding General Slocum at Nashville. A dispatch from Indianapolis the same day read that the last shipment was sent from there at 9.30 P. M., consisting of horses, baggage and caretakers, closing with the sentence, 'the movements of the XIth and XIIth Corps have been finished in nine days.'

General Daniel H. Rucker, Quartermaster, telegraphed from Washington, October 9th, that all of the transportation of the XIth and XIIth Corps had gone forward; that of the XIth Corps consisting of 150 four-horse teams, 156 six-mule teams, and 75 two-horse ambulances all with horses, harness, wagon-masters, assistant wagon-masters, and drivers, and all in good order. The numbers of the XIth Corps were about the same as those of the XIIth as stated above. The first of the last-named shipment was made Sunday evening, October 4th, and the last Wednesday evening, October 7th. Quartermaster-General Montgomery C. Meigs telegraphed from Louisville October 17th that all the rolling stock of the railway from that place to Stevenson, Alabama, was then in use of the War Department; that some of the animals had suffered from the journey, and he had directed that others be substituted from the stock there; and that rest and food would recruit the jaded travelers.

This was considered a remarkable record for these railways at that time in their earlier history. The distance traveled was about 1,200 miles; the number of soldiers carried, approximately 24,000, with wagons and other equipment as before named. The military management held every employee as well as official responsible for the full and prompt performance of his duty, and permitted no unnecessary delay.



## CHAPTER XXIV

## AGAINST THE ENEMY'S CAVALRY RAIDS

The Battle of Chickamauga Creek, Georgia, was fought September 19th and 20th. The command of the Union General William S. Rosecrans was outnumbered by the enemy and was obliged to retreat, although his losses were much less than those of the foe. Rosecrans took refuge in Chattanooga, and his able supporter, General George H. Thomas, followed and, September 21st, he took up positions at Rossville and Dry Valley Gap of Mission Ridge. The Confederate General, Braxton Bragg, leisurely followed the Union army and, September 22nd he took positions on Lookout Mountain and Mission Ridge.

At Louisville, Kentucky, General Slocum assured himself that his corps had received, or would receive, all the implements and tools necessary for his troops in the mountainous regions of their destination; also an extra wagon-load of such articles for each of his divisions.

In addition to reports from other sources, October 3rd General Rosecrans notified the XIth and XIIth Corps of the great Confederate cavalry raids being made by Generals Joseph Wheeler and Philip D. Roddy through the country they were to pass, and he directed the XIIth Corps to stop on the railway, one division at Wartrace, Tennessee, southeast of Nashville and, if possible, another division at Decherd nearer the Alabama State line 'till the raid blows over' as Union cavalry were in pursuit of the foe. The arrival of Slocum's men was of great service to the Union cause, as they acted an important part in protecting the towns, railway, United States property, and in aiding the Union cavalry in dispersing the enemy not captured.

The enemy captured and burned McMinnville east of Wartrace October 4th; and he was reported as advancing westward on Manchester. General R. S. Granger of Nashville desired information regarding the Union force at Manchester and, October 4th, asked General Hooker, then at Stevenson, Alabama, for report. Butterfield, Chief of Hooker's staff referred Granger to Slocum. The Confederates were deflected from Manchester. General J. A. Garfield, afterward President of United States, now Chief of Rosecrans's staff, asked Hooker October 4th, to

station sufficient detachments of Slocum's men along the railway between Nashville, Tennessee, and Bridgeport, Alabama, as would secure the Union communications against cavalry raids of the enemy. The next day General Slocum was directed to place a sufficient force in Murfreesborough for the protection of United States stores there. Much excitement prevailed. Different commanders of subordinate rank wanted to divide and order around Slocum's troops. Hooker was yet erratic and unstable. He took the XIth and part of the XIIth Corps to Stevenson, and then sent many of these troops back to Bridgeport. He was ordered by Rosecrans to call these troops back to Stevenson, and to send most of General Slocum's men back to Decherd. The rapid movements of the enemy's large cavalry forces, and the severity of their dealings with towns, supplies, railway bridges, and every other thing likely to embarrass the Union troops, spread fear and confusion of action. Union cavalry were in pursuit, however, and the active enemy could not long remain free wanderers.

At 11 A. M. October 4th Slocum received notice that the railway from Wartrace southward to Tantalum was assigned to his protection. The transportation and ambulance trains had been temporarily stopped, and all bridges and trestles were guarded as well as possible with the men in hand. Again, at 11.50 P. M. Slocum received an order from Hooker to send back northward to Murfreesborough as many troops as might be required to make that city secure. This town was again threatened by General Wheeler's cavalry variously estimated to number from 4,000 to 10,000 men. Slocum hurried 7,000 troops thither, meantime protecting the railway between Wartrace and that city as best he could. The enemy, being warned of this rally, turned toward Shelbyville some miles from Wartrace and off Slocum's line of protection.

Call came to Slocum October 5th for two regiments of infantry to be sent northward to Christiana before daylight next morning to attack the enemy there, and to keep communication open. At six P. M. a call came for immediate action against the enemy at Christiana. The next morning Wheelers full force, including twelve to twenty-four pieces of artillery, was reported near Shelbyville. They burned this town. Wartrace was attacked



by part of the enemy. He was defeated there, but succeeded in driving small detachments of Slocum's guards away from their stations and thus separating for a short time his line of communication. Rations were getting short and, railway communications being broken, a reduction of one-third ration in issuing was ordered.

General Slocum was in Nashville October 6th attending to the adjustment of supplies in transit. This day he wrote to Butterfield, Hooker's Chief of staff, that he would withdraw his troops from Murfreesborough and elsewhere north, and take up the guarding of the railway between Wartrace and Tantalón, unless soon ordered otherwise. Meantime all efforts were given to repairing lines of communication destroyed by the enemy. The 7th, part of Slocum's XIIth Corps were yet guarding the railway between Cowan and Bridgeport, which shows continued wide separation. This day General A. S. Williams of Slocum's First Division, telegraphed from Murfreesborough to General Slocum at Nashville, asking directions regarding movement of troops, and reporting that Union cavalry were in pursuit of the fleeing enemy, and that 'it is plain General Hooker knew nothing of the condition of matters this way' while he was issuing irrelative orders from Stevenson. The same day Williams reported to Hooker that the condition of affairs along the railway were not so serious as he thought, and that all communications would soon be reestablished.

Report from Nashville October 8th showed that the part of the XIIth Corps troops belated at Washington from several causes, were being forwarded to Murfreesborough; also the horses and supplies, all requiring at least one hundred cars a day. The 9th Slocum's troops had everything well in hand, yet with line extended southward between Murfreesborough and Tantalón; and communications were fully repaired this day. Small bands of the enemy continued active, however, threatening the wires, bridges, and railway water supplies, requiring constant vigilance of the Union guards, by night as well as day. The detachments of troops were intrenched at every necessary point of vantage where they could keep the condition of affairs under surveillance.

It had been necessary that General Slocum visit Nashville again regarding the oncoming troops and wagon trains. He re-

turned to Murfreesborough the evening of October 9th to meet General Butterfield. Further complaint was made the next evening that the non-arrival of the belated eastern troops, and the continued requests of an unusual number of general officers, were embarrassing the small detachments spread along the railway, and leaving their places open to the enemy. But the enemy was being rapidly depleted by deaths in skirmishes and in disablenents and captures by the Union troops.

General Slocum's First Division moved its headquarters to Decherd October 10th, and General Williams reported that the enemy had been active thereabout, and that his own movement had been arduous and not eminently fruitful. He found the railway tunnel at Cowan blocked, and the enemy hiding in the woods nearby.

General Geary, of Slocum's Second Division, also reported the 10th, regarding his command at Murfreesborough, an important depot of United States supplies, that in addition to his Second Division of the XIIth Corps he had troops, as follows: the 19th Michigan Volunteer Infantry, Colonel H. C. Gilbert, with effective strength of 478 men; 22nd Wisconsin, Colonel W. L. Utley, 321; Detachment of the 4th East Tennessee Cavalry, Major Stephens, and detachment of dismounted men of the 1st Brigade, IInd Cavalry Division, Lieutenant-Colonel J. J. Seibert, aggregating 270 men. Troops in Fort Rosecrans, Major C. Houghtaling, commanding; First Illinois Light Artillery, 938; Stragglers of the XIth and XIIth Army Corps, Captain W. J. Mackey of the 147th Pennsylvania Volunteers commanding, 124 men. Total 2,131.

The armament of Fort Rosecrans consisted of: 11 8-inch siege howitzers; 15 24-pounder James's rifled siege guns; 16 6-pounder smoothbore field guns; 2 12-pounder howitzers, field; One 10-pounder rifled Parrot, field; 4 6-pounder rifled James, field; One 3-inch rifled Rodman, field; and One 3-inch bronze, field gun. Total 51 cannon. General Slocum also had eleven outpost stations near Fort Rosecrans.

General Hooker, being in cheerful, elated and communicative state of mind, October 11th, he wrote from Stevenson, Alabama, to Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War, that, if he projected the transference of the XIth and XIIth Corps to the De-



partment of the Cumberland, he might well claim the merit of having saved Chattanooga to the Union cause.

As soon as the Confederate General Bragg found it not practicable to attack Rosecrans in Chattanooga, or Thomas at Rossville, Bragg started his cavalry on its strong and rapid raiding tour to cut off all communications and supplies, and thus compel the surrender of the Union forces to prevent their starvation. Such would have been an early result but for the prompt arrival of Slocum's and Howard's forces.

## CHAPTER XXV

### MUCH HARD WORK, AND BUT LITTLE HONOR

Slocum kept his men busy, as much as practicable by extending and strengthening intrenchments and stockades, and in securing good water supplies from the enemy who was active to destroy by pollution if necessary. This, with the receipt and adjustment of the great army trains necessary to put the troops again on a full war basis, required much time and fatiguing work by officers and troops.

Not being content at Stevenson Hooker, with his persistence in annoying Slocum with frequent orders of a dictatorial nature, most of which were unnecessary and, withal very irritating to Slocum's sensitive spirit, he wrote a letter to President Lincoln October 12, making gratuitous suggestion that Slocum 'be tendered a command in Missouri or somewhere else.' His letter further reads: "Unless he gives more satisfaction in the discharge of his duties, he will soon find himself in deeper water than he has been wading in. I shall deal very deliberately with him. I will incur reproach if I allow the public interest to suffer by his contumacy. He now appears to be swayed entirely by passion in the exercise of his office. I hear that his grievances are hostility to myself, association with the Eleventh Corps, and disrespect shown his rank in detailing him for this service. It seems that he aspired to the command of the Army of the Potomac, and that mortal offense was given in not naming him first. Of these you probably know more than myself. I should rejoice to have the Twelfth Corps put in Butterfield's hands."

The writer would not mention such personal differences

were this effusion of Hooker, and much other, not embraced in the publications of the War Department<sup>62</sup> and were exploited malignly against General Slocum. Not a little time and effort have been expended by the writer with desire to find evidence warranting this tirade of Hooker against Slocum and, in the writer's opinion, it was not warranted. That Slocum chafed under Hooker's unjust censoriousness is doubtless true, but his writings afford no evidence of desire on his part to annoy or embarrass Hooker, much less the service to which he devoted all his energies. Slocum's desire was to keep away from Hooker and his command. There is evidence, however, of Hooker's continued efforts to criminate Slocum by censorious expressions and needless inquiry into the cause of a few detached soldiers fleeing, and thus saving themselves and their equipment, from an overwhelming force of the raiding enemy. Slocum was at this time at Nashville, over fifty miles distant, attending to his major duties. Undoubtedly Hooker's able and gentlemanly chief of staff, Major-General Daniel Butterfield, was able to tide his chief over many erratic and absurd denunciations, errors of commission and of omission, that would otherwise have caused his dismissal from the army definitely.<sup>62</sup> A less considerate man than Slocum would have positively resigned and left the service. He having been placed in such objectionable company, even subordinated to it, by President Lincoln the latter would soon fulfill his promise, and he felt that the present condition would continue only during this emergency.

Colonel Thomas A. Scott reported from Louisville October 13th that there was an abundance of equipment for the XIth and XIIth Corps on the railway line between there and Bridgeport, Alabama, to supply 140 cars a day if they could be free from accident and the enemy. The equipment referred to included not only the animals for the army wagons but beef cattle, forage for the animals, rations for the men and other army supplies. None of the XIIth Corps equipment had passed Nashville this day. Forage was scarce for the officers' horses, and liberal price was offered farmers in their vicinity for all that they could supply. But the enemy's raiders had consumed much and destroyed more, and the farmers received no real money from them.



There had been so much of change and interchange, and at times of confusion therefrom, that General Slocum issued his General Orders Number 26, under the date of October 13th, formally assuming command of the United States troops along the Nashville and Chattanooga Railway from Murfreesborough to Tanton. Five hundred of the enemy's cavalry were sighted this day, but they escaped unharmed there being no Union cavalry to pursue them.

The character, and depleted condition, at this date of the XIIth Corps, particularly of the Third Brigade of the 1st Division, was reported by its commander, General Thomas H. Ruger, at his headquarters, Tullahoma, Tennessee, namely:

Colonel W. Hawley commanding at Elk River with the 3rd Wisconsin Volunteers, 312 enlisted men; 2nd Massachusetts Volunteers, 290 men under Colonel Cogswell; 107th New York Volunteers (eight companies) 270 under Colonel Crance; 102nd Ohio Volunteers, 280, Major Elliott; 1st United States Colored Infantry, 800, Colonel Thompson; 33rd Indiana (detachment) 60, Captain Seaton; 2nd Kentucky Battery, 82 men, Captain Hewett; Engineer troops (detachment) 155 men. At Estill Springs: the 107th New York, two companies, 67 men, and at Trestle-work three miles south of Tullahoma the 150th New York (three companies) 120 men, Captain Wickes commanding.

At Tullahoma: the 27th Indiana, 320, Colonel Cosgrove; 13th New Jersey, 331, Colonel Carman; 150th New York (seven companies) 280 under Colonel Ketcham; 33rd Indiana (five companies) 286 men, Lieutenant-Colonel Henderson; and the 9th Ohio Battery (two sections), 84 men, Captain H. B. York, Two 12-pounder Napoleons, and Two 3-inch rifled cannon.

General John W. Geary, in command of Slocum's Second Division, reported October 13th from his headquarters at Murfreesborough, the positions of his scattered troops, in substance as follows:

Colonel Cobham was ordered by telegraph at 10.15 this morning to detach two companies to Shelbyville. IIrd Brigade, Colonel G. A. Cobham, headquarters at Christiana; the 111th Pennsylvania Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel T. M. Walker, at Christiana, on picket duty and patrolling the railway from within three miles of Murfreesborough to Murray's Cut; 109th Pennsylvania Volunteers, Captain F. L. Gimber, at the Millersburg and Columbus Cross-Roads, on picket and patrolling railway to connect with regiment last named; the 29th Pennsylvania Volunteers, Colonel W. Richards, Jr., at Posterville (two companies at Shelbyville), on picket, patrolling railway to Bell Buckle, and connecting with the last named regiment. IIIrd Brigade, Brigadier-General George S. Greene, headquarters at Murfreesborough; with the 78th New York Volunteers, Lieutenant

H. von Hammerstein, on railway bridge over west fork of Stone's River about three miles south of Murfreesborough; 60th New York Volunteers, Colonel A. Godard; 102nd New York Volunteers, Colonel Lane, and 19th Michigan Volunteers, Colonel H. C. Gilbert, stationed at Murfreesborough, near railway depot; 149th New York Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Randall; 22nd Wisconsin Volunteers, Colonel W. L. Utley, and detachments of convalescents, in Fortress Rosecrans, near Murfreesborough.

Fortress Rosecrans, Major C. Houghtaling, 1st Illinois Light Artillery, commanding: Detachment of dismounted cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel J. J. Seibert, on Court House Square, Murfreesborough; Detachment of 4th East Tennessee Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel J. M. Thornburgh, at Murfreesborough when not out on scouting duty.

Detachment of infantry, from 1st Brigade IVth Division of the XIVth Army Corps, Lieutenant G. W. Boggess, near Fortress Rosecrans. 1st Brigade, Colonel Charles Candy, headquarters at Duck River; with the 7th and 66th Ohio Volunteers, at Wartrace; the 28th and 147th Pennsylvania Volunteers, at Duck River; 5th and 29th Ohio Volunteers, at Normandy Trestle. Report of other scattered commands of Colonel Candy had not been received at this date.

The 137th New York Volunteers, Colonel David Ireland, of the IIIrd Brigade, was guarding wagons on their way to Tanton.

The details of keeping such widely scattered troops in soldierly bearing and discipline required far more attention from the general officers than a compact army in the field against the enemy. Whenever possible the scattered troops were protected in the best possible way from the weather and the enemy's firearms. Earthworks of various forms were constructed, logs and timber were used for stockades, bastions, sleeping and resting shelters and for traverses, and trees in abatis.

## CHAPTER XXVI

### BATTLE OF WAUHATCHIE BY SLOCUM'S MEN

President Lincoln ordered, through the War Department, October 16th, an important change by merging the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and of the Tennessee, into the Military Division of the Mississippi. General U. S. Grant was placed in command of the Division, with headquarters in the field. General Rosecrans was relieved of his command of the Army of the Cumberland, and General George H. Thomas was named as his successor. In this order General Grant's attention



was called to two of his first duties: the supply of his armies, and the closing of the passes in the Georgia Mountains for the shutting of the enemy from Tennessee and Kentucky.

General A. S. Williams, with headquarters at Decherd, Tennessee, among his reports to General Slocum October 17th, mentioned as resident there, Captain Sims who had been commissioned brigadier-general and military governor, by Governor Andrew Johnson, afterwards Vice President of the United States, and President after the death of Abraham Lincoln. Notwithstanding his claims, this product of Governor Johnson did not materially interfere with the United States authority.

General Slocum was asked October 18th, to yet further divide his command by sending his II<sup>nd</sup> Division to Bridgeport to advance to the front; also to extend other detachments to take the place of a brigade of the XI<sup>th</sup> Corps by sending three companies of infantry near Tantalum, two companies to Anderson, two companies to Cowan, three companies between Stevenson and Bridgeport, Alabama, and the remainder of the brigade, with brigade headquarters, to Stevenson. This was for the purpose of making an advance against the enemy, primarily to open communication between Bridgeport and Chattanooga, both by land and the Tennessee River, to supply the short rationed Army of the Cumberland and, secondarily, as a starting of a general advance of the Union forces against the enemy.

Slocum's movements and readjustments were necessarily made by marchings, from want of sufficient railway equipment to carry them by rail.

General George H. Thomas assumed command of the Army of the Cumberland October 19th, and General Rosecrans was ordered to the north. This day General Slocum sent an officer to Nashville to forward wagons, ambulances, hospital stores, ammunition, and all other supplies necessary for his commands.

Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, and special correspondent of the secretary, wrote from Chattanooga October 23rd that an immediate movement of the Union troops for the occupation of Raccoon Mountain and Lookout Valley was indispensable. General Hooker had been ordered the 13th to mass his troops for this purpose, but he waited for wagons although Thomas would not permit him to use them in this short journey

in the valley; and Hooker had no zeal in the enterprise. Hooker was behindhand. Dana met him at Bridgeport, his starting point October 27th, and found him "in an unfortunate state of mind for one who has to co-operate, fault finding, criticising, dissatisfied."<sup>61</sup>

Hooker started his forces, composed of Howard's XI<sup>th</sup> Army Corps and Slocum's Second Division, in part, of the XII<sup>th</sup> Corps, at daylight October 27th, Howard taking the lead. Howard went through to near Brown's Ferry where he arrived about three P. M. without serious opposition. Thomas's men were there with pontoons for a bridge. They met with some opposition but were victors with small loss, and completed their work. Hooker halted Slocum's men under General Geary, about three miles back from the Union front, and directed their camp for the night at Wauhatchie, the intersection of Kelly's Ferry and Brown's Ferry roads (see map). Here we will let Dana describe the condition: "These positions not only invited attack from the enemy, who could see everything from the top of Lookout Mountain, but were very bad for the defense of the Valley, and General Hazen, commanding the forces on the hills, went to General Hooker and endeavored to get him to take up a compact line across the valley, and to bring all his forces together. But being confident the enemy would not disturb him, Hooker refused to change his dispositions."

The enemy formed a plan to surprise Geary's small division, rout it, capture his animals, and set fire to all supplies he could not carry away. About the middle of the night Geary's trusted pickets were impetuously attacked and driven in, with the furious enemy at their heels with 'unearthly yells wherein these Confederates stood confessedly unrivalled.' The enemy's forces though rattle-brained and exhausted from their great efforts to frighten, were highly expectant of an easy prey. But Geary and his men, true to the discipline received from Slocum, were in no wise inclined to panic or running. Although the enemy charged on three sides, he was met with a steady, direct fire into each of his fronts, such as running, excited men could neither direct nor escape. This fire rapidly withered their ranks. Those at close range began to surrender, and those further away deployed with little change in result. Geary's four cannon on nearby knoll also



did great execution. From the prisoners it was learned that the assailants were Hood's division of Longstreet's corps, General Micah Jenkins being in immediate command. After between three and four hours the enemy was withdrawn, leaving 153 of his dead in Geary's front, and over 100 prisoners. General Geary fortified his position the next day, while shot and shells from the enemy's guns on the Mountain fell 'in every portion of the works, without any casualties or interference with the workers.'

Seven of Geary's regiments had not joined him in time for this engagement at Wauhatchie; one was holding the pass between Whitesides and Trenton, and the 29th Pennsylvania was engaged on grand guard duty. The actual (severe) fighting throughout the battle was sustained, in conjunction with the artillery, by the 137th New York Volunteers, the 109th, 111th, and portions of the 29th Pennsylvania Volunteers, embracing 41 officers with 743 men. Slocum's other regiments present were actively engaged but part of the time. Their presence, however, retarded the movements of the enemy to a degree. The Union losses were: Staff, 4 wounded; the 78th New York, 15 killed, 75 wounded; 149th New York, 1 killed, 11 wounded; 29th Pennsylvania, 1 killed, 6 wounded, and 2 missing; 109th Pennsylvania, 5 killed, 23 wounded, and 4 missing; 111th Pennsylvania, 9 killed, 34 wounded, and 2 missing; Knapp's Pennsylvania Battery, 3 killed, and 19 wounded.

General George S. Greene, an able and faithful brigade commander of Gettysburg fame, was seriously wounded early in the battle. He did not rejoin his brigade until it arrived in North Carolina, completing its great march from Atlanta.

General Geary's son was among the killed. "When the rays of the rising sun came over Lookout Mountain they fell with a mellow light upon the tall and portly form of General Geary, standing with bowed head on the summit of the knoll, while before him lay the lifeless form of a lieutenant of artillery. Scattered about were cannon, battered and bullet-marked caissons and limbers, and many teams of horses dead in harness. There were many other dead, but none attracted his attention save this one, for he was his son. The men, respecting his sorrow, stood at a distance in silence, while he communed with his grief."<sup>63</sup>

Lieutenant E. R. Geary of the artillery, son of the General, was a young man of excellent character. His father wrote of him in his official report as follows: "I may be permitted to remark, I experience, in conjunction with the keen regrets of a commanding officer for a worthy officer, the pangs of a father's grief for a cherished son, whose budding worth in wealth of intellect and courage was filling full the cup of paternal pride."

General Geary estimated the enemy's losses in this battle as fully 1,000 men. Hooker stated in his report that 'it cannot fall short of fifteen hundred.' But Hooker was several miles distant. The disproportion between the Union and Confederate losses was due to the calmness of Slocum's men who were instructed to aim so as to strike chest or abdomen of the foe, while the enemy aimed high, lost far more in prisoners, and largely in desertions.

At 3.30 P. M. of October 29th Geary sent for reinforcements, with notice that they guard well their right bank. At 7:25 P. M. his headquarters reported to Butterfield that two brigades of General Schurz's division were with him. They were placed near Rowden's House, Wauhatchie. The enemy made no further attack; and, with the connection now opened and maintained between Bridgeport and Chattanooga, by both railway and river, rations in full were soon established, excepting occasional delays from poor condition of the railway. The successful midnight Battle of Wauhatchie by Slocum's men had settled the most important question of food supplies for the Army of the Cumberland.

Assistant Secretary Dana wrote to the Secretary of War, from Chattanooga, October 29th, that: "Grant also wishes to have both Hooker and Slocum removed from his command, and the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps consolidated under Howard. He would himself order Hooker and Slocum away, but hesitates because they have just been sent here by the President. Besides, I think he would rather prefer that so serious a proceeding should come from headquarters. Hooker has behaved badly ever since his arrival,<sup>64</sup> and Slocum has just sent in a very disorderly communication, stating that when he came here it was under promise that he should not have to serve under Hooker, whom he neither regards with confidence as an officer nor respects as a man. Altogether Grant feels that their presence here is replete with both



trouble and danger; besides, the smallness of the two corps requires their consolidation."

The signature of Major-General U. S. Grant appears at the bottom of the following writing under date of Chattanooga, October 26th, namely: "Indorsement on letter from Major-General H. W. Slocum, Twelfth Corps, asking to be relieved from duty under General Hooker: Respectfully forwarded to headquarters of the army, Washington, D. C.

"On taking command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, I found Major-General Hooker in command of the Eleventh and Twelfth Army Corps. His position is one that rather embarrasses the service than benefits it, inasmuch as detaching one of these corps would leave two commanders for one small army corps. As General Slocum objects to serving under General Hooker, who has been assigned to his present command by the President, I would respectfully recommend that General Hooker be assigned to the command of the Twelfth Army Corps and General Slocum relieved from further duty."<sup>65</sup>

Copy of General Slocum's second resignation further than the foregoing has not been found (for reference to his first resignation see the index), nor has any record been found that the War Department took any notice of Hooker's fulmination (see ante) or of Grant's recommendation. The authorities at Washington knew too much of Slocum's worth to the Union cause, however, to accept his resignation from the army. Why they appointed Hooker to this command, they well knowing his intemperate habits and shattered nervous system, and why they kept him at this time 'to embarrass the service' is not apparent. The average verdict would probably be, that they should not have coupled Slocum and Hooker together for this work in Tennessee, but having done so, they should have separated them at this time, in justice to Slocum at least.

General George H. Thomas, commanding general of the Army of the Cumberland, to whom General Slocum sent his letter desiring relief from Hooker's further dictation, wrote to Slocum as follows: "You are to command all troops stationed on the railroad from Murfreesborough to Bridgeport, both inclusive. You will pass over the line and make such disposition as you deem best, and report to these headquarters [Chattanooga not to

Hooker] where you think it advisable to establish your headquarters. The message sent you in cipher referred to your communication marked personal, which has been referred to General Grant." Surely Dana was drawing a very long bow when he styled General Slocum's communication to General Thomas (marked personal and mentioning his Washington agreement regarding Hooker) 'a very disorderly communication.'

General Slocum issued his General Orders Number 27 in accordance with General Thomas's communication.

General Hooker's position at Wauhatchie was considered a weak one by army engineers and, October 30th, he was ordered to change to a strong line running diagonally across Lookout Valley, his right covering the Kelly's Ferry Road and resting on Raccoon Mountain, and his left resting on one of the series of hills which formed the engineers' bridge head and extended up the Lookout Valley. The enemy continued cannoneering against the Union forces, but without effect.<sup>66</sup>

## CHAPTER XXVII

### BATTLE ABOVE THE CLOUDS BY SLOCUM'S MEN

Abstract of returns from the Department of the Cumberland October 31st, show the status of XIIth Army Corps to have been as follows:

Major-General H. W. Slocum commanding, with headquarters at Wartrace, Tennessee, with escort of 14 officers and 145 enlisted men present for duty, and with aggregate present and absent, 237.

Ist Division, General A. S. Williams with headquarters at Tullahoma, 255 officers, and 4,310 enlisted men present for duty, and an aggregate present and absent of 7,417.

IIInd Division, General John W. Geary with headquarters at Wauhatchie, with 219 officers and 3,904 men present for duty, and an aggregate present and absent of 7,248.

Artillery, 11 officers and 343 men present for duty, and an aggregate present and absent of 469, with 20 cannon.

Total present for duty, 499 officers, with 8,702 enlisted men, and an aggregate present and absent of 15,371.



These numbers are materially less than those of the last return, from losses in engagements with the enemy, and deaths from disease. The Abstract of returns of this Corps November 20th, show some increase, as follows:

Present for duty, officers, 511; enlisted men, 8,206; aggregate present for duty, 10,206, with 26 cannon. Those absent were not enumerated in this report. At this time the XIth Army Corps was reported with only 7,769 present for duty.

On November 6th Dana reported that General Thomas had passed the day visiting Hooker's lines in Lookout Valley, that he found the lines very negligently placed, and the rifle pits badly done. "Apparently this is the first time Howard has ridden the lines of his corps. Hooker seems to pay little attention to his duties."<sup>66</sup> This will remind the reader of Chancellorsville, and again show why General Slocum would not have further association with Hooker; and why he chafed from his Second Division, under General Geary, being nominally under Hooker's command.

Major-General William T. Sherman, who had been in command of the XVth Army Corps, operating in Mississippi, was appointed by General Grant Commander of the Department and Army of the Tennessee October 19th. Sherman assumed this command October 24th when at Iuka, Mississippi; and he at once took up the march, and arrived at Chattanooga in person November 19th. The greater part of his XVth Corps arrived the next day, with a division of the XVIIth Corps.

Preparations were nearly completed for advancing against the enemy on Lookout Mountain, and Missionary Ridge. Part of Sherman's troops not arriving in time, Howard and his XIth Corps were taken from Hooker by Sherman instead. The Tennessee River rising at this time from flooding rains, and disabling the bridges, part of Sherman's belated troops were turned to Hooker's command, consisting of two brigades under Generals James A. Williamson and Charles R. Woods from General Peter J. Osterhaus's division. Hooker was also given command of two brigades under Generals William Grose and Walter C. Whitaker from General Charles Cruft's division of the IVth Corps Army of the Cumberland.

Part of Hooker's forces began active preparation for the


advance on Lookout Mountain November 23rd, namely: Slocum's Second Division, under General Geary, was extended so as to include the entire position previously maintained by Howard's XIth Army Corps and Geary's own command combined, the line extending from the confluence of Lookout Creek with the Tennessee River at its left to the top of Raccoon Mountain with its right (see map).

It was decided not to attempt to take even the lightest of artillery up the Mountain side. The day before the storming of the Mountain's crest General Geary stationed his section of Slocum's artillery as follows: One section of Knapp's Pennsylvania Battery, under Lieutenant McGill to accompany the storming column to the point of massing, then to return and be placed on a hill half way between the old mill and Bald Hill under the supervision of Major J. A. Reynolds, Chief of Artillery, who also placed two sections of Battery K, 1st Ohio Artillery (light 12-pounders) under Lieutenant Sahm, on Bald Hill near the junction of the creek with the river; and he put two sections of Battery I, 1st New York Artillery on a hill opposite Lookout Point and behind Bald Hill. One Section of 20-pounder Parrott's, of the 4th Ohio Battery was placed in the gap to the right, and one section of howitzers of the 1st Iowa Battery placed to command the approaches to the lower bridge from the hill on the right of the gap. Two sections of Knapp's Pennsylvania Battery had been placed on an eminence to the left of Kelly's Ferry Road on the original line of defense, from which they could command the sides of Lookout Mountain. All of the artillery thus placed could work on the enemy's upper fortifications.

As protectors of the most exposed part of his valley position, and gunners, Geary placed two hundred of his grand guards, chosen from different regiments, along the creek from Wauhatchie Junction to the left of the Kelley's Ferry Road, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel E. Powell of the 66th Ohio Volunteer Infantry.

Slocum's men were at the head of the column for the storming of Lookout Mountain November 24th. General W. C. Whitaker with six regiments of the 1st and 2nd Divisions of the IVth Army Corps, were subordinate to General John W. Geary who was also in immediate command of Slocum's IIInd Division of





Showing the Sites of the Battles of Wauhatchie and Lookout Mountain  
where General Slocum's men won Great Victories

the XIIth Army Corps. All of these troops were in light marching order for active, energetic work for scaling the Mountain and attacking the enemy.

Crossing the railway at Wauhatchie Junction, they passed under cover of the woods to an old mill about two and a half miles up the Lookout Creek from its mouth. At this time clouds enveloped the Mountain top, while heavy misty fog obscured the Mountain side from distant view, favoring the advance of the Union force. Pioneers were sent forward under protective skirmishers, to bridge the creek which was swollen from copious rains. A detachment from Slocum's 66th Ohio Regiment was also sent to another point of the Mountain approach to make demonstration for the purpose of diverting the attention of the enemy away from the chosen points of ascent. This stratagem was successful.

When the creek bridge was completed, Slocum's advance skirmishers were instructed to capture the enemy's pickets in the front by ready, quick movement without firing a gun. The skirmishers were veterans, true to their training, and they captured forty-three of the enemy's pickets including one negro in the rapid round up.

The leading column, of Slocum's men, began crossing Lookout Creek at 8.30 A. M., the Second Brigade under Colonel G. A. Cobham, Jr., rapidly leading the right up the slope in a direct line from the creek crossing to the upper front palisade of the Mountain. Colonel David Ireland, in command of the Third Brigade of Slocum's Second Division since the wounding of General George S. Greene in the Battle of Wauhatchie, followed, joining Cobham on the left. Then General Whitaker's brigade followed, and Colonel Charles Candy with Geary's First Brigade of Slocum's men, closed the rear.

The line of battle was formed as follows: Cobham in front of right, with two regiments; Ireland with four regiments in the center; Candy on the left in echelon, at about thirty paces interval to the troops on his right; and the 66th Ohio Regiment and three companies of the 5th Ohio in echelon as reserve. This constituted the front, covering the slopes from Lookout Creek to the palisade of Lookout Mountain top. The 8th Kentucky Regiment, the 35th Indiana, 99th and 40th Ohio, respectively, in order from the right of Whitaker's brigade,



formed the second line of support, about three hundred and fifty yards to the rear of the front line, the right remaining opposite Cobham's center. About one hundred yards in the rear of the supporting line were placed the 96th Illinois Regiment and the 51st Ohio, also of Whitaker's brigade. Each subordinate command held this relative position remarkably well, excepting from the necessary changes of Candy from the changing contour of his way. Hooker had little, if anything, to do in formulating the plan of attack; and he remained in a place of safety at his previous headquarters miles away.

The numerous skirmishers kept the front line from being surprised by the enemy throughout the day. But sharpshooters above the palisade rock were annoying whenever the clouds raised to enable them to aim well. The right of Cobham's advancing line was held, by the 29th Pennsylvania Regiment, close to the rugged palisade, or precipice, of the Mountain's summit. This gradually separated the left obliquely from the creek, lengthened the line after a mile's advance, and changed Candy's echelon to two lines. The slope of the Mountain was often nearly a forty-five degree angle; and it was frequently broken into gullies and ravines, the latter varying from fifty to even one hundred feet in depth, generally with rather precipitous and rocky sides which made the sliding down one side and clambering up the other not only difficult but dangerous from liability of their comrades' guns being accidentally discharged, and rocks easily loosened to roll or slide with rapidity and force against the soldiers below.

When nearing the turning point around Point Lookout, the skirmishers reported a movement of the enemy above in support of comrades in rifle pits near the flats and river. This caused quick change of front and charge of the Union left, and this part of the enemy was routed from the pits. The fords were thus uncovered; and the Union troops held there in reserve advanced to new positions.

Badge of the



XIIth Army Corps

## CHAPTER XXVIII

## THE BATTLE ABOVE THE CLOUDS, CONCLUDED

Candy's brigade was soon ordered at a right half wheel, and it hurried up the lower slope of the Mountain side while the line above moved relatively slower on the upper slopes.

The enemy's pickets were soon met in their well stationed and protected positions. They were at once attacked by the Union skirmishers, and driven back to the battle lines of their comrades who were formed about one mile beyond and near their camp which covered the entire plateau in front of the Union right and center. Approach to them displayed a formidable natural protection of rocks, made yet more formidable by breastworks of earth with tangled meshes without. These were the front of a network of rugged fortifications, in form of natural, and artificial irregular polygons, within which was the Confederate General E. C. Walthall's brigade of Mississippians in battle array.

Without dismay or hesitation Slocum's skirmishers, with their comrades at their heels, attacked the enemy, advancing as rapidly as possible and with bayonets fixed. They returned the enemy's fire in front and doubled on his flank. Regardless of the sharpshooters in the gorges, and on the crest during the lighter intervals of fog liftings, vigorous assault was made, Ireland's brigade and Cobham's 111th Pennsylvania Regiment closing in with the enemy in front, and the 29th Pennsylvania striking them forcibly in their left flank. Slocum's forces rapidly encompassed the camp, scaled the walls of the fortification, and so bayoneted and bruised Walthall's men that, in less than fifteen minutes, many of them threw down their arms and surrendered their colors. The others started to run away and were checked by shells from Slocum's watchful artillerists who were anxious to share in routing the enemy who surrendered, preferring capture to attempting to run the gauntlet of such accurate artillery work. These batteries also threw some shells over the heads of their comrades, into the fortifications on top of the Mountain which caused no little confusion there. Efforts of the enemy to use their artillery on the storming party resulted in no harm from their being unable to lower the muzzles of their guns



sufficiently. They then lighted the fuses of shells and hurled them over the palisade rock, but little harm was done by them. A Confederate regiment descended from the top of the Mountain through a pass in the rear of the Union right flank; and immediately the 29th Pennsylvania Regiment faced about and fired a volley into the newcomers that caused their immediate surrender.

Active advance work was continued by Slocum's men. The second serious obstructions met by them were the fortifications occupied by the Confederate General Thomas J. Churchill's brigade composed of Alabama and Georgia troops then commanded by General George Maney. The Union artillery ceased firing as Slocum's men rounded the curvature between the lower and uppermost ledges. This being attained, Colonels Ireland and Cobham's commands charged upon the fortifications held by Maney's troops who presented strong resistance for a short time. Ireland pressed the enemy hotly in the face of fierce volleys at close quarters; and Cobham's right poured into the enemy's flank yet more fatal volleys which caused the enemy to fall back from one protective work to another. He was vigorously followed in rear and flank, his retreat being constantly hastened, no time being given him to rally until he was beyond the fortifications and well out of reach of the Union assailants. Now, in addition to the pleasure of being victors, and in possession of much of the enemy's stronghold, the Union troops, who were mostly from less mountainous regions, reveled in the novelty of being about the clouds which had settled on the mountain slope. The air, and surrounding conditions, were exhilarating.

It was now midday and, between the riftings of the clouds, glimpses of General Osterhaus's division and of General Grose's brigade, of Sherman's belated troops were seen climbing the mountain a long way to the left of Slocum's men.

Reconnoissance discovered the retreated enemy massing a heavy line in Geary's front, on the east side of the mountain and extending from the palisade above to the valley below. Colonel Cobham was directed to advance seven or eight hundred yards around the point in order to command the enemy's flank, and make that of Geary secure. The mountain was here exceedingly steep, but Cobham was equal to the requirement and passed

his men singly along a narrow path at the base of the palisade of rock rising seventy-five to one hundred feet perpendicularly above them. They attained the desired position, and drove the enemy's skirmishers from the slope below, while their backs rested against the acclivity.

During Cobham's movement, Colonel Ireland continued the chase after the retreating enemy. He passed through a peach orchard on a narrow plateau, encircled a strong mass of protective works, captured them, fired on the retreating foe from them, then leaped over the rear wall, and assailed another line with like result. At the time of the attainment of Cobham's new position, Ireland was engaging the enemy intrenched behind a stone wall running parallel with the Union line from the Craven House, often called White House. Ireland's center divided at this house directly across the enemy's line, and the 60th and 137th New York Volunteer Regiments dashed through the yard, captured two cannon there and, throwing the flag of the last named regiment over the guns to denote their capture, passed on, while the 149th New York Volunteers swerved to the left of the house, and all actively engaged the enemy, the entire force rapidly capturing prisoners, continuing an effective firing, and keeping up with the retreating foe over successive belts of ramparts through the level area, the enemy reluctantly yielding each protected point. The State of New York has erected a beautiful monumental shaft at this point in honor of Colonel Ireland's (formerly Greene's) brigade of Slocum's men.

About five hundred yards beyond the Craven House, by the Mountain Road, the enemy before mentioned in heavy force (afterward learned to be three large brigades of Confederate Generals William H. T. Walker and Carter L. Stevenson's divisions) well covered in the woods and by rocks, received their comrades who had been routed by Slocum's men. Colonel Ireland, without consideration of their overwhelming numbers, fresh condition, and strong position, fiercely attacked them. General Whitaker, who had been halted at the Craven House, was ordered to send part of one of his regiments to the support of Ireland's left. It met strong resistance, and was soon withdrawn. The enemy made several charges against Ireland's command and was handsomely repulsed each time. Ireland's entire force was



hotly engaged, and Cobham then seeing his opportunity from his exalted perch, poured volley after volley into the enemy's left flank, enflading his lines so as to make his position untenable. Unfortunately for the Unionists at that time the clouds, which had been for some time raised above the scene, now settled upon Cobham's men and continued to obscure the enemy who, being relieved from the disastrous fire, gave attention to his wounded, and to the reforming of his lines.

Now came an order out of the great distance from the commanding general, Hooker, for Geary to halt on the heights and strengthen the Union position there, Hooker not realizing the great advance gained. While Geary was planning to hold not only the heights but all of his advanced position below, Osterhaus's men came up and were formed on Ireland's left which, with other parts of Slocum's men, enabled him to form a strong line to retain all the ground gained from the upper palisade down well toward Chattanooga Creek. Whitaker's brigade was held as reserve on line with the Craven House. All parts of Geary's force which were not well positioned and protected in the captured works of the enemy, proceeded to construct works for their protection. Colonel Cobham's command cut into the side of the mountain for more room and protection. Soon after midday their flag was hoisted on the highest accessible point of the mountain gained November 24th.

About one o'clock in the afternoon the enemy assaulted in force the left of Geary's division of Slocum's men, but he was driven back to his cover notwithstanding the hasty retreat of a supporting Union regiment of another command.

Slocum's men had been at the front and on the heels of the enemy in all of the four miles of strenuous advance. The severe exertion on the steep mountain sides, with their gullies and ravines, caused the profuse perspiration and fatigue. Their animated assaultings and pursuits of the enemy, continued as they were, were not less fatiguing. Their clothing was wet with perspiration and with the heavy mists of the mountain. The mountain air was cold and, in their light dress, they were much chilled when the active exercise ceased. All of this, however, was borne cheerfully, and the best of spirit animated these veterans of Slocum at all times.

When ammunition ran low, the cartridges were replenished from the boxes of the captured foe, and from supplies brought from the valley in the pockets of those sent for it, and on the backs of mules brought back with them.

About three o'clock the enemy began to mass under the upper palisade in front and to the left of Cobham. General Geary directed the 28th Pennsylvania Regiment to dislodge this force, which it did with dispatch. The enemy's sharpshooters abounding at this time, a part of the 28th Pennsylvania was detached to quiet them, which desired effect it also accomplished. Fires were built later among the Union men and they were kept burning during the night. Although there was no call to arms, but little sleep was obtained during the night by the bivouacking victors.

Before daylight of the morning of November 25th small reconnoitering parties were sent by General Geary to gain the summit of Lookout Mountain by the aid of ladders placed at the lower parts of the palisade. One party ascended on the eastern and another on the western side of Point Lookout; and they unfurled their banners at about the same time. The numerous enemy evacuated every part of his works on mountain and slope, and had retreated in the night, leaving camp equipment, many arms, and stores in great quantity. Stragglers yet lingered around the fires which they had kept burning. They gladly gave the conquerors all the information they possessed regarding their former comrades. The fear of Geary's besetting force on Lookout Mountain, the advance of Sherman and Thomas's armies against their Confederate comrades on Missionary Ridge who required their help, or the fear of the blocking of their line of retreat from Geary, one, or all these, may have influenced the enemy's retreat from Geary.

It was a very noteworthy battle, altogether, and a very remarkable victory, worthy of Slocum's thoroughly disciplined and often tried veterans. Fortunately Hooker remained in the valley miles away, where he could not defeat victory. In addition to the natural obstructions of ravines, precipices, rocks and crevices, with sharpshooters stationed at every point of vantage, were added abatis, slashings, and carefully constructed defensive works built systematically in chain along the top of the



mountain and down its side well toward the valleys below. Practically all of the enemy's fortifications, and equipment, were in possession of the victors. The battle-fields were strewn with the dead of Union and Confederate troops.

Relative to the prisoners captured by the Unionists, possibly overestimated as two thousand or more, there were conflicting claims inasmuch as Slocum's men, being in the van and continued fighting and turning prisoners over to those in their rear, many, if not most of the prisoners were claimed by each, or most, of the subordinate commands seeing or guarding them, while Slocum's men were the real captors.

The advance columns of Slocum's men had vantage in the necessary right-wheel movement in turning the angle of Lookout Point and slope crest, which afforded Geary's slower moving right flank a continued enfilading fire, thus greatly relieving the center and left columns on the slope below for their necessarily more rapid movement. Rapid, persistent action was necessary throughout for success in storming the enemy's works. Be quick to displace the man in front of you, was the order of the day, and it meant that several of the enemy were displaced by each persistent assailant, which accounted for the wonderful accomplishments by the determined energy of the storming force. Slow, deliberate movement would have been followed by quick defeat of the smaller Union force engaged.

Southern officers have written that the Union force in this battle far exceeded the Confederates; and that the far-famed Battle of the Clouds was largely a pretty fiction. It is well to bear in mind the facts that those writers much underestimate the number of Confederates engaged; also that but a part of those who started with Slocum's men who composed only a very small division, participated particularly in the engagements. It was the able directions of Geary, the impetuous Colonel Ireland and his inspired men, ably supported by the steadfast Cobham and Candy, to whom the victory is due. The Confederate General John B. Gordon wrote in his *Reminiscences* that "Whatever may be its proper designation, it was a most creditable affair to both sides." Also that "The conception of moving upon an unknown force located in such a series of strongholds was bold and most creditable to the high soldierly qualities of General

Geary and the men who moved at his command through the fogs and up the steeps." Gordon, like most other writers, gives all the honor to General Hooker who did not plan the action and who was during all of the time of its execution several miles distant from the field of action. The credit is due to General Slocum who made these soldiers for this work, all of whom were under the command of his trustworthy General Geary. Each one, and all of them deserve the honor of the brilliant results at Wauhatchie and Lookout Mountain; also of their brilliant work at Missionary Ridge, and throughout the Chattanooga-Atlantic campaign. Much of this brilliant work was done, however, notwithstanding the gross mistakes, unfortunately, of Hooker, as have previously been several times shown, and will be later necessarily referred to from high authority.

## CHAPTER XXIX

### BATTLES OF MISSIONARY RIDGE AND RINGGOLD

In accordance with General Hooker's order received from General Thomas, General Geary's division of Slocum's corps, took up the march about 10 o'clock A. M. of November 25th in pursuit of the retreating foe. The route of his retreat led down Lookout Mountain to Chattanooga Creek. Here about three hours were passed by the Union forces in building a bridge in place of one burned by the enemy. There was some artillery opposition by the enemy a little beyond the creek, but his guns were soon silenced, and one was captured.

At three P. M. when near Rossville Gap, Georgia, Hooker, who was now with the column, directed Geary to turn to the left and follow the trend of the western base of Missionary Ridge in a northeasterly direction. The left of the Union army was at this time hotly engaged with the enemy on the knobs a little to the north. Geary's division of Slocum's men pressed forward, with their five batteries, until much in advance of his supporters (Generals Charles Cruft on the crest of the ridge and Osterhaus along the eastern base) then forming his three small brigades, Cobham and Creighton's along the base in column of regiments, and Ireland's in support of the artillery, Geary opened Captain