

THE LIFE AND LETTERS
OF
GEORGE GORDON MEADE

MAJOR-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY

BY
GEORGE MEADE

CAPTAIN AND AIDE-DE-CAMP AND BREVET LIEUTENANT-COLONEL UNITED STATES ARMY

EDITED BY
GEORGE GORDON MEADE

VOLUME II

NEW YORK
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
1913

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Published May, 1913



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THE LIFE AND LETTERS
OF
GEORGE GORDON MEADE

VOLUME II

PART V

NARRATIVE OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG

I

THE MARCH TO GETTYSBURG

ON the afternoon of the same day on which this last letter was written, June 25, General Meade received the order of march for the following day, which was to bring his corps to Frederick City, Maryland. Accordingly, early in the morning of June 26, the corps started *en route* for that place, and going by way of Carter's Mill¹ and Leesburg, crossed the Potomac at the upper pontoon bridge, at Edwards's Ferry, and proceeded to within four miles of the Monocacy, where it encamped for the night. Resuming its march, early on the 27th, it forded the Monocacy near its mouth, and arrived toward afternoon at Ballinger's Creek, just outside of Frederick City.

After making proper dispositions for the encampment of the corps, General Meade rode into Frederick City with one or two of his staff, hoping to meet there General Hooker, whom he had not seen since breaking camp near Banks's Ford, on the Rappahannock, on the 13th of June, and to gain some information as to the plans and supposed whereabouts of the enemy; in which hope he was disappointed, General Hooker not having yet arrived.

Returned to camp, ignorant of a great change which had been decided upon and impended over him and the army, General Meade lay quietly asleep in his tent at three o'clock of the morning of June 28, when he was aroused by hearing on the outside an inquiry for his tent, by a person who claimed to be the bearer of important despatches to him. This proved to be Colonel James A. Hardie, of General Halleck's staff, who entered General Meade's tent and executed his mission.

What this mission might have been was the occasion of agitated comment among several of General Meade's aides, who, their tents

¹ Not shown on map.

being in the immediate vicinity, were awakened by the stir in camp at that hour. That it had been executed in the dead of night, by an officer direct from the general-in-chief at the War Department, proved it to be of the last importance; but that was the only thing evident. What it portended, whether good or ill, to their general, no one could pretend to say. Enough, however, of the misunderstandings and difficulties with which he lately had had to contend was known to that little band to make some apprehensive that all was not well. The details of the interview between General Meade and Colonel Hardie will be left for the general himself to relate in the next letter to his wife.

General Meade soon appeared from his tent, and designating one of his aides as the only officer, besides Colonel Hardie, to accompany him, just as the day was faintly dawning he mounted and set out with his two companions for the head-quarters of the army. The little party rode silently along, the conversation almost restricted to a few questions asked by General Meade, who seemed deeply absorbed in his own thoughts, until, head-quarters being reached just after daylight, he was ushered into the tent of General Hooker, who was apparently ready to receive him. The interview between Generals Hooker and Meade lasted for some time, when the latter issued from the tent and called to his aide, who had been patiently waiting outside, still uninformed as to what was taking place, but with a vague impression that the fate of his general was not to be that predicted by his brother aides-de-camp. Although, as he answered the general's summons, he could not fail to observe that the general continued very grave, he also perceived a familiar twinkle of the eye, denoting the anticipation of surprise at information to be imparted, the effect of which he was curious to see; and so, when he at last quietly said, "Well, George, I am in command of the Army of the Potomac," his hearer was not, after all, very much surprised.

Giving immediate directions for his other aides-de-camp to join him at head-quarters, and for having personal effects brought over from the head-quarters of the Fifth Corps, the general retired into one of the tents, and in his consummate manner, in which all his powers were at his disposal at a moment's notice, at once bent his mind and energies to the task before him. The magnitude of this task may be faintly imagined but cannot be realized. It must be remembered that a change of commanders had been made in an army, not when, the preliminary manœuvres having been executed, it awaited or was engaged in battle, where, in either case, a change

of commanders is an ordinary incident of war, but that the change had been made in an army on the march, with its corps necessarily distributed over a great extent of territory, advancing to intercept and concentrate against an army of supposably equal or superior numbers, the whereabouts of which was not accurately known, led by the ablest general of the enemy.

General Hooker, at the interview which had taken place between him and his successor, relieved it of all embarrassment by the extreme courtesy of his demeanor, expressing his gratification at the choice which had been made for his successor. General Meade responded in the same spirit, and assured General Hooker that the selection had been made without any action or even knowledge on his part; that it was against his personal inclinations; but that, as a soldier, subject to authority, he felt bound to obey orders.

Within a few hours after being relieved of the command of the army, General Hooker took his departure for Baltimore, the post designated in his orders. General Meade received no intimation from him of any plan that he had formed, or of any views that he held, and therefore naturally presumed that he had had no definite plans, but that he had been, up to that moment, as he himself was subsequently obliged to be, governed by developments.

It seems that the final disagreement between General Hooker and the general-in-chief, General Halleck, was with reference to the post and garrison of Harper's Ferry. General Hooker had visited Harper's Ferry on the 27th, and thence addressed a recommendation to General Halleck to abandon the post and order the garrison to join the Army of the Potomac. General Halleck declined to consent to this, and General Hooker, in consequence of this action, feeling aggrieved, requested to be relieved from the command of the army. His request being complied with, soon after the arrival of General Meade he bade farewell to the army in a general order.

With the order placing General Meade in command of the Army of the Potomac came the following letter from General Halleck:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, D. C., *June 27, 1863.*

MAJOR GENERAL G. G. MEADE,

Army of the Potomac.

GENERAL:

You will receive with this the order of the President placing you in command of the Army of the Potomac. Considering the circumstances, no one ever received a more important command; and I

cannot doubt that you will fully justify the confidence which the Government has reposed in you.

You will not be hampered by any minute instructions from these headquarters. Your army is free to act as you may deem proper under the circumstances as they arise. You will, however, keep in view the important fact that the Army of the Potomac is the covering army of Washington, as well as the army of operation against the invading forces of the rebels. You will therefore manoeuvre and fight in such a manner as to cover the Capital and also Baltimore, as far as circumstances will admit. Should General Lee move upon either of these places, it is expected that you will either anticipate him or arrive with him, so as to give him battle.

All forces within the sphere of your operations will be held subject to your orders.

Harper's Ferry and its garrison are under your direct orders.

You are authorized to remove from command and send from your army any officer or other person you may deem proper; and to appoint to command as you may deem expedient.

In fine, General, you are intrusted with all the power and authority which the President, the Secretary of War, or the General-in-Chief can confer on you, and you may rely on our full support.

You will keep me fully informed of all your movements and the positions of your own troops and those of the enemy, so far as known.

I shall always be ready to advise and assist you to the utmost of my ability.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,

General-in-Chief.

Soon after his interview with General Hooker, General Meade telegraphed to the general-in-chief as follows:

FREDERICK, MD., 7 A. M., June 28, 1863.

H. W. HALLECK,

General-in-Chief:

The order placing me in command of this army is received. As a soldier I obey it, and to the utmost of my ability will execute it. Totally unexpected as it has been, and in ignorance of the exact condition of the troops and position of the enemy, I can only now say

cannot doubt that you will fully justify the confidence which the Government has reposed in you.

You will not be hampered by any minute instructions from these headquarters. Your army is free to act as you may deem proper under the circumstances as they arise. You will, however, keep in view the important fact that the Army of the Potomac is the covering army of Washington, as well as the army of operation against the invading forces of the rebels. You will therefore manœuvre and fight in such a manner as to cover the Capital and also Baltimore, as far as circumstances will admit. Should General Lee move upon either of these places, it is expected that you will either anticipate him or arrive with him, so as to give him battle.

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that it appears to me I must move towards the Susquehanna, keeping Washington and Baltimore well covered, and if the enemy is checked in his attempt to cross the Susquehanna, or if he turns towards Baltimore, to give him battle. I would say that I trust that every available man that can be spared will be sent to me, as, from all accounts, the enemy is in strong force. So soon as I can post myself up I will communicate more in detail.

GEORGE G. MEADE,
Major General.

The general then at once issued his order assuming the command of the army.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 28, 1863.*

General Orders, No. 67.

By direction of the President of the United States, I hereby assume command of the Army of the Potomac.

As a soldier, in obeying this order—an order totally unexpected and unsolicited—I have no promises or pledges to make.

The country looks to this army to relieve it from the devastation and disgrace of a foreign invasion. Whatever fatigues and sacrifices we may be called upon to undergo, let us have in view, constantly, the magnitude of the interests involved, and let each man determine to do his duty, leaving to an all-controlling Providence the decision of the contest.

It is with great diffidence that I relieve in the command of this army an eminent and accomplished soldier, whose name must ever appear conspicuous in the history of its achievements; but I rely upon the hearty support of my companions in arms to assist me in the discharge of the duties of the important trust which has been confided to me.

GEORGE G. MEADE,
Major General, commanding.

It would be well for the reader here briefly to review in sequence the events which had taken place, in which he cannot fail to see the cumulative causes which had led at last to the selection of General Meade for the command of the Army of the Potomac at this critical juncture.

Going back to the Peninsular campaign, we have seen him as a

brigade commander rendering efficient service, and falling wounded in the last of the Seven-Days' Battles, amidst the hottest of the fighting. We have seen him at the Second Battle of Bull Run, again as brigade commander, stemming the tide of defeat, and afterwards receiving the thanks of the commanding general. We have seen him at the head of his division storm the heights at South Mountain and gain the plaudits of the army, so exciting the admiration of his corps commander as to make him exclaim: "Look at Meade! Why, with troops like those, led in that way, I can whip anything!" We have seen him at Antietam, at a most critical moment of the battle, selected in preference to superiors in rank, by the commanding general of the army, to replace his wounded corps commander. We have seen him at Fredericksburg selected, with his division, to make an assault, for the reason that "the Army of the Potomac had no braver soldier or better officer than General Meade to lead his division to the attack." And, finally, we have seen him at Chancellorsville, the main reliance of the commanding general at a most disastrous moment of that most disastrous field.

We have gleaned from his letters of this latter period, through mention of the willingness and desire of his brother corps commanders, seniors in rank, to serve under him, knowledge of the high estimation in which he was held by them. We find it reported that that able soldier General John F. Reynolds, with whom he had long served and fought side by side, upon being offered the command of the army, declined the honor, and suggested General Meade, as the best fitted, in his estimation, for the command. And we find that the gallant soldier General John Sedgwick, when waited on after Chancellorsville, by one high in the confidence of the President, to hear his views as to the condition of the army, and to learn whether, in case a change of commanders should prove necessary, he would accept the position, declined the command, and emphatically replied, in answer to the question as to the best appointment that could be made from those serving in the army, "Why, Meade is the proper one to command this army."

It was the general recognition among the high officers of the army, through intimate association in the field in the face of the enemy, of General Meade's strict attention to duty, his constant presence with his command, quick perception, generous support at all times of his immediately superior officers, his promptness and decision in action, his firm self-reliance; it was, in a word, the general

recognition of his rare combination of dutifulness, military talent, and gallantry that led at last to its legitimate result in the almost universal sentiment among these officers of his pre-eminent fitness to command the Army of the Potomac. These were the influences, and these alone, that prompted the authorities at Washington, when the country was oppressed with dreadful uncertainty and dark foreboding as to what the next few days might bring forth, to intrust one unsupported by personal or political favor with the leadership of its last hope against an invading army, strong in numbers and flushed with success, which threatened the principal cities of the North and even the safety of the Capital itself. How grandly General Meade executed this trust, how completely he justified the sentiment of the army, how he restored bright hopes throughout the North, where before there was only deep depression, the events of the next few days will show.

The change of commanders, although made at a time which all regarded as critical, was received by the army with its usual admirable spirit. The congratulations and assurances of hearty support, tendered on all sides, were particularly gratifying to the new commander. A feeling of confidence soon pervaded the army, greatly strengthened by observation of the systematic manner in which General Meade at once set to work. The first day, the 28th of June, he devoted to gaining a knowledge of the strength and condition of the different corps, and their relative positions, and of the position and movements of the enemy; and when, on the following day, the army moved forward, the enthusiasm and determination evinced on all sides was a favorable omen of success.

The Army of the Potomac consisted at this time of seven corps of infantry, one of cavalry, and the Artillery Reserve.¹ The First Corps, commanded by Major-General John F. Reynolds, numbered 10,022 men; its position was at Middletown, Maryland. The Second Corps, commanded by Major-General Winfield Scott Hancock, numbered 12,996 men; it was on the march from Sugar Loaf Mountain, Maryland, under orders from General Hooker, to encamp at Frederick City. By orders of General Meade it was halted near Monocacy Junction, and encamped there during the night. The Third Corps, commanded by Major-General Daniel E. Sickles,² numbered 11,924 men; it was at Middletown. The Fifth Corps, lately Gen-

¹ See Map No. 1, position June 28.

² General Sickles resumed the command of the Third Corps, relieving General Birney, on the morning of the 28th of June.

eral Meade's, now commanded by Major-General George Sykes, numbered 12,509 men; it was at Frederick City, Maryland. The Sixth Corps, commanded by Major-General John Sedgwick, numbered 15,679 men; it was at Hyattstown, Maryland. The Eleventh Corps, commanded by Major-General Oliver O. Howard, numbered 9,893 men; it was, with the First and Third Corps, at Middletown. The Twelfth Corps, commanded by Major-General Henry W. Slocum, numbered 8,589 men; it arrived at 2 P. M., on the 28th, at Frederick City, from Knoxville, Maryland. The Artillery Reserve, commanded by Brigadier-General Robert O. Tyler, consisted of twenty-one batteries (108 guns) and 2,546 men; it was at Frederick City.¹ The Cavalry Corps, commanded by Brigadier-General Alfred Pleasanton, numbered 11,501 men; it was disposed on the flanks of the army.² The First Division, commanded by Brigadier-General John Buford, on the left flank, at Middletown, and the Second Division, commanded by Brigadier-General David McM. Gregg (which had been bringing up the rear of the army and covering its crossing of the Potomac), on the right flank, at various points between Frederick City and Ridgeville, on the road to Baltimore. The Third Division (formerly Stahl's), commanded by Brigadier-General Judson Kilpatrick, and lately added to the army, was at Frederick City. During the day, June 28, the First, Third, and Eleventh Corps were withdrawn from Middletown and concentrated in the neighborhood of Frederick City.

From the meagre information obtainable by General Meade, and that chiefly through the public press, he was led to believe that the Army of Northern Virginia, commanded by General Robert E. Lee, and estimated at over 100,000 men, had crossed the Potomac, passed through Hagerstown, and was marching up the Cumberland Valley. He decided to move as quickly as possible on the main line from Frederick City to Harrisburg, extending his wings as far as he could consistently with facility of rapid concentration, and to continue the movement until he either had come suddenly upon the enemy or had had reason to believe that the enemy was advancing upon him; his object, of course, being at all hazards (except uncovering Washington and Baltimore) to compel the enemy to relinquish his hold

¹ The positions of the Artillery Reserve are not shown on the maps.

² The dotted line designating the cavalry situation on the maps simply shows the general line covered by the main divisions of the cavalry. Beyond this line their pickets and patrols were scouting the country for miles in all directions.

upon the Susquehanna, and to accept battle. It was his determination, subject to the necessity of general manœuvres, to deliver battle wherever and whenever he could possibly find the enemy.

Upon inquiry of the authorities at Washington whether he would be permitted to withdraw a portion of the force under General French, at Harper's Ferry, he was informed that it was now under his orders. Previously, he had been notified that the troops of General Schenck, outside of the defences of Baltimore, were subject to his orders, as were also those of General Couch at Harrisburg. However, as on June 29, telegraphic communication was cut off by the enemy's cavalry with Baltimore and Washington, and as the distance to General Couch was too great for him to be available, no assistance was possible from either of these quarters. The cutting of telegraphic communication by the enemy's cavalry between the army and Washington, Baltimore, and other places had, although annoying in some respects, the redeeming feature of isolating the army and relieving the commanding general from the necessity of considering the usual suggestions from Washington and the thousand idle rumors which would have been brought to his attention, and of allowing him to concentrate it upon his own army, that of the enemy, and upon the main purpose in view.

During the day information was received by General Meade that a body of Confederate cavalry, the exact strength of which was not known, had crossed the Potomac at Seneca Falls, and was between his army and Washington. Two brigades of cavalry and a battery of artillery were at once despatched in search and pursuit of this force, which eventually proved to be the main body of Stuart's cavalry.

Having perfected his plans, General Meade issued to the army the order of march for the following day:¹

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
FREDERICK, MD., *June 28, 1863.*

Orders:

The army will march to-morrow as follows:

4 A. M. The 1st Corps, Major General Reynolds, by Lewistown and Mechanicstown to Emmettsburg, keeping the left of the road from Frederick to Lewistown, between J. P. Cramer's² and where the road branches to Utica and Cregerstown, to enable the 11th Corps to march parallel to it.

¹See Map No. 2, position night of June 28.

²Not shown on map.

4 A. M. The 11th Corps, Major General Howard, by Utica and Cregarstown to Emmettsburg.

4 A. M. The 12th Corps, by Ceresville,¹ Walkersville and Woodsborough, to Taneytown.

4 A. M. The 2d Corps, by Johnsville, Liberty and Union,² to Frizzleburg.

4 A. M. The 3d Corps, by Woodsborough and Middleburg (from Walkersville), to Taneytown.

The 5th Corps will follow the 2d Corps, moving at 8 A. M., camping at Union.³

The 6th Corps, by roads to the right of the 5th and 2d Corps, to New Windsor.

The Reserve Artillery will precede the 12th Corps, at 4 A. M., and camp between Middleburg and Taneytown.

General Lockwood,⁴ with his command, will report to and march with the 12th Corps.

The Engineers and bridge-trains will follow the 5th Corps.

Headquarters will move at 8 A. M. and be to-morrow night at Middleburg. Headquarter's train will move by Ceresville and Woodsborough to Middleburg, at 8 A. M.

The cavalry will guard the right and left flanks and the rear, and give the Commanding General information of the movement and of the enemy in front.

Corps commanders and commanders of detached brigades will report by a staff officer their positions to-morrow night and on all marches in future.

The corps moving on the different lines will keep up communication from time to time, if necessary. They will camp in position, and guard their camps. Corps commanders will send out scouts in their front, as occasion offers, to bring in information. Strong exertions are required and must be made to prevent straggling.

By command of Major General Meade.

S. WILLIAMS,

Asst. Adj't. Gen'l.

On the morning of the 29th of June, before leaving Frederick City, General Meade despatched to General Halleck a communica-

¹ Ceresville not shown on map. ² Or Uniontown. ³ Or Uniontown.

⁴ General Lockwood and command had just arrived from Baltimore as a reinforcement.

tion in which, after giving the position the army would occupy by night, he said:

"If Lee is moving for Baltimore, I expect to get between his main army and that place. If he is crossing the Susquehanna, I shall rely upon General Couch, with his force, holding him until I can fall upon his rear and give him battle. * * * I shall incline to the right towards the Baltimore and Harrisburg Road, to cover that and draw supplies from there if circumstances will permit it; my main objective point being, of course, Lee's army, which I am satisfied has all passed through Hagerstown towards Chambersburg. My endeavors will be in my movements to hold my force well together, with the hope of falling on some portion of Lee's army in detail."

General Meade further stated that the cavalry force between him and Washington, which had caused much anxiety in Washington, would be looked to, and added: "My main point being to find and fight the enemy, I shall have to submit to the cavalry raids around me, in some measure;" and also, in speaking of the impossibility, in the absence of telegraphic communication, of his giving orders to General Schenck, in Baltimore, or to the troops on the Potomac, in his rear, or to General Couch, at Harrisburg, he said: "These circumstances are beyond my control."

Just before leaving Frederick City he seized the first opportunity that had offered to write personally to Mrs. Meade as to the wondrous change in his affairs.

To Mrs. George G. Meade :

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 29, 1863.*

It has pleased Almighty God to place me in the trying position that for some time past we have been talking about. Yesterday morning, at 3 A. M., I was aroused from my sleep by an officer from Washington entering my tent, and after waking me up, saying he had come to give me trouble. At first I thought that it was either to relieve or arrest me, and promptly replied to him, that my conscience was clear, void of offense towards any man; I was prepared for his bad news. He then handed me a communication to read; which I found was an order relieving Hooker from the command and assigning me to it. As, dearest, you know how reluctant we both have been to see me placed in this position, and as it appears to be God's will for some good purpose—at any rate, as a soldier, I had

nothing to do but accept and exert my utmost abilities to command success. This, so help me God, I will do, and trusting to Him, who in his good pleasure has thought it proper to place me where I am, I shall pray for strength and power to get through with the task assigned me. I cannot write you all I would like. I am moving at once against Lee, whom I am in hopes Couch will at least check for a few days; if so, a battle will decide the fate of our country and our cause. Pray earnestly, pray for the success of my country, (for it is my success besides). Love to all. I will try and write often, but must depend on George.

The army, as ordered, had moved promptly, at four o'clock in the morning, and by nightfall, although the march was made over very bad roads, nearly all the corps found themselves at the specified points.¹ The Second Corps, however, through delay in receiving its orders, did not start until eight o'clock, and was halted one mile beyond Uniontown, by two o'clock at night, having in the interval accomplished, with its entire train, a march of over thirty miles. Frizelburg, its destination, was not reached; the distance from Monocacy Junction, from which it had started for Frizelburg, being considerably further than indicated on the maps. This delay in the movement of the Second Corps correspondingly delayed the Fifth Corps, which had to follow on the same road, and in consequence, the latter corps only reached Liberty instead of its destination, Uniontown. The march was disagreeable and fatiguing, owing to a drizzling rain and the very bad condition of the roads. The general advance of the army was twenty miles.

General Meade established his head-quarters at Middleburg, where he passed the night of the 29th of June.

During the day he had been in constant communication with the advancing columns, the whole tenor of his instructions and orders looking to a rapid march. To General Sedgwick, who reported that he would be unable to reach New Windsor, he replied that it was of the utmost importance that he should move early the next morning, and, with his left at Westminster, occupy the railroad terminating at that place. He requested General Sickles to give his immediate personal attention to keeping his trains moving, which were reported at a standstill at Middleburg, and blocking the way. In reply to General Sykes, who reported some detention, he stated that he was

¹ See Map No. 3, position night of June 29.

satisfied with the progress made, and wished him to regulate his movements by endeavoring to cover just so much ground as he could without over-fatiguing the men. To his provost marshal he gave orders to have all stragglers collected and returned to their commands. He ordered General French, at Harper's Ferry, to remove, under escort, the public property from that place to Washington, and with the rest of his command, to join the army without delay; adding, that he expected to engage the enemy within a few days, and looked anxiously to being reinforced by him. This order to General French was, on July 1, when it was found that it would be impossible for him to arrive in time, changed by instructions to him to remain where he then was, at Frederick City, for the purpose of keeping communication open between that place and the army.

Not much had been added during the day to the store of information regarding the movements of the enemy. The reports coming in from the front showed that the army was not in the immediate vicinity of the enemy. In fact, what little information was procurable rather confirmed the opinion that the enemy was still moving in the direction of Harrisburg.

The order of march for June 30, issued at Middleburg on the 29th, directed the Twelfth Corps, passing the Third Corps, to move to Littlestown. The Fifth Corps was ordered to the crossing of Pipe Creek, at Union Mills, on the road between Littlestown and Westminster. The Sixth Corps was ordered to move to Manchester; the First Corps to the crossing of Marsh Creek, half-way to Gettysburg; the Artillery Reserve, following the Twelfth Corps, to the crossing of Piney Run,¹ by the road between Littlestown and Taneytown. The order of march for these corps was, in fact, nothing but continuing the execution of the plan of the previous day. It brought up the right flank to Manchester, the left to beyond Emmettsburg, and the centre to Littlestown; outlying corps being within easy supporting distance.

From Middleburg, in the evening, General Meade again wrote home:

To Mrs. George G. Meade:

HEADQUARTERS, MIDDLEBURG, MD., *June 29, 1863.*

We are marching as fast as we can to relieve Harrisburg, but have to keep a sharp lookout that the rebels don't turn around us

¹ Not shown on map.

and get at Washington and Baltimore in our rear. They have a cavalry force in our rear, destroying railroads, etc., with the view of getting me to turn back; but I shall not do it. I am going straight at them, and will settle this thing one way or the other. The men are in good spirits; we have been reinforced so as to have equal numbers with the enemy, and with God's blessing I hope to be successful. Good-by!

The army was off again promptly on the morning of June 30, and the respective corps reached their newly allotted positions before night.

At 11.30 A. M., just before leaving Middleburg, General Meade sent a despatch, of which the following are extracts, to General Reynolds, in reply to a communication of his of that morning:¹

"The enemy undoubtedly occupy the Cumberland Valley in force. Whether the holding of the Cashtown Gap is to prevent our entrance, or is their advance against us, remains to be seen. * * * With Buford at Gettysburg and Mechanicstown, and a regiment in front of Emmettsburg, you ought to be advised in time of their approach. In case of an advance in force, either against you, or Howard at Emmettsburg, you must fall back to that place, and I will reinforce you with the corps nearest to you, which are Sickles's at Taneytown, and Slocum's at Littlestown. You are advised of the general position of the army. We are as concentrated as my present information of the present position of the enemy justifies. I have pushed out the cavalry in all directions to feel for them, and as soon as I can make up any positive opinion as to their position, I will move again. In the meantime, if they advance against me, I must concentrate at that point where they show the strongest force. * * * The only news we have beyond yours is that Stuart, with a large cavalry force, was in Westminster last night, and moved towards Gettysburg—supposed the same force that has been harassing in our rear. If, after occupying your present position, it is in your judgment that you would be in a better position at Emmettsburg than where you are, you can fall back without waiting for the enemy or further orders. Your present position was given more with a view to an advance on Gettysburg than a defensive point."

During the day General Meade moved his head-quarters to Taneytown. The reports that here began to come in from the advance,

¹See Map No. 4, position noon of June 30.

especially the cavalry, announced that the army was closely approaching the enemy. In consequence, General Meade placed General Reynolds in command of the left wing, consisting of his own corps, the First, and of the Third and Eleventh Corps. Orders were given to General Sickles to move his corps to Emmetsburg, and the two following circulars were forwarded to each corps of the army:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 30, 1863.*

Circular:

The Commanding General has received information that the enemy are advancing, probably in strong force, on Gettysburg. It is the intention to hold this army pretty nearly in the position it now occupies, until the plans of the enemy shall have been more fully developed.

Three corps, 1st, 3d and 11th, are under the command of Major General Reynolds, in the vicinity of Emmetsburg, the 3d Corps being ordered up to that point. The 12th Corps is at Littlestown. General Gregg's division of cavalry is believed to be now engaged with the cavalry of the enemy, near Hanover Junction.

Corps commanders will hold their commands in readiness at a moment's notice, and upon receiving orders, to march against the enemy. Their trains (ammunition trains excepted) must be parked in the rear of the place of concentration. Ammunition wagons and ambulances will alone be permitted to accompany the troops. The men must be provided with three-days' rations in haversacks, and with sixty rounds of ammunition in the boxes and upon the person.

Corps commanders will avail themselves of all the time at their disposal to familiarize themselves with the roads communicating with the different corps.

By command of Major General Meade.

S. WILLIAMS,

Asst. Adj't. Gen'l.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 30, 1863.*

Circular:

The Commanding General requests that, previous to the engagement soon expected with the enemy, corps and all other commanding officers address their troops, explaining to them briefly the immense issues involved in the struggle. The enemy are on our soil; the whole country now looks anxiously to this army to deliver it from the presence of the foe. Our failure to do so will leave us no

such welcome as the swelling of millions of hearts with pride and joy, as our success would give to every soldier of this army. Homes, firesides and domestic altars are involved. The army has fought well heretofore; it is believed that it will fight more desperately and bravely than ever, if it is addressed in fitting terms.

Corps and other commanders are authorized to order the instant death of any soldier who fails in his duty at this hour.

By command of Major General Meade.

S. WILLIAMS,

Asst. Adj. Gen'l.

These circulars were soon succeeded by the following orders for the march of July 1, to be executed immediately upon their receipt:¹

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 30, 1863.*

Orders:

HEADQUARTERS AT TANEYTOWN:

3d Corps to Emmettsburg.

2d Corps to Taneytown.

5th Corps to Hanover.

1st Corps to Gettysburg.

11th Corps to Gettysburg.
(or supporting distance).

12th Corps to Two Taverns.

Cavalry to front and flanks, well out in all directions, giving timely notice of operations and movements of the enemy. All empty wagons, surplus baggage, useless animals, and impedimenta of every sort, to Union Bridge,² three miles from Middleburg; a proper officer from each corps with them; supplies will be brought up there as soon as practicable.

The General relies upon every commander to put his column in the lightest possible order. The Telegraph Corps to work east from Hanover, repairing the line, and all commanders to work repairing the line in their vicinity between Gettysburg and Hanover.

Staff-officers to report daily from each corps, and with orderlies to leave for orders. Prompt information to be sent into headquarters at all times. All ready to move to the attack at any moment.

The Commanding General desires you to be informed that, from present information, Longstreet and Hill are at Chambersburg, partly towards Gettysburg; Ewell, at Carlisle and York; movements indicate a disposition to advance from Chambersburg to Gettysburg. General Couch telegraphs, 29th, his opinion that enemy's operations

¹See Map No. 5, position night of June 30.

²Not shown on map.

on Susquehanna are more to prevent co-operation with this army than offensive.

The General believes he has relieved Harrisburg and Philadelphia, and now desires to look to his own army and assume position for offensive or defensive, as occasion requires, or rest to the troops. It is not his desire to wear the troops out by excessive fatigue and marches, and thus unfit them for the work they will be called upon to perform.

Vigilance, energy and prompt response to the orders from headquarters are necessary, and the personal attention of corps commanders must be given to reduction of impedimenta. The orders and movements from these headquarters must be carefully and confidentially preserved, that they do not fall into the enemy's hands.

By command of Major General Meade.

S. WILLIAMS,
Asst. Adjt. Gen'l.

Late in the afternoon, and during the evening, reports from the cavalry came in, giving notice of the presence of the enemy on both flanks. General Buford had moved his division of cavalry from Middletown through Turner's Gap,¹ successively through Boonesboro, Cavetown, and Monterey Springs,¹ and had encamped on the night of the 29th of June a few miles short of Fairfield. Moving forward very early the next morning, to reach Gettysburg by the way of Fairfield, upon approaching the latter place he came across a body of the enemy, and after skirmishing sufficiently to ascertain it to be in strong force, not wishing to bring on an engagement there, as Fairfield was four or five miles west of the route assigned him, he drew off toward Emmettsburg and was soon on the direct road to Gettysburg. Entering that place in the forenoon, just as the body of the enemy was about to enter it from the direction of Cash-town, he prepared to advance upon them, when they retired in the direction from which they had come, leaving pickets about four or five miles from Gettysburg.

General Kilpatrick, who that morning had moved his division of cavalry from Littlestown to Hanover, reported that, on entering the latter town, he had encountered a body of Stuart's cavalry and, after a sharp fight, had succeeded in driving it out of the town, capturing several prisoners and a battle-flag, the enemy retreating in the direc-

¹ Not shown on map.

tion of York. He stated, also, that it was reported that a division of the enemy's infantry had left York at daybreak.

This information, with various other reports, having reached General Meade during the night of June 30, he was convinced that the enemy was advised of his movements. It was therefore evident to him that a general engagement would not be long deferred.

Since assuming the command of the army everything had been done by General Meade to push it forward. Under General Hooker it had been almost continuously marching and manœuvring, after leaving the Rappahannock, and now, with only one day's intermission, it had just completed two hard marches. The weather for the greatest part of the time had been intensely hot, the roads stifling from dust, and besides, for the last two days there had been a disagreeable, drizzling rain. General Meade feared that the troops would break down if pushed any harder, and in reporting to General Halleck, on the afternoon of June 30, he stated that he might be obliged to rest them for a day; although, of course, he should be compelled to govern his action by what he learned of the movements of the enemy.

Having made all his dispositions for the following day, General Meade wrote home:

To Mrs. George G. Meade:

HEADQUARTERS, TANEYTOWN, *June 30, 1863.*

All is going on well. I think I have relieved Harrisburg and Philadelphia, and that Lee has now come to the conclusion that he must attend to other matters. I continue well, but much oppressed with a sense of responsibility and the magnitude of the great interests entrusted to me. Of course, in time I will become accustomed to this. Love, blessings and kisses to all. Pray for me and beseech our heavenly Father to permit me to be an instrument to save my country and advance a just cause.

Let us now turn to the Confederate army, to learn what it had been doing since crossing the Potomac.

On the night of June 27—that is to say, about the very same time when General Meade was put in command of the Army of the Potomac—the whole of the Army of Northern Virginia was across

the Potomac, had passed up the Cumberland Valley, and had entered Pennsylvania.

Before beginning this campaign the Army of Northern Virginia had been reorganized. It now consisted of three corps of infantry: the First Corps, under command of General James Longstreet; the Second, under Lieutenant-General Richard S. Ewell; the Third, under Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill; and the cavalry, under Major-General J. E. B. Stuart. It is supposed that, preparatory to so important a campaign as that about to ensue, involving an invasion of the heart of the hostile territory, and from the success of which important results were expected to flow, General Lee recruited his army from every available source.

General Ewell's corps had led the advance of the infantry, and Rodes's division of it reached the Potomac on June 15. It crossed the river at once, and, resting on the other side for a few days, resumed its march on the 19th of June, pursuing the direct route by way of Hagerstown and Greencastle to Chambersburg, where it was overtaken by General Johnson's division of the same corps, which had crossed the Potomac at Shepardstown on the 18th of June. Preceded by Jenkins's brigade of cavalry, together they advanced to Carlisle, arriving there on the 27th.¹ The Third Division of General Ewell's corps (Early's) crossed the Potomac at Shepardstown on the 22d, marched along the western base of South Mountain, and reached Greenwood on the 24th. Resuming his march on the 26th, and proceeding by way of Cashtown, Mummasburg, and Berlin, General Early reached York on the 28th.² At Cashtown he had detached one of his brigades (Gordon's), with White's battalion of cavalry, to march by way of Gettysburg, which force passed through the town on the same day, driving out of it some militia cavalry, and after levying contribution upon the town, and burning some bridges and cars, it proceeded on the direct road to York and entered that place on the 28th, just in advance of the rest of the division. From that point General Early pushed out General Gordon's brigade, with cavalry, to seize the bridge which crosses the Susquehanna at Wrightsville. It had been his intention to cross his whole command by this bridge, march on Lancaster, cut the Pennsylvania Railroad, and then march upon and attack Harrisburg in the rear. His purpose, however, was frustrated by a body of militia stationed at the bridge, which, upon the approach of General Gordon, retreated across it to

¹ See Map No. 6, position night of June 27.

² General Early encamped on the 27th at Berlin.

Columbia and fired the bridge. General Early, thus foiled in his intention, then moved General Gordon's brigade back to York, and sent out parties in all directions, burning bridges and railway stations.

On the 24th and 25th the corps of Generals Longstreet and Hill had crossed the Potomac; that of the former at Williamsport, of the latter at Shepardstown. Concentrating at Hagerstown, they marched on Chambersburg, where they arrived on the 27th and encamped.

From this point General Lee, present in person with this part of his army, and unaware of the crossing of the Potomac by the Federal army, ordered a general advance of his forces, on the 30th, on Harrisburg, a movement with which that of General Early, detailed above, and frustrated by the burning of the bridge over the Susquehanna at Wrightsville, was intended to be combined.

General Ewell, who, on the 27th, we left at Carlisle with the divisions of Rodes and Johnson, was prepared and waiting to begin the movement on Harrisburg. The cavalry had thoroughly reconnoitred the country in that direction, their advanced scouts approaching on the 29th to within a few miles of the town.

The troops were in the highest spirits. Everything to them looked favorable. Although they had marched far since leaving the Rappahannock, they had had, at intervals since crossing the Potomac, several days of rest. The campaign, so far, had been eminently successful. They had swept down the Shenandoah Valley, carrying everything before them. Their march up the Cumberland Valley had been unopposed, and made so leisurely that they had been able to levy from the towns they passed through, and from the surrounding country, ample contributions in provisions and in all needful supplies of clothing, forage, etc. The greatest enthusiasm pervaded the ranks. It was taken for granted that the order to march meant the fall of the capital of the great State of Pennsylvania.

General D. N. Couch, a veteran of the Army of the Potomac, had, early in June, been summoned to take command of the newly organized Department of the Susquehanna, head-quarters at Harrisburg. In the brief interval allowed by coming events, every effort had been made by this officer to fortify the approaches to Harrisburg, situated on the left bank of the Susquehanna. Under various calls of the President, and of the Governor of Pennsylvania, for troops for the pending emergency, he had been able to collect a respectable force of militia, which was hastily organized as well as circumstances

would permit, and divided into commands over which he placed a number of experienced officers absent from the army, either recovering from wounds or on leave of absence, who promptly volunteered their services on the occasion. It was upon this force that General Meade counted for checking and delaying General Lee's advance sufficiently to enable him to come to its relief. More than this was not to be expected. Undoubtedly it would have acquitted itself as well as its hasty organization and discipline, untried by battle, would have admitted. It is not to be supposed that it could have long withstood the bronzed veterans of the Army of Northern Virginia.

But suddenly upon the strategical horizon appeared a foe worthy of the steel of the Army of Northern Virginia. General Lee received word at Chambersburg, through a scout, that his old antagonist of many a hard-fought field, the Army of the Potomac, was rapidly advancing. Necessity demanded that attention should be first paid to its movements. It was on the night of the 28th of June that General Lee received the information that the whole of the Federal army had crossed the Potomac and had advanced beyond Frederick City. This at once compelled him to stop the general advance upon Harrisburg and concentrate his army.¹

General Lee states in his report of the campaign that the absence of the cavalry, commanded by General Stuart, had prevented his obtaining definite information of the movements of the Federal army. Judging by his report, he certainly did not expect General Stuart to pursue the course he took. General Stuart, on the contrary, speaks positively in his report of his having had authority from General Lee for the movement which he made. The discrepancy is easily reconcilable by the supposition that General Lee's orders to General Stuart were not explicit, but allowed a certain latitude, which in his judgment was not used with discretion. This is evidently not the place to enter upon a discussion of the merits of the case, even if it could be done with the faintest hope of adjusting satisfactorily the burden of responsibility. The province of this history extends no further than to state that there was evidently some misunderstanding of intention between Generals Lee and Stuart as to the projected movements of the latter when detached from the Confederate army. One thing only in this connection is certain: that from the 24th of June to the 2d of July General Lee was without the services of the

¹ See Map No. 7, position night of June 28, No. 2.

main body of his cavalry, under General Stuart, upon which he had counted for information of the enemy's movements.

In what manner the cavalry of General Stuart had been engaged from the 24th to the 30th of June must now form the subject of a necessary digression, in order to afford the reader a clear comprehension of the way in which all the forces on both sides eventually reached the field of Gettysburg.

On the night of June 24th General Stuart, who had since the affairs at Aldie and Upperville been watching Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps, in the Blue Ridge, secretly rendezvoused three brigades of cavalry (Hampton's, Fitz Lee's, and W. H. F. Lee's, the latter under command of Colonel Chambliss) at Salem Depot, on the Manassas Gap Railroad. It was his intention to move in rear of the Army of the Potomac, intercept its communications with Washington, delay its passage over the Potomac, embarrass its advance, and then join General Lee north of the Potomac, and, placing himself on the right flank of the Confederate army, take part in the purposed movement on Harrisburg and the Susquehanna. The cavalry brigades of Robertson and Jones were left to hold the positions on the Blue Ridge which he was leaving.

Marching from Salem at 1 A. M. on June 25, and moving to the right, he first tried to pass by way of Haymarket and Gainesville to the west of Centreville. Finding General Hancock, with the Second Corps, marching in this direction, and, as he expresses it, "having the right of way," he moved back to Buckland, and marched thence to Brentsville and to the crossing of Bull Run at Wolf's Run Shoal. Here he crossed on the morning of the 27th, and pushing ahead through Fairfax Court House and Dranesville, striking the Potomac opposite the mouth of Seneca Creek on the night of the same day, by great exertions got his whole force across the river by twelve o'clock that night. At this point he captured a good many prisoners, and supplies in boats on the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, destroyed a lock gate, and otherwise inflicted much damage. He here ascertained that the Federal army had crossed the Potomac, and moving toward Frederick City, was interposing between General Lee and himself. Now realizing the importance of reaching his commanding general as speedily as possible, he determined to push directly north, hoping to come up with Early's column, which he knew ought to be at York. Starting soon on the 28th, he was not long in reaching Rockville, on the main highway between Washington and Frederick.

Brushing away a few cavalymen belonging to the defences of Washington, he here cut the telegraph wires and captured a large wagon train of supplies for the Army of the Potomac, together with a number of prisoners. The train he very effectually destroyed, reserving only such wagons and supplies as could be carried along.

This was the point of time at which, as will be perceived by the preceding narrative, General Meade was first apprised of the presence of the enemy's cavalry.

The raid upon Rockville occupied the cavalry a good part of the day. When finished, it pushed forward and reached Brookville at night, when, finding that the number of prisoners was embarrassing, they were paroled, and it kept on, marching all night, passing through Cooksville on the morning of the 29th, and striking the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad at Hood's Mill. Here the cavalry tore up the track for miles, destroyed the bridge at Sykesville, and cut the telegraph wires, thus severing all communication between the Army of the Potomac and Washington and Baltimore. Hence it marched direct on Westminster, reaching that place at 5 P. M. on June 29, where it had a smart skirmish with a portion of the Fifth Delaware Cavalry, which had been sent out from Baltimore. It soon disposed of this force, though with the loss of two officers and several men. The head of the column was halted that night (the 29th) at Union Mills, while the column remained strung out between that place and Westminster.

Early on June 30 the cavalry was off again, and going by a cross cut reached Hanover about 10 A. M., just as General Kilpatrick's column of cavalry was passing through the town. A severe fight ensued, which lasted several hours, and resulted in General Stuart's falling back from the town. The situation had become critical for him. Much embarrassed by what captured wagons he had retained, and his direct route north intercepted by General Kilpatrick, he determined to make a *détour* to the right, through Jefferson, and thence in the direction of York, trusting to be able to join General Early's column of infantry. He hastened forward, therefore, as fast as compatible with the fatigued condition of men and horses, now almost spent with marching. Up to this time he had had no communication with General Lee, and had been unable to find out where the army was. But, having accompanied General Stuart thus far, we must leave him struggling along on this dark night, over rough roads, to return to General Lee, and resume the main thread of the narrative by mention of the new dispositions necessitated by the knowledge

which he had suddenly acquired of the movement of the Army of the Potomac.

It was said, before entering upon the digression which has accounted for the absence of General Stuart's cavalry, and for General Lee's prolonged ignorance of the movements of the Army of the Potomac—circumstances dependent upon each other—that General Lee had, upon receiving the intelligence of the presence of that army beyond Frederick City, at once changed his plans and countermanded the movement upon Harrisburg. The time of a possible *coup de main* had now evidently passed. Immediate concentration was of vital importance to the Confederate army. Just what General Meade said, in one of his hastily written missives, that he thought he had obliged the enemy to do the enemy had been obliged to do; for by his own dispositions in advancing, to have relieved the threatened outlying places, Harrisburg and Washington, the enemy's objective points in the zone of operations, meant that the enemy must concentrate or be lost.

Consequently General Lee at once addressed himself to the task of concentration, and fearing lest his communications by way of the Cumberland Valley should be interrupted, he determined, in order to prevent a movement of the Army of the Potomac further toward the west, to concentrate his army east of the mountains. Accordingly Generals Longstreet and Hill were ordered to concentrate at Cashtown, and General Ewell was ordered to withdraw from Harrisburg to the same point.

Under these orders, General Ewell, on the 29th, sent Johnson's division, with the trains, back by way of Shippensburg to Greenwood, and taking Rodes's division himself, left Carlisle on the morning of the 30th, and passing through Petersburg, halted at Heidlersburg and bivouacked for the night.¹ On the same day, the 29th, that these two divisions marched, General Ewell despatched orders to his remaining division, Early's, at York, to retire and join the rest of the corps on the west side of South Mountain. General Early, on the 30th, moved in that direction, marching by way of Berlin toward Heidlersburg, so as to be able to move thence either to Shippensburg or Greenwood, as circumstances might demand, and encamped that night about three miles from Heidlersburg.

General Hill, at Chambersburg, moved Heth's division, on the 29th, to Cashtown, followed the next morning by the other two divi-

¹ See Map No. 8, position night of June 29, No. 2.

sions of his corps. Heth, on the morning of the 30th, still in the advance, sent Pettigrew's brigade of his division forward from Cashtown to Gettysburg, to secure a supply of shoes that he had heard were there. Pettigrew, approaching the suburbs of Gettysburg, unexpectedly came across General Buford's cavalry, which he, supposing it to be supported by infantry, did not deem it advisable to encounter, but falling back to Cashtown, reported the presence of the enemy.

General Longstreet, with two divisions, followed General Hill, on the 30th, and was at Greenwood that night. He left his Third Division (Pickett's) at Chambersburg, guarding the trains, to await the arrival of Imboden, who, with a brigade of cavalry, had been at McConnellsburg, and had been ordered to Chambersburg to relieve Pickett. Up to that time General Imboden had been operating on the left of the Confederate army on its march into Maryland and Pennsylvania, and had inflicted great damage along the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad between Martinsburg and Cumberland,¹ and to the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal; had been at Hancock on the 27th; and, under orders, had marched to McConnellsburg, collecting supplies all along his route.

The reader has followed the strategical operations of the opposing forces. He sees them now almost face to face, in all but battle-array. On the night of June 30, the Army of the Potomac occupied the following positions:² General Buford, with two brigades of cavalry, having, as mentioned, caused the advance of Pettigrew's brigade to retire upon Cashtown, was at Gettysburg, with his pickets well thrown out and patrols scouring the country in all directions, gathering information. General Reynolds was on Marsh Creek, four miles from Gettysburg, ready to march for that place early the next morning. General Howard was within supporting distance of General Reynolds, between him and Emmettsburg. General Sickles was at Emmettsburg. General Hancock was at Uniontown. General Slocum was about a mile beyond Littlestown, on the road to Hanover. General Sykes was at Union Mills. General Sedgwick was within two miles of Manchester. General Gregg, with his division of cavalry, was at Manchester, and General Kilpatrick, with his division, at Hanover. General Meade's head-quarters were at Taneytown.

The same night, the 30th of June, the Army of Northern Virginia was disposed in the following manner: General Hill was at Cashtown;

¹ About thirty miles west of Hancock, off of map.

² See Map No. 9, position night of June 30, No. 2.

his advance, consisting of Heth's and Pender's divisions, toward Gettysburg; his Third Division (Anderson's) at Fayetteville. General Longstreet, with two of his divisions (McLaw's and Hood's), was at Greenwood; his Third Division (Pickett's) at Chambersburg. General Ewell, with Rodes's division, was at Heidlersburg. General Early's division was within three miles of Heidlersburg. General Johnson, with his division, was at Scotland. Jenkins's brigade of cavalry was with General Johnson, convoying General Ewell's trains. Colonel White's battalion was on General Early's left, on the direct road from York to Gettysburg. General Stuart, with the main body of the cavalry, was, as we have seen, making the best of his way between Jefferson and Dover, searching for some portion of the main body of the army. General Lee's head-quarters had been just outside of Chambersburg since the 25th. On the morning of the 30th he rode to Greenwood, where he passed the night.

When Lee started from Fredericksburg he could have contemplated nothing more definite than the invasion of Pennsylvania by such a march that, while his right flank was for a long time protected by the Blue Ridge and his base of supplies well established at the most salient bend of the Potomac toward the zone of his contemplated operations, he should be able, by spreading out his corps over that zone, to threaten, and even to capture, Washington, Baltimore, Lancaster, Harrisburg, and also, in this event, Philadelphia. Of so much of a plan of operations as involved threatening these places he could be sure, but of nothing more, leaving all else to be determined by circumstances, which hourly changed, and which culminated in the battle of Gettysburg.

But Lee's march, even from the beginning, was compelled to have reference to the known and the probable movements of the Army of the Potomac, although those movements were trammelled by a responsibility from which Lee was exempt—the necessity of covering a capital and two rich and populous cities. Hooker, constrained by Lee's initiative to follow his course as nearly as possible in a parallel line, and to confine Lee's march to one line of invasion, had still that other necessity imposed upon him, to pursue in such a manner, at such a rate, and with such dispositions, as to make sure of covering at least Washington and Baltimore. Up, therefore, to the moment when Hooker, having crossed the Potomac, was superseded by Meade, at Frederick City, Maryland, although the move-

ments of the two armies had acted and reacted on each other, they were then, from that time forth to the end, to influence each other reciprocally, with ever quicker and quicker impulse. From the time when Meade took command, the enemy having swept out toward the east from beyond the mountains, the advance of the Army of the Potomac had to be well extended toward the right as well as toward the left. As for the determination of the exact locality of the battle-field, if there were to be a battle, it did not depend upon the decision of either Meade or Lee, but upon many circumstances which each could modify, but could not altogether control; for besides the circumstances of ground and the disposition of troops, each general was by his action creating varying circumstances for the other. Not until the order came to march upon Gettysburg, did circumstances prescribe to each exactly the same course. When Lee's information that the Army of the Potomac had reached Frederick City and was advancing, caused him to recall Ewell from Carlisle and Early from York, he had accepted the necessity of his own concentration, and the consequence of the enemy's concentration to meet it. But the exact point where the battle was to take place must have still remained at that time an insoluble problem to both generals.

The battle-field might have been anywhere from Chambersburg and Heidlersburg, and beyond, counting from west to east; or anywhere from Chambersburg and Heidlersburg to Emmettsburg and Pipe Creek, counting from north to south. Ewell and Early could just as easily have countermarched to Lee at Chambersburg as to Cashtown, near Gettysburg. But Gettysburg, although somewhat more distant than Chambersburg from Lee's base at Williamsport, had for him the inestimable advantage, in view of the then position of the Army of the Potomac, of rendering secure his line of communication with Williamsport. His marching on Gettysburg meant the maintenance of the invasion. He was compelled, under the circumstances of Meade's advance, to converge upon Gettysburg, but not necessarily with the knowledge that the battle would take place there. That was a question which depended upon the final action of the Army of the Potomac. If the Army of the Potomac had not at that point of time been so well advanced and in hand as it proved to be, despite the necessities which had embarrassed its progress, Lee must either have retreated and abandoned the invasion, or else have advanced south beyond Gettysburg.

Lee had no alternative but to deliver battle speedily or speedily

to retreat. In the contingency suggested, of the Army of the Potomac not having been sufficiently advanced and in hand as to be able to meet the enemy at Gettysburg, Lee would have been obliged to push beyond, and in all probability the battle would have taken place on Pipe Creek, for the simple reason that, Meade having compelled the enemy to relinquish the hold which he was about to take upon the Susquehanna, there was no such urgent necessity of immediate fighting laid upon him as upon Lee. The tables had been suddenly turned. Only two days before the battle it was more urgent for the Army of the Potomac to meet the Army of Northern Virginia than for the Army of Northern Virginia to meet the Army of the Potomac. Now, Meade was in a position where it was more urgent for Lee to seek him than to be sought; for not only was the line of the Susquehanna safe, and Washington and Baltimore covered, but Lee was in a hostile country, with the line of his communications endangered.

That neither general knew of the tactical importance of Gettysburg is no discredit to either, in view of the slight knowledge in both armies of the country in which they were operating, and in view of the pooriness of the maps. The place of Lee's concentration was dictated solely by his knowledge of the strategic importance of Gettysburg, under the circumstances of his having been compelled to withdraw Ewell from the direction of Harrisburg; but exactly where the battle would be fought he could not have known until much later than the time of his issuing orders for the concentration of his corps at Gettysburg.

Similarly, Meade, although he knew of the strategic importance of Gettysburg, and consequently, that Lee might attempt to concentrate there, could not, twenty-four hours before the battle, have been able, any more than Lee, to predict with certainty that the impending battle would take place at Gettysburg. Then, at once, from that moment, events hastened on, and what had only a short while before taken days to develop became matter of hourly development, until both commanders found themselves urging their troops forward toward Gettysburg, both compelled by the fact of its strategical relations to their previous movements, but neither, until the actual ground was reached, at all aware of the military strength of the two positions that it affords.

To sum up, Meade's movements compelled Lee to concentrate somewhere; the strategical importance of Gettysburg, growing out

of the relative positions of the opposing forces, constrained Lee to endeavor to concentrate there; and that same cause, in turn, constrained Meade to endeavor to anticipate, or at least to meet him there.

On the night of June 30, Meade became satisfied, from information received from various sources, that the enemy had relinquished his hold upon the Susquehanna, through having become aware of the movements of the Army of the Potomac, and was in consequence concentrating his forces. He was therefore aware that he might expect shortly to come in contact with the enemy, but when and where, as has been proved, it was then impossible to predict with certainty. In order to be prepared, if possible on ground of his own choosing, to give him battle, in case he should advance over the South Mountain, Meade, while on the march, had instructed his engineers to make an examination with reference to the selection of ground having relation to the then general position of the army, upon which, if occasion should arise, the army might find it desirable to concentrate.

On June 30, General Humphreys, commanding the Second Division of the Third Corps, was instructed by the commanding general to make a similar examination at Emmettsburg, and on the following day Reynolds was instructed to acquaint himself thoroughly with the country, conferring, if expedient, with General Humphreys as to the ground. He had previously been told that he might fall back on Emmettsburg if he thought, after examination, that it was a better position than where he was at Marsh Creek.

As the result of the first examination mentioned, a position on the general line of Pipe Creek had been selected for the contingency of battle in that vicinity, and a circular was issued, notifying corps commanders that the occupation of that position might become necessary in the specified eventuality, in which they were directed how to move, and where to place their troops along that line.

The intention of this circular has sometimes been much misunderstood. It was written before Meade had any positive knowledge that the enemy was moving on the Cashtown Road. In fact, all that he positively knew at the time of the issue of the order was that the enemy was concentrating. The circular was merely a preliminary order of manœuvre to meet a given contingency. This circular has also been misrepresented by some who can hardly be thought to have misunderstood it, but who, it must be supposed, were actuated in their misinterpretation of it by desire to detract from Meade's

military reputation. These persons have asserted that the circular proves that, at that time, Meade was desirous of retiring before, instead of fighting, the enemy. Now, the whole tenor of the circular is opposed to that theory, as completely as Meade's other action, from the moment of his taking command, is opposed to that theory. The circular was written late on the night of June 30. The intention was that it should be in the hands of the several corps commanders early on the following morning, July 1. There was, however, delay in expediting it, so much so that General Reynolds never received it.

Language is powerless to express more clearly than this circular does the idea that, through the fortunes of war, the army might have to receive, instead of to make, an attack; that, if attack were made by the enemy, then the position, provisorily selected at Pipe Creek, being strong, and known to the corps commanders, was the best possible to occupy; and that, finally, as no man could say what a few hours might bring forth, the army might be obliged to take the offensive from the positions which it then occupied. In one word, if the army was obliged at first to receive attack, then there was the prearranged place to receive it; if the army had to take the offensive, then orders would be forthcoming for that. And this, which follows, was the clear and concise manner in which the idea was expressed, so that no honorable man in his senses, with full knowledge of the circumstances, can put any other construction upon it than the one assigned:

"This order is communicated that a general plan, perfectly understood by all, may be had for receiving attack, if made in strong force upon any portion of our present position. Developments may cause the Commanding General to assume the offensive from his present positions."

To assume the offensive from his then position was what happened to occur. At the time when he issued the circular, the other alternative was just as likely to occur, and, at least, even if it were not, it was the part of a prudent general to guard against it. It was wise for Meade to learn about the ground over which the army was passing, and to instruct his officers how to meet a probable crisis, but no more forecasting and wise than he always was.

Early in the day of July 1 the commanding general sent to Sedgwick, commanding the Sixth Corps, at Manchester, on the extreme right, the following despatch:

July 1, 1863.

COMMANDING OFFICER SIXTH CORPS:

I am directed by the Commanding General to state that it would appear from reports received, that the enemy is moving in heavy force on Gettysburg (Ewell from Heidlersburg, and Hill from Cash-town Pass), and it is not improbable he will reach that place before the command under Major General Reynolds (the First and Eleventh Corps), now on the way, can arrive there. Should such be the case, and General Reynolds finds himself in the presence of a superior force, he is instructed to hold the enemy in check, and fall slowly back. If he is able to do this, the line indicated in the circular of to-day will be occupied to-night. Should circumstances render it necessary for the Commanding General to fight the enemy to-day, the troops are posted as follows for the support of Reynolds's command, viz.: On his right, at "Two Taverns," the Twelfth Corps; at Hanover, the Fifth Corps; the Second Corps is on the road between Taneytown and Gettysburg; the Third Corps is at Emmettsburg.

This information is conveyed to you, that you may have your Corps in readiness to move in such direction as may be required at a moment's notice.

Very respectfully, etc.,

S. WILLIAMS,

Asst. Adjt. Gen'l.

Thus, early in the day, Sedgwick had his warning of the only two contingencies probable and approaching, and full information of the disposition of the troops in the advance and on the right flank, and was therefore duly prepared for either emergency implied in the despatch and the circular. At the point of time noted, it was impossible, as has been said, to predict with certainty whether the battle that was imminent would take place at Gettysburg or at Pipe Creek. All that could be known with certainty was that it would first take place on the left of the general advance. Hence Sedgwick, who, as has been mentioned, was furthest away on the right, was early forewarned of the situation on the left and advance, in order that he might be able to co-operate to the best advantage according to circumstances.

It will be remembered that Buford, with two brigades of his division of cavalry, had entered Gettysburg on the afternoon of June 30, and that, on his appearance, an advance of the enemy had withdrawn

toward Cashtown. During the night of the 30th he pushed out scouting parties in every direction, and from information gathered by them he became convinced that the enemy was concentrating near him. He therefore proceeded to dispose his troops to the best advantage, to make as good a resistance as possible to the enemy's advance, hoping to keep him beyond the town, and hold him in check until the infantry under Reynolds could come up.

About 8 A. M., of July 1, Buford's advanced pickets gave warning that the enemy was approaching on the Chambersburg Road.¹ Gamble's brigade was promptly moved forward and formed in line of battle across the Chambersburg Road, about a mile beyond the Seminary,² with skirmishers well out, and with Calef's battery, Second U. S. Artillery, disposed along the line. The advance of the enemy, Heth's division of A. P. Hill's corps, a heavy column, marching down the road, now appeared. Skirmishing soon began, and as the Confederates came within range, Lieutenant Roder, in charge of the right section of Calef's battery, fired the first gun, which opened the battle of Gettysburg. Heth then deployed his two leading brigades, Archer on the right of the Chambersburg Road and Davis on the left, and continued his advance.

Gamble made a stubborn fight, but being outnumbered, was forced to fall back to the next ridge, about two hundred yards to the rear. Devins's brigade was brought up and deployed on Gamble's right, his line extending across the Mummasburg Road,³ with a line of pickets well out to the right and rear, across the Carlisle Road⁴ to Rock Creek,⁵ in which direction it was also reported that the enemy was advancing. Buford handled his two small brigades admirably. Although opposed by a strong force of infantry, which was gradually overlapping both of his flanks, he made a sturdy resistance to the enemy and held him well in check. As soon as the action had begun, he had sent word of it to Reynolds, and now anxiously awaited succor.

Reynolds, who had passed the night at the point where the Em-

¹ Chambersburg Pike, not shown on map, extends from Chambersburg to Gettysburg through Cashtown.

² The seminary, not shown on map, is three-quarters mile west of Gettysburg.

³ Mummasburg Road, not shown on map, extends from Mummasburg to Gettysburg.

⁴ Carlisle Road, not shown on map, enters Gettysburg from the north.

⁵ Rock Creek, name not shown on map, flows south, three-quarters mile east of Gettysburg.

mettsburg Pike crosses Marsh Creek, set his corps in motion, at 8 A. M., under his orders of the previous day, on the road to Gettysburg, Wadsworth's division in the advance, with Doubleday's following, and Robinson's bringing up the rear. He had directed Howard, at Emmettsburg, to follow with the Eleventh Corps.

When about two miles from Gettysburg, Reynolds heard the guns of the cavalry hard at work beyond the town. Here he was met by a messenger from Buford, announcing the approach of the enemy in force. Instead, therefore, of continuing in the course which he had been pursuing toward the town, he deflected the head of his column to the left, off the main road, instructed Wadsworth to push on rapidly in a northwesterly direction, toward the firing, despatched word back to Howard to urge on the Eleventh Corps, and galloped on in advance and joined Buford at the Seminary.

What general plan Reynolds intended to pursue will never be known. This much, however, is known, that he was one of the most capable and trustworthy officers in the Army of the Potomac, and that he had the full confidence of the commanding general. The day that the command of the army was conferred upon Meade, at Frederick City, Reynolds visited him, to tender his congratulations, and to assure him of his hearty support. They were on that occasion long in consultation, and the commanding general fully explained to him his plans as far as they could be formed. These were to push forward the army as rapidly as possible in the direction of Harrisburg; in which direction it was then supposed that the enemy was moving, to compel him to relinquish his hold upon the Susquehanna, and to force him to battle whenever and wherever found. On June 30 was committed to Reynolds the responsible duty of commanding the advance of the army. Almost the last communication from Meade to Reynolds (which has been elsewhere quoted from), beginning with the words, "Your despatch is received. The enemy undoubtedly occupy the Cumberland Valley, from Chambersburg, in force; whether the holding of Cashtown Gap is to prevent our entrance, or is their advance against us, remains to be seen," etc., was timed 11.30 A. M., on June 30. The very last communication from Meade to Reynolds, when he had already ordered him to advance on Gettysburg, reads as follows:

July 1, 1863.

The telegraphic intelligence received from General Couch, with the various movements reported by Buford, seem to indicate the

concentration of the enemy either at Chambersburg, or at a point situated somewhere on a line drawn between Chambersburg and York, through Heidlersburg, and to the north of Gettysburg.

The Commanding General cannot decide whether it is his best policy to move to attack until he learns something more definite of the point at which the enemy is concentrating. This he hopes to do during the day. Meanwhile, he would like to have your views upon the subject, at least so far as concerns your position.

If the enemy is concentrated to the right of Gettysburg, that point would not, at first glance, seem to be a proper strategic point of concentration for this army. If the enemy is concentrating in front of Gettysburg, or to the left of it, the General is not sufficiently informed of the nature of the country to judge of its character either for an offensive or defensive position. The number of the enemy are estimated at about 92,000 infantry, with 270 pieces of artillery, and his cavalry, from six to eight thousand. Our numbers ought to equal it, and with the arrival of General French's command, which should get up to-morrow, exceed it, if not too much weakened by straggling and fatigue.

The General having assumed command in obedience to orders, with the position of affairs leaving no time to learn the condition of the army as to *morale* and proportionate strength, compared with its last return, would gladly receive from you any suggestions as to the points laid down in this note. He feels that you know more of the condition of the troops in your vicinity, and the country, than he does.

General Humphreys, who is at Emmettsburg with the Third Corps, the General considers an excellent adviser as to the nature of the country for defensive or offensive operations. If near enough to call him to consultation with you, please do so, without interference with the responsibilities that devolve upon you both. You have all the information which the General has received, and the General would like to have your views.

The movement of your Corps to Gettysburg was ordered before the positive knowledge of the enemy's withdrawal from Harrisburg and concentration was received.

What we know of Reynolds, subsequently to this time, is very little, as he fell among the first on the field of battle; but that little is conclusive as to his having at once realized the military situation

and taken every means to meet it. He had had the fullest understanding with the commanding general, and possessed the definite information as to his intentions conveyed in the despatch just quoted. Even if he had received the Pipe Creek circular, that would not have embarrassed him or any other good general, for he would have seen that its instructions were conformable with the military situation as he found it. As the officer in command of the advance, put there for the express purpose of his being able to act with judgment in every contingency covered by the expressed intentions of his superior, he acted, when the special case did arise, just as the commanding general had contemplated that he would act. Meade, let it be remembered, had said in his despatch: "The commanding general cannot decide whether it is his best policy to move to attack until he learns something more definite of the point at which the enemy is concentrating. This he hopes to do during the day." The eyes, the ears, and the brain which Meade, in default of his being able to be omnipresent, had selected for the advance, soon obtained that definite knowledge of which he had spoken, requisite, as he had said, to enable him with advantage to move to attack. In conformity with his instructions, perception and action were necessarily simultaneous on the part of Reynolds, when he suddenly acquired knowledge of the imminence of the concentration of the enemy at Gettysburg.

During the morning the Second Corps, under Hancock, had been marching from Uniontown, and about eleven o'clock halted outside of Taneytown and bivouacked. Hancock rode over to the commanding general's head-quarters and reported to him. In a long and earnest conference between them, Meade fully explained his views and plans, and expressed his intentions to fight a battle in front, if practicable, and if not there, wherever practicable. Hancock then returned to his command.

About half-past eleven o'clock Meade received the first positive intelligence of the movement of the enemy on Gettysburg, and of the engagement of his advance at that place. It was brought to him by an aide-de-camp of Reynolds's, Captain Stephen M. Weed, who had left his gallant chief at ten o'clock, at the moment when Reynolds and Buford had just met outside of Gettysburg, and who had ridden hard with his message. Captain Weed reported that General Reynolds had said to him, "Ride at your utmost speed to General Meade. Tell him the enemy are advancing in strong force, and that

I fear they will get to the heights beyond the town before I can. I will fight them inch by inch, and if driven into the town, I will barricade the streets and hold them back as long as possible. Don't spare your horse—never mind if you kill him."

General Meade seemed disturbed at first at this news, lest he should lose the position referred to at Gettysburg. At his request the officer repeated the message, when he seemed reassured, and said: "Good! that is just like Reynolds; he will hold on to the bitter end."

It must have been shortly after this, judging by the distance, and by the time at which the despatch was written, that Meade received a message from Buford. It was as follows:

To General Meade:

GETTYSBURG, July 1, 10.10 A. M.

The enemy's force (A. P. Hill's) are advancing on me at this point and driving my pickets and skirmishers *very* rapidly. There is also a large force at Heidlersburg, that is driving my pickets at that point from that direction. General Reynolds is advancing, and is within three miles of this point, with his leading division. I am positive that the whole of A. P. Hill's force is advancing.

JOHN BUFORD,
Brig. Gen.

About one o'clock news was brought to the commanding general of the engagement and of the death of Reynolds at Gettysburg. Upon receipt of the intelligence of this not only great, but, at the present juncture, doubly serious loss to the army, in the death of Reynolds, Meade, of course, realized at once the urgency of despatching to the front some one who might, through familiarity with his own views and intentions, be able to replace him. Hancock, gallant soldier as he was, and possessing also, as he did, the full confidence of Meade in his ability, was also, through the late, long, and earnest conference, and through his being still at hand, the officer in whom all requirements met to replace the fallen commander. Accordingly, Meade at once directed Hancock to proceed to Gettysburg, to take command of the troops there, and to advise him as to the exact situation of affairs, and as to the practicability of fighting a battle there. His written instructions to Hancock were these:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *July 1, 1863—1.10 P. M.*

COMMANDING OFFICER, SECOND CORPS:

The Major General Commanding has just been informed that General Reynolds has been killed or badly wounded. He directs that you turn over the command of your corps to General Gibbon; that you proceed to the front, and by virtue of this order, in case of the truth of General Reynolds's death, you assume command of the corps there assembled, viz., the Eleventh, First, and Third, at Emmettsburg. If you think the ground and position there a better one to fight a battle under existing circumstances, you will so advise the General, and he will order all the troops up. You know the General's views, and General Warren, who is fully aware of them, has gone out to see General Reynolds.

Later. 1.15 P. M.

Reynolds has possession of Gettysburg, and the enemy are reported falling back from the front of Gettysburg. Hold your column ready to move.

Very respectfully, etc.,

Official:

S. WILLIAMS,

A. A. Gen'l.

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD,

Maj. Gen'l., Chief of Staff.

Hancock at once turned over the command of the Second Corps to Gibbon, commander of its Second Division, and promptly proceeded to Gettysburg; and General Meade soon ordered Gibbon to move the corps for that place.

Hancock, as was seen in his written instructions, had been ordered to report, upon his arrival at Gettysburg, as to the character of the ground there, with reference to its availability for fighting a battle, and had been informed that, if his report were favorable, the commanding general would move the whole army forward. But, before hearing from him, Meade, owing to information received from officers returning from the front, had become satisfied that the enemy was advancing in sufficient force to prove that Lee was concentrating his whole army at Gettysburg. Therefore, without awaiting the report of Hancock, he began to move the troops to the front.¹

At 4.30 P. M., General Meade sent a despatch to Sedgwick, as follows:

¹ See map No. 10, position 2.30 P. M., July 1.

July 1, 1863, 4.30 P. M.

COMMANDING OFFICER, SIXTH CORPS:

The Major General Commanding directs that you move your command up to Taneytown to-night, your trains, except ambulances and ammunition, to Westminster and south of the railroad, as ordered. I regret to inform you that Maj. Gen'l. Reynolds was killed at Gettysburg this morning. You will inform Gen'l. Sykes of your movement, and the cavalry.

Very respectfully, etc.,

Official:

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD,

S. WILLIAMS,

Maj. Gen'l., Chief of Staff.

A. A. Gen'l.

About the same time that the commanding general sent the preceding order to Sedgwick, he also sent orders to the Fifth Corps, and to the Twelfth Corps, to move to Gettysburg. Six batteries of the Reserve Artillery were also ordered to Gettysburg.

About four o'clock, Hancock sent from Gettysburg a verbal message by one of his aides, Major Mitchell, which probably reached the commanding general shortly after six o'clock, explaining the situation of affairs and stating that "he would hold the ground until dark"; meaning by this, as Hancock afterward explained, in his testimony before the congressional committee on the conduct of the war, to allow the commanding general time to decide the question of maintaining the position. At 5.25 P. M., Hancock sent the following written despatch by his aide, Captain Parker:

July 1, 5.25.

GENERAL:

When I arrived here an hour since, I found that our troops had given up the front of Gettysburg and the town. We have now taken up a position in the cemetery, which cannot well be taken; it is a position, however, easily turned. Slocum is now coming on the ground, and is taking position on the right, which will protect the right. But we have as yet no troops on the left, the Third Corps not having yet reported; but I suppose that it is marching up. If so, his (Sickles's) flank march will in a degree protect our left flank. In the meantime Gibbon had better march on so as to take position on our right or left, to our rear, as may be necessary, in some commanding position. Gen. G. will see this despatch. The battle is

quiet now. I think we will be all right until night. I have sent all the trains back. When night comes it can be told better what had best be done. I think we can retire; if not, we can fight here, as the ground appears not unfavorable with good troops. I will communicate in a few moments with General Slocum, and transfer the command to him.

Howard says that Doubleday's command gave way.

Your obedient servant,

WINFIELD S. HANCOCK,

Maj. Gen'l., Com'd'g. Corps.

General Warren is here.

At 6 P. M., probably before even Hancock's 4 P. M. verbal message had had time to reach head-quarters at Taneytown, and certainly before Hancock's 5.25 P. M. written despatch had had time to reach there, for Taneytown is thirteen miles from Gettysburg, the commanding general had sent to Hancock the following despatch:

July 1, 1863, 6 P. M.

MAJ. GEN'L. HANCOCK, and copy to

MAJ. GEN'L. DOUBLEDAY:

If General Slocum is in the field, and I hope he is, of course he takes command; say to him I thought it prudent to leave a division of the Third Corps at Emmettsburg, to hold in check any force attempting to come through there. It can be ordered up to-night, if required. It seems to me that we have so concentrated, that a battle at Gettysburg is now forced on us, and that if we can get up our people and attack with our whole force, to-morrow, we ought to defeat the force the enemy has. Six batteries of the Reserve Artillery have been sent up and more will be sent up to-morrow.

Very respectfully, etc.,

GEO. G. MEADE,

Major General, Commanding.

At 7 P. M., the commanding general sent further orders to the Fifth Corps, to urge it forward. At 7.30 P. M., he sent orders to the Sixth Corps, and to the two brigades of the Third Corps, left at Emmettsburg, to urge the forward movement to Gettysburg. Those to Sedgwick, of the Sixth Corps, were as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
TANEYTOWN, *July 1, 1863, 7.30 P. M.*

COMMANDING OFFICER, SIXTH CORPS:

The Major General Commanding directs me to say that a general battle seems to be impending to-morrow at Gettysburg. That it is of the utmost importance that your command should be up. He directs that you stop all trains, or turn them out of the road, that impede your progress. Your march will have to be a forced one, to reach the scene of action, where we shall be largely outnumbered without your presence. If any shorter road presents itself without difficulty in getting up, you will use your discretion in taking it, and report the facts to these headquarters. General Sykes has been ordered up from Hanover to Gettysburg, and General Slocum from Littlestown, and General Hancock's Corps from here. The whole army is there (Gettysburg), or under way for that point. The General desires you to report here in person, without delay, the moment you receive this; he is waiting to see you before going to the front. The trains will all go to Westminster and Union Bridge, as ordered.

Very respectfully, etc.,

Official:

S. WILLIAMS,
A. A. G.

DAN'L. BUTTERFIELD,
Maj. Gen'l., Chief of Staff.

At the same time the commanding general sent orders to the provost marshal and others to collect all stragglers and send them to the front. The trains were all sent back to Westminster, and guarded by the engineer battalion and other infantry of the army.

It had been for some hours, as evidenced by the preceding orders and dispositions, a fixed fact in the mind of the commanding general that the battle would take place at Gettysburg, so, at 6 P. M., he despatched a messenger to Frederick City, to send the following telegram to General Halleck, in Washington, apprising him of the definite conclusion that had been reached:

July 1, 1863, 6 P. M.

The First and Eleventh Corps have been engaged all day in front of Gettysburg. The Twelfth, Third and Fifth have been moving up, and all I hope, by this time on the field. This leaves only the Sixth, which will move up to-night. General Reynolds was killed this morning, early in the action. I immediately sent up General

Hancock to assume command. A. P. Hill and Ewell are certainly concentrating. Longstreet's whereabouts, I do not know. If he is not up to-morrow, I hope, with the force I have concentrated, to defeat Hill and Ewell; at any rate, I see no other course than to hazard a general battle. Circumstances during the night may alter this decision, of which I will try to advise you.

I have telegraphed Couch that if he can threaten Ewell's rear from Harrisburg, without endangering himself, to do so.

GEORGE G. MEADE,

Major General.

Sedgwick, in compliance with Meade's order, started soon after 7 P. M. for Taneytown, and had marched in that direction beyond the Baltimore Pike,¹ which here is the direct road to Gettysburg, when he was met by an aide, despatched to him by the commanding general, who had been awaiting his arrival at Taneytown, but who, having concluded to wait no longer, had sent this officer to instruct him not to pass through Taneytown, but to take the more direct road to Gettysburg by the way of Littlestown. Turning bridle, Sedgwick rejoined the head of his column, and after considerable difficulty and delay, owing to the narrowness of the road upon which it was then moving, counter-marched it, regained the Baltimore Pike, and started on the direct road to Gettysburg through Littlestown.

Just as, shortly before ten o'clock, Meade was about starting for the front Hancock arrived and reported to him the condition of affairs up to the time of his leaving Gettysburg. Guided by Captain W. H. Paine, of the engineer staff, he then started, and notwithstanding that the night was dark and the road blocked by troops and artillery moving to the front, in fifty-seven minutes by the watch after leaving Taneytown the general reached the head-quarters of the Second Corps, a distance of between eight and nine miles. He here stopped for about fifteen minutes for consultation with General Gibbon, and gave him orders to push forward as soon as it was light. Resuming his route, it was about a quarter of twelve o'clock when he rode into the cemetery, about three and a half miles beyond where he had left Gibbon.

If the reader will place the point of a pair of dividers on the town of Gettysburg, as laid down on the map, as a centre, and with the distance from Gettysburg to Chambersburg, twenty-four miles, for

¹ Not shown on map.

radius, describe a circle, he will find that Carlisle, York, and Hagerstown lie only a short distance outside of, and about the same distance from, the circumference of the circle, and that Manchester and Westminster, seven and a half miles distant from each other, lie just inside, and each about two miles from, the circumference.

From this simple consideration, the relations to each other of the two contending armies, in their final positions and movements on Gettysburg, are clearly perceived. Ewell's dispersed corps was recalled, by Lee's orders, from the circumference of the circle toward the centre, Gettysburg. From Chambersburg, a point on the circumference itself, and the head-quarters of Lee, A. P. Hill's corps and Longstreet's corps advanced toward that centre.

Critically examining the map, we find that the line of Lee's main direction in the final advance from Chambersburg to Gettysburg, and the line from Manchester to Emmettsburg, which represented the extreme right and left of Meade's advance, are parallel, although not opposite to each other, the first being to the south of east and the other necessarily to the north of west. The significance of these two advancing positions is this: Lee, still protected on his right flank by the line of the South Mountain, is issuing through them by Cashtown Pass, if we except Ewell's corps, rejoining him to the east of Cashtown Pass. Meade's necessity is to hold on, longer than anywhere else, with a force at Emmettsburg, because he cannot be sure that Lee's appearance at Cashtown is not a feint, and that, masked by the line of mountains, Lee may not issue with his main force on the left flank of the Army of the Potomac, at Emmettsburg. Meade has his right wing extended to Manchester, because Early has been over on his right as far as York. If Lee's movement on Cashtown had been a feint, and his objective point, with A. P. Hill's and Longstreet's corps, while Ewell was joining them, had been Emmettsburg, then the vicinity of Emmettsburg, or more probably the line of Pipe Creek, would have been the battle-ground, and in that event, certainly the first part of the great contest would have taken place at Emmettsburg.

Westminster, which was noted in connection with the circle drawn from Gettysburg as a centre, is, as remarked, just within the circumference. It was the place upon which the trains of the army were chiefly directed when the final advance had been ordered. Hagerstown, on the enemy's side of the mountains, and just beyond the circumference of the circle, is not far from Williamsport, on the Potomac,

his base of supplies. Meade's head-quarters, at Taneytown, had lain between Manchester and Emmettsburg, a little south of a line drawn between those two points, and a little nearer to Emmettsburg than to Manchester.

The reader has now been afforded, first, a view of the general field of operations of the campaign; and, second, a view of the smaller field of operations just before the final collision between the two armies took place.¹ It only remains that he shall become acquainted with the actual battle-ground of Gettysburg, and this will be described in connection with the operations there.

¹ See Map No. 11, Lines of March from the Rappahannock to Gettysburg.

II

THE FIRST DAY

THE scene now naturally shifts back to the battle-field at Gettysburg, where Reynolds, just arrived, had immediately despatched an aide-de-camp to the commanding general with the urgent message which has been already given.

One thing is obvious from the consideration of an incidental mention in this message: that Reynolds had seen at a glance that the position finally obtained by the Federal army was that which ought to be secured. And the inference, moreover, is unavoidable, that he thought dispositions on the field should be made with reference to safe retirement to the heights of Cemetery Hill and Ridge. In the situation, however, that was to be instantaneously met, as he reached the field, the only thing to be done was to put in the arriving troops wherever they could be placed, in order to stem the tide of the advancing Confederates.

For details of the battle-ground of the three following days the reader must of course resort to the map.¹ But a good general idea of the ground can be obtained by regarding, as before, the town of Gettysburg as a centre, and forming one's notions of directions and accidents of surface by regarding them as seen from that centre. Facing the north, thence, we may define the general shape of the battle-ground as rudely representing a parallelogram, four and a half miles long by two and a half wide, the long sides of it lying north and south, the short sides east and west, the spectator in the town of Gettysburg occupying the middle of it, taking it from east to west, and about one-fourth of its length from the north, taking it from north to south. Two creeks, Rock Creek and Willoughby Run, flow, as to their general direction, north and south along the east and west sides of this parallelogram. Their direction may be more nearly particularized by saying that Rock Creek, taken due east of the centre of Gettysburg, is three-quarters of a mile distant, and that Willoughby Run, taken due west of the centre of Gettysburg, is a mile

¹ See Map No. 12, The Battle-field.

and a quarter distant, making the distance between them at Gettysburg two miles; and that, from these points, the creeks, in flowing the three miles and a half to the end of the battle-field, at the south diverge from this width of two miles apart at the north to a width apart of three miles and a half.

Now, again assuming the centre of Gettysburg as the point from which to view in imagination the movements of the contending armies, through the convergence of roads at the town, we find that, coming from Cashtown, Lee (A. P. Hill's and Longstreet's corps) marched on Gettysburg by the Chambersburg Pike, southeast; and that Ewell and Early, coming from Carlisle and York to reinforce Lee, marched on the town by the Carlisle Road, due south, and by the Harrisburg Road, south of southwest.

Meade's troops advanced toward the town by the Emmettsburg Pike, north of northeast; by the Taneytown Road, west of north; by the Baltimore Pike, northwest; and by the Hanover Road, west of northwest.

It now only remains to add that on the line of a semicircle, rudely described, north of Gettysburg from the centre of Gettysburg, taking in the slopes rising from Rock Creek and Willoughby Run and across the Carlisle Road, the battle of the first day was waged. The position of the Army of the Potomac where the battle was finally delivered (to which, of course, the Confederate position was generally conformable), was along the high ground running south of southwest from Gettysburg for three miles, ending with Big and Little Round Tops; a line making, inclusive of a sharp turn to the eastward of about a mile in length at the cemetery, and inclusive also of the flexures in the hills, a position of over four miles in length for the Federal line of battle. Beyond this reference the reader could glean nothing from a general description of the ground, and must refer for details to the map, in conjunction with a study of the separate movements in battle.

Wadsworth's division, Cutler's brigade leading, left the Emmettsburg Road about two miles from Gettysburg, and double-quicking across the fields in a northwesterly direction, reached Seminary Ridge, relieving Buford's tired troopers, who by hard fighting had, alone, thus far successfully disputed the enemy's advance. Three regiments of Cutler's brigade were rapidly put in line, on the right of the Chambersburg Road, across the old railroad cut.² The

¹ Shown on map as Harrisburg Road.

² See Map No. 13, July 1, 10 A. M.

other two regiments of the brigade were placed by Reynolds on the left of the Chambersburg Road, in support of Hall's Second Maine Battery. Cutler at once became hotly engaged.

It was now ten o'clock. Meredith's brigade was formed as it came up, on the left of the Chambersburg Road, and under Reynolds's immediate direction moved forward into a strip of woods on the ridge parallel to and in front of Seminary Ridge through which the enemy was advancing, charged, and drove him back across Willoughby Run. Two of Meredith's regiments (the Nineteenth Indiana and the Twenty-fourth Michigan) were thrown across the run, enveloping Archer's brigade of A. P. Hill's corps. Archer and the greater part of his brigade were captured by this well-executed movement.

At the moment of Meredith's advance, Reynolds, who was directing the movement, was killed, shot through the head. Never, perhaps, has a general fallen in battle at a more momentous time; never, perhaps, at such a crisis, has a command passed from an extraordinary soldier to one so inferior to him. Doubleday, to whom that command fell by seniority, was brave, and capable enough for ordinary emergencies; but this emergency was extraordinary, and the soldier to whom he succeeded was without a peer in the army. He was of the stuff of which marshals of France were made when every soldier carried the baton in his knapsack. Still, it is no disparagement of the other that the same cannot be said of him.

Doubleday, who had appeared upon the field in advance of his division before Reynolds was killed, and had received orders from Reynolds as to what portion of it he should direct, was now separated from Reynolds, and consequently was not for some time aware of the death of his chief, and that he had thus become the ranking officer on the field.

Cutler's three regiments, on the right of the road, were opposed by the whole of Davis's brigade. Finding themselves, after a short but sharp fight, outnumbered and outflanked, they were ordered to retire. They at first gradually fell back to Seminary Ridge, and then still further to the rear. The retiring of this brigade left Hall's battery, posted to its front and left, and already heavily engaged in a very exposed position, and the right of Meredith's brigade as well, of which opportunities Davis took immediate advantage. Freed now from opposition on his front, he turned his attention to this battery, and after subjecting it to a very severe fire, killing many men and horses, rushed forward to capture it. Hall, now endeavoring to

retire and save it, accomplished his purpose, except in the case of one piece, of which all the horses were killed and many of the men killed and wounded.

Just at this critical moment the Sixth Wisconsin, of Meredith's brigade, which had, up to this time, been in reserve, appeared on the scene, and being joined by the Ninety-fifth New York and the Fourteenth Brooklyn, two of the regiments which had acted as the support to the battery, they together made a gallant charge, recovered Hall's gun, and drove the advancing enemy across and into the railroad cut, capturing some three hundred men belonging to Mississippi regiments of Davis's brigade. This brilliant dash maintained that portion of the field.

In the meantime Meredith's brigade had been recalled to the hither side of the run and reformed in line. Cutler's brigade was now ordered forward with those of his regiments which had fallen back, and his brigade, reunited, was reformed, occupying to the right of the road the ground where the fight had begun. Stewart's First United States Artillery was also brought up and posted on Cutler's line.

About eleven o'clock Doubleday's division came upon the field and at once took position, Stone's brigade in the interval between Cutler and Meredith, and Biddle's brigade, with Cooper's First Pennsylvania Battery, on the left of Meredith, Gamble's brigade of cavalry being deployed on Biddle's left. Robinson's division, following Doubleday's, was placed in reserve near the seminary.

The attack of Archer and Davis had signally failed. Archer, as has been said, had been captured, with many of his men, and the brigade driven back. Davis's brigade had suffered so severely, had been so badly cut up and scattered, that it could not be again brought into action until late in the day.

Heth, bringing up the brigades of Pettigrew and Brockenborough, with the remnants of Archer's brigade, formed a new line on his right of the Chambersburg Road, and awaited further orders. There was now a lull in the action until after one o'clock.¹

It was verging toward one o'clock when the head of the column of the Eleventh Corps reached Gettysburg, Schurz's division, then commanded by Schimmelfennig, leading. This division was advanced through the town into the open country beyond, to the north, with orders to form line of battle on the right of the First Corps.

¹See Map No. 14, July 1, 11 A. M.

Howard, with the Eleventh Corps, had left the vicinity of Emmetsburg about 8.30 A. M., under orders from Reynolds to march to Gettysburg. Barlow's division of the corps followed the route of the First Corps, while the divisions of Schurz and Von Steinwehr took a road which would bring them into Gettysburg by the Taneytown Road. After seeing his column started, Howard rode ahead to Gettysburg. On his way he received from Reynolds news of the engagement and orders to hasten forward with the corps. Sending back these orders to the advancing divisions of the corps, Howard again hastened forward, arriving at Gettysburg at about eleven o'clock. Shortly after his arrival he was notified of the death of Reynolds, and became aware that he was the senior officer on the field.

During the lull in the conflict that had taken place between eleven and one o'clock General A. P. Hill, with Pender's division, had arrived by the Chambersburg Road. Having been apprised of the approach of Ewell from the north, he ordered Heth to advance at once and attack with his whole line, notifying him that Pender would support him.

Ewell, with Rodes's division, had passed the night of June 30 at Heidlersburg, and had moved on the morning of July 1, under orders to march toward Cashtown. Before reaching Middletown, however, he had received word from A. P. Hill, that he was moving toward Gettysburg. Ewell, therefore, turned the head of Rodes's column for that place by the way of the Middletown Road, and sent word to Early to advance by the Heidlersburg Road.¹

Upon arriving near the field Rodes found that, by keeping along the ridge, which is here a prolongation of Seminary Ridge, he could strike in flank the force opposed to Hill. Accordingly, he formed his line facing due south, with Iverson's brigade on the right, O'Neill's in the centre, and Doles's on the left, with Daniels and Ramseur in reserve. He continued along with this formation until he arrived at Oak Hill, a commanding point from which he had a full view of the First Corps's line. Rodes then advanced his batteries and opened fire on Cutler's troops. Having his own troops in position, and deeming the opportunity favorable, he ordered Iverson and O'Neill to advance. To meet this advance Cutler moved further to the right, and swinging back his right, soon became hotly engaged. As Rodes continued to press and overlap him, Baxter's brigade, of Robinson's division, Robinson himself accompanying it, was hastened over from

¹ Shown on map as Harrisburg Road.

the seminary to his assistance and formed on his right, extending to the Mummasburg Road.

As the afternoon passed, and Rodes's efforts to break the Federal line increased, and the fighting became in consequence more and more desperate, Paul's brigade was also brought up and disposed partly in support of Baxter, and partly on his right.

Now was the time, when the enemy was appearing on Oak Hill, that the Eleventh Corps came upon the immediate field, Schurz, directed by Howard to assume command of the corps, moving his own division, under Schimmelfennig, to the right of the First Corps. Before, however, Schurz had had time to occupy Oak Hill, on his left and front, Rodes's division had seized it and was advancing. Schimmelfennig therefore deployed his division in the open fields, facing it north, to the right of the First Corps. His line, however, did not extend far enough to connect with the right of that corps, quite a wide interval intervening between the two bodies of troops. On his left was placed Dilger's First Ohio Battery, and a little later that was reinforced by the addition of Wheeler's Thirteenth New York Independent Battery, brought up on the right of Dilger. Barlow's division, which had arrived by the Emmettsburg Pike, marched through the town of Gettysburg, and took position on the right of Schimmelfennig, Von Gilsa's small brigade, with Battery G of the Fourth United States Artillery, being advanced to a small wooded eminence near Rock Creek, Ames's brigade remaining in reserve. Devins's cavalry, up to this time disputing the advance of Rodes, and now relieved by the advance of the Eleventh Corps, fell back to the right of the York Road, covering that approach.

Von Steinwehr's division, of the Eleventh Corps, remains to be accounted for. As it had arrived to the southward of Gettysburg, it had, by direction of General Howard, been turned off to the right and stationed, with Wiedrich's New York battery, on the heights in front of the cemetery, just south of the town.

To return now to the First Corps, on the left of the line: Heth, on receiving the order from Hill to attack, advanced his whole line, Brockenborough on the left, Pettigrew in the centre, and Archer on the right. Archer was soon compelled to change front to the right, on account of the active demonstrations of Gamble's troopers, and Brockenborough encountered such a determined resistance from Stone and Meredith that he made no headway. But Pettigrew, although not without hard fighting and suffering heavy loss, was more suc-

cessful. Biddle's line opposed his; but, although far outnumbered and greatly outflanked on the left, Biddle maintained his position with spirit for a long time, under a severe front and flank fire, when he was compelled to retire, a movement which he executed slowly, to a partial cover close to the seminary. In this advance Heth himself was wounded.

On the right of the First Corps the fighting had been equally desperate with that on the left. O'Neill's brigade had, upon receiving the order to assault, advanced in such irregular formation as to make his attack so ineffective that he was almost immediately hurled back and attacked in turn by Robinson, his troops scattered, and many prisoners taken.

About this time Cutler's brigade, being entirely out of ammunition, and the men exhausted by the day's encounters, was withdrawn from the field.

Iverson, on O'Neill's right, had, in moving forward, swung around his right until he faced in a southeasterly direction. Baxter, being now relieved on his front by the repulse of O'Neill, which had uncovered Iverson's left, promptly changed front and furiously assaulted Iverson, driving him back with fearful slaughter. Iverson's change of direction had uncovered the front of Daniels, who was following on his right and rear. In consequence Daniels moved directly forward until he reached the railroad cut. There Stone, who had refused his right, so that it was then facing north, obstinately resisted Daniels. Daniels managed to get possession of the railroad cut, but was unable to gain any further advantage. Baxter's brigade was now withdrawn, and for a time remained on the eastern slope of Seminary Ridge, north of the Chambersburg Road in support of Stewart's battery. Ramseur now advanced and, with the remnants of Iverson's and O'Neill's brigades, prepared to attack the right flank of the First Corps.

The movements of Schimmelfennig had caused Rodes to extend Doles's brigade further to the left, in order to protect that flank, and also to connect with Early's division, coming on the field by the Heidlersburg Road.¹ Early arrived at 2.30 p. m. and formed line of battle on some wooded hills across Rock Creek; Hays's brigade in the centre, Gordon's on the right, and Avery's on the left, with Smith in reserve. The artillery of this division, placed in position south of the Harrisburg Road, opened fire and enfiladed

¹ Shown on map as Harrisburg Road.

Barlow's line. Ames was brought up and placed on the left of Von Gilsa.

At 1 p. m. Howard had sent a despatch to Sickles, at Emmettsburg, urging him to come up. A little later he had sent to Slocum a message, stating how hard they were pressed, and calling for assistance. At 2 p. m., just before this period of the fight that we have reached, he reported to the commanding general:¹

HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH CORPS, *July 1, 2 p. m.*

GEN. MEADE:

The First Corps came in position in front of town—two divisions of the Eleventh Corps on the right of the town, one division, Eleventh Corps in reserve.

Enemy reported to be advancing from York (Ewell's corps)—the First and Eleventh Corps were engaged with Hill's forces.

Have ordered General Sickles to push forward.

O. O. HOWARD,
M. G.

As Doles was attacking Schimmelfennig in front, Gordon's brigade advanced across Rock Creek, and, in joining Doles, attacked Barlow's right. Von Gilsa's brigade, being hard pressed, after a brief resistance fell back in great disorder, the men pouring through Ames's regiment, and causing much confusion. Barlow was desperately wounded, and his division fell back, leaving him a prisoner in the hands of the enemy.

Doles was equally successful with Schimmelfennig. The whole line of the Eleventh Corps gave way. There was an attempt to rally, some four or five hundred yards to the rear, near the county almshouse,² but Hays and Hoke, having crossed Rock Creek, south of the Harrisburg Road, took the Federals in flank, and they, being pressed in front by Gordon and Doles, made but a brief stand, and continued to retreat pell-mell to the town.

Dilger's, Wheeler's, and Wilkeson's batteries had rendered excellent service throughout the engagement. Lieutenant Wilkeson had been mortally wounded early in the day. When the infantry fell back, the three batteries were by skilful handling safely retired, fighting their guns in retreat to Cemetery Hill, one of Wheeler's guns, only on account of its being disabled, being left on the field.

¹ See Map No. 15, July 1, 2.30 p. m., No. 2.

² Not shown on map.

It was now half-past three o'clock. Before the retreat Howard had sent word to Schurz to fall back, but this order was not received until the corps was in full retreat. At the same time that Howard had sent this order he had advanced as support Coster's brigade, of Von Steinwehr's division. This brigade, with Heckman's Ohio battery, was advanced just northeast of the town, between the Harrisburg Road and the Hanover Railroad. They were able, however, to retard the enemy's advance only sufficiently to enable the shattered remains of the rest of the Eleventh Corps to take refuge behind them, when they, in turn, to avoid being enveloped, were compelled to retire, Heckman losing two of his guns.

During this onslaught on the Eleventh Corps, which had just terminated so disastrously, the First Corps had maintained its position against the most vigorous attacks, from Heth in front and from Rodes on the right. Robinson, after a magnificent defence, now, on account of his right being uncovered by the rout of the Eleventh Corps, and, as well, furiously attacked on front and left, received orders to withdraw.

The time of day was half-past three in the afternoon. Heth's division, now out of ammunition, and thoroughly exhausted by almost continuous fighting since ten o'clock in the morning, was relieved by Pender's division. Pender promptly advanced his three brigades in line, Lane's on the right, Perrin's in the centre, and Scales's on the left, all south of the Chambersburg Road, the other brigade of this division, Thomas's, being held in reserve as a support to the artillery. Lane had not advanced far before he was compelled to concentrate his attention on Gamble's cavalry brigade, which, well extended to the left, thus threatened the right flank of the advancing line. Scales, on the left, passing Brockenborough's troops, came into action by vigorously attacking Stone and Meredith.

By this time Doubleday had withdrawn his line to the seminary, collecting the batteries of the corps, to make there the last stand under which to cover the withdrawal of the rest of the First Corps from the field. Stone and Meredith, in conjunction with the batteries, opened such a murderous fire upon Scales that his brigade was almost annihilated and he himself wounded. Of Scales's brigade, but five hundred men and one field officer were left.

Perrin's brigade, advancing beyond Pettigrew, attacked Biddle, who, after a gallant resistance, was compelled to relinquish his position.

The check to Scales had, however, enabled all the batteries to retire. But Perrin still continuing to press on, the order to abandon Seminary Hill was given. Scales, although badly wounded, collected the fragments of his brigade, and joining Perrin's, still pressed on, when the Federal line, now attacked in front and on both flanks, fell back toward Gettysburg. Perrin continued to pursue to the town, where he halted, having captured one gun, belonging to Reynolds's New York battery.

Lane, still beset by Gamble, had been unable to take any part in this last attack, and had to content himself with slowly pushing Gamble back to the cover of the guns on Cemetery Hill. Gamble was here joined by Devins, whom Buford had moved over from the right of the town.

General Paul, commanding the First Brigade of Robinson's division of the First Corps, had been badly wounded in one of the attacks on the right of the First Corps. He was succeeded by Colonel Leonard, of the Thirteenth Massachusetts, and he by Colonel Root, of the Ninety-fourth New York, and he again, by the time the brigade had reached Cemetery Hill, by Colonel Coulter, of the Eleventh Pennsylvania, belonging to the Second Brigade of the division; all but Colonel Coulter being wounded. Similarly, Colonel Stone, of the Second Brigade, Third Division, had been wounded early in the fight, and was succeeded by Colonel Wister, of the One Hundred and Fiftieth Pennsylvania, who was wounded very shortly afterward, and succeeded by Colonel Dana, of the One Hundred and Forty-third Pennsylvania Regiment.

Pender's division was collected and halted outside of the town, and between four and five o'clock Anderson's division, of A. P. Hill's corps, came up and bivouacked about a mile to the rear of the battle-field.

It was just before this issue of the conflict that Buford sent his well-known despatch to Pleasanton, who was with the commanding general at Taneytown. It is timed 3.20 P. M. In it he said:

"I am satisfied that Longstreet and Hill have made a junction. A tremendous battle has been raging since nine and a half A. M., with varying success. At the present moment the battle is raging on the road to Cashtown, and in short cannon range of this town; the enemy's line is a semicircle on the height from north to west. General Reynolds was killed early this morning. In my opinion there seems to be no directing person.—We need help now."

Not until the Eleventh Corps, on its right, had entirely given way, was it that the First Corps was obliged to seek safety in retreat. It was about 4 P. M. when the whole line was abandoned, the corps sullenly retiring toward Gettysburg, and turning at every favorable opportunity to check the too eager advance of the enemy. As the corps reached the town it necessarily became involved with the confused masses of the routed Eleventh Corps, and in consequence of this, the confusion naturally increasing, as the enemy were pressing forward on all sides, many prisoners were taken.

In this state of affairs, at nearly 4 P. M., when the whole of the positions previously occupied by the Federals had been abandoned, and when the troops from the First and Eleventh Corps were surging through the streets of Gettysburg, Hancock arrived upon the field at the cemetery. He had, after receiving the verbal and written orders of the commanding general, ridden direct from Taneytown.

The sight which met his gaze upon his arrival at Cemetery Hill was, on the immediate ground, Smith's brigade, of Von Steinwehr's division, well posted, with Weidrich's battery, of the Eleventh Corps, along the crest of the hill. To the northward and westward, on the plain below, a half-mile distant, stretched the line of battle of Buford's dismounted cavalry, interposing between the advancing enemy's right wing, and presenting such a firm front to the enemy as to cause him on that part of the field to desist from his pursuit of the broken ranks of infantry. Beyond, to the north of Gettysburg, stretching toward Cemetery Hill, came the remnants of the Eleventh Corps, intermingled with some of the troops from the First Corps, who, until they had become entangled in the streets of the town with the disorganized masses of the Eleventh, had preserved the orderliness of their retreat.

Hancock promptly addressed himself to the task of restoring order and forming a strong line of battle on the crest of Cemetery Hill. In this he was materially assisted by the exertions of Howard, Buford, and Warren, who, lately arrived upon the ground, rendered invaluable aid in stopping stragglers and directing them upon the formation of a line. Around Smith's brigade, as a nucleus, the rest of the Eleventh Corps was, through desperate efforts on the part of all the officers present, finally concentrated in line on the north and west faces of the extremity of Cemetery Hill. Robinson's and Double-

day's divisions were posted on the left of the Eleventh Corps, on the continuation to the south on Cemetery Ridge.

Hancock, perceiving signs among the enemy of the movement of a line of battle on the east, and recognizing the importance of the possession of Culp's Hill, to the east of Cemetery Hill, as a position, on account of its commanding the approaches from Gettysburg and communications along the Baltimore Pike and elsewhere, sent Wadsworth's division to occupy it. The batteries of the two corps were skilfully planted in positions along the line now occupied from Culp's Hill around by the way of the point of Cemetery Hill, down along its west side, and along its continuation as Cemetery Ridge. These dispositions, taken together with the fire of the batteries, which opened whenever the enemy made any show of advancing, presented a sufficiently formidable front to deter him from attempting any serious demonstration.

At 5 P. M. Howard sent the following despatch to the commanding general:

HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH CORPS, *July 1, 5 P. M.*

First. Gen. Reynolds attacked the enemy as soon as he arrived, with one division, about 10.45 o'clock, A. M. He moved to the front of the town, driving in the enemy's advance for about half a mile, when he met with a strong force of A. P. Hill's corps. I pushed up as fast as I could by a parallel road; placed my corps in position on his right. General Reynolds was killed at eleven and a quarter A. M. I assumed command of the two corps and sent word to Slocum and Sickles to move up. I have fought the enemy from that time to this. The First Corps fell back, when outflanked on its left, to a stronger position, when the Eleventh Corps was ordered back also, to a stronger position. General Hancock arrived at 4 P. M., and communicated his intentions. I am still holding on at this time. Slocum is near, but will not come up to assume command.

O. O. HOWARD.

Slocum had arrived with the Twelfth Corps, at 11 A. M., at a small place on the Baltimore Pike, called Two Taverns, about five miles from Gettysburg. Here he had halted his command to await further instructions. Finally, about 2 P. M., upon receipt of Howard's urgent calls for assistance, he started his column in the direction of Gettysburg. Williams's division, which was in advance, was,

just before reaching Rock Creek, directed to the right by a cross-road to the Hanover Road, and to prepare to attack the enemy's left, moving from the east against the troops of the Eleventh Corps, supposed to be still in front of Gettysburg. He had marched for some distance in the direction indicated, when he was recalled, intelligence having been received that the Federal troops had relinquished the town. Williams therefore countermarched to near the crossing of Rock Creek by the Baltimore Pike, and there bivouacked.

Geary's division, of the Twelfth Corps, which had followed Williams on the Baltimore Pike, continued its way along the pike to and over the crossing at Rock Creek, still following the pike, which abuts on the very rear of Cemetery Hill. Arrived there, about 5 p. m., Geary reported to Hancock with two of his brigades, his third brigade having been, by order of Slocum, left as a reserve on the right. Hancock thereupon directed him to take his command over to the left of the First Corps, to occupy and prolong the line along Cemetery Ridge. Geary, in obedience to these directions, posted his division along Cemetery Ridge, from the left of the First Corps to Little Round Top, up the slope of which he placed two regiments of the First Brigade—the Fifth Ohio and the One Hundred and Forty-seventh Pennsylvania.

Slocum, in person, did not arrive at Cemetery Hill until 6 p. m., and being the senior officer on the field, Hancock turned over the command to him, and everything being now quiet, started for Taneytown, to report to the commanding general. He arrived at Meade's head-quarters just as the general was starting for the front.

It has been mentioned that, at one o'clock, Howard had sent an urgent message to Sickles, at Emmettsburg, to push on as rapidly as possible to Gettysburg. This message did not reach Sickles until three o'clock. He at once responded to the summons, leaving two brigades to guard the approaches to Emmettsburg, and moving with the rest of his corps toward Gettysburg. Birney, with two brigades of his division, arrived at Cemetery Ridge about 6 p. m., and was massed to the rear of the ridge, between it and the Taneytown Road. Humphreys's division, owing to the fact that it had been put on the wrong road by a staff officer of Sickles's, did not reach the ridge until one o'clock in the morning of the following day.

General Lee reached Seminary Ridge about half-past four in the afternoon, just as the Federal troops were retreating through the town of Gettysburg, taking position on the hills beyond. He then

learned from prisoners and other sources that he had been engaged with two corps of the Army of the Potomac, and that the other corps, under General Meade, were approaching. Ignorant of the exact position of the rest of the Army of the Potomac, he concluded that, with the force of only four divisions, which were all the troops he had then present, and these weary from a long and bloody struggle, he ought not to hazard attacking the Federals in the strong position which they occupied on Cemetery Hill. He, however, instructed Ewell, whose troops were in the best condition of any, and occupying the best position, to carry Cemetery Hill, if possible, but not to run the risk of bringing on a general engagement before the arrival of the rest of the army.

Ewell came to the conclusion that, from his position, Cemetery Hill could not be carried, and as his troops were very much fatigued by their long march and day's fighting, he decided to await the arrival of his Third Division, Johnson's, which was reported to be near at hand, and with it capture Culp's Hill, which commanded Cemetery Hill, and which seemed unoccupied.

Johnson's division had passed the night of the 30th at Greenwood, and had moved forward during the day by the road thence to Gettysburg. Before Johnson could get into position, however, it was reported to Ewell that the enemy (probably Slocum's command) was moving on his left flank, and by the time that the report could be sifted the night had so far advanced that he relinquished his purpose of attempting to occupy Culp's Hill. Johnson, however, sent to the hill a reconnoitring party, which was attacked by Wadsworth's troops and driven away, many prisoners being captured.

During the evening Smith's brigade, of Early's division, which was posted some distance out on the York Road, reported that a body of Federal troops was approaching by that road. Early therefore despatched Gordon's brigade to keep a lookout in that direction. During the night some of this command captured an orderly bearing a despatch from Sykes to Slocum, timed midnight, stating that he was four miles from Gettysburg, and would start for that place at four o'clock in the morning.

Thus closed the first day of the battle.

The general result of the day's operations had been decidedly in favor of the Confederates. The positions of the corps of the respective armies at the time when the approach of the Army of the Potomac became known to Lee had rendered it possible for him to

issue such orders looking to final concentration as to enable him more speedily than lay within the power of his opponent to make that final concentration. The difference was not great; it was slight, in time, but it was appreciable in the results of the first day's contest. Before dark of July 1 he had fully two-thirds of his army present on the field. That portion of his force which had been present during the day had far outnumbered the force opposed to it. It consisted of seventeen brigades of infantry, fifteen of which, with seventeen batteries of artillery, had been engaged. Of the Army of the Potomac there were present twelve brigades of infantry, two brigades of cavalry, and eleven batteries of artillery, of which eleven brigades of infantry, the two brigades of cavalry, and all the batteries of artillery had been engaged.

Despite the superiority of his force, the enemy had only after a prolonged struggle, suffering great loss in killed and wounded, driven the Federal troops from their advanced position, and had compelled them to take refuge on the heights beyond the town of Gettysburg. On the left of the Federal line, the First Corps had for a long time maintained its position with such tenacity as to inflict greater loss than it sustained. This, too, to its honor be it said, it managed to do notwithstanding the untimely death of Reynolds, at the very beginning of the conflict—a loss irreparable as to command of the field, and also well calculated to impair the *morale* of any troops. No better evidence can exist as to the discipline, bravery, and determination of that corps than that, under the circumstances of repeated and prolonged assaults upon it by superior numbers, and of the loss of its accomplished leader, it undauntedly maintained its position, receiving and repulsing attack after attack from ten o'clock in the morning to four o'clock in the afternoon, and even taking the initiative when opportunity was afforded. Not until this fighting had been nearly continuous for hours, until fresh troops were brought forward to oppose it, not until both its flanks were enveloped and its line of retreat seriously endangered, did this heroic corps abandon its last position. It was only in the retreat from the position on Seminary Hill that, through its entanglement in the streets of Gettysburg with the fragments of the Eleventh Corps, its loss in prisoners took place.

In considering the indubitable fact of the rout of the Eleventh Corps, it would be unfair not to take into consideration the many disadvantages under which it labored. Most unfavorably situated

as to position, with the greater portion of its troops stretched across an open plain, with little or no advantage for defence from the character of the ground, it was hurried into action before its lines were thoroughly formed. Under these circumstances it was not capable of making the organized resistance which, otherwise, it might, under more favorable auspices, have opposed to the advance of the enemy.

The Confederates, on their part, had fought with their usual courage and pertinacity. Being the attacking force, their losses in their repeated onslaughts on the Federal lines must have been very great. It is impossible to ascertain the exact amount of their losses. What is positively known, however, is that the brigades of Archer, Davis, O'Neill, Iverson, and Scales were, after the fight, mere skeletons of their previous organizations. That their success was not more fruitful of results was owing to the gallant stand made by the First Corps, to the promptness with which the line was re-established by Hancock on Cemetery Hill, and to Lee's ignorance of the exact position of the corps of the enemy that were still moving to the point of concentration.

It is desirable here to glance at the positions of the respective armies at midnight, between July 1 and July 2.¹

Of the Army of the Potomac there were in position, on Cemetery Hill and Ridge, and on Culp's Hill, the First Corps, including Stannard's Vermont Brigade (which, during the evening, had joined the corps after a forced march from the defences of Washington), the Eleventh Corps, the Twelfth Corps, and two brigades of one division (Birney's) of the Third Corps. Out on the plain, and stretching away parallel with Cemetery Ridge, were the lines of the two brigades of cavalry of the ever-watchful and tireless Buford.² The remaining division of the Third Corps (Humphreys's) was making the best of its way, through the darkness of the night, on the road to Gettysburg, and was happily now near at hand. The Second Corps was on the Taneytown Road, about three miles from Gettysburg, where it had been halted by Hancock, to protect the left and rear, when he went in person to make his final report to the commanding general. The Fifth Corps was four miles back on the Hanover Road, at Bonaughtown, making a brief halt after its long march, and only waiting for the dawn to push onward to the front. The Sixth

¹See Map No. 16, July 1, 12 P. M.

²The cavalry situations are not shown on maps, owing to their varied and extended positions.

Corps was some hours out from Manchester, hastening along on its ever-memorable forced march to reach their comrades in battle.

Merritt's cavalry brigade, of Buford's division, was still in the neighborhood of Mechanicstown, scouting the country in that direction. Gregg was at Hanover, with two brigades of cavalry, having sent the Third Brigade (Huey's) back to Westminster, to assist in guarding the wagon trains of the army, now being collected there. Kilpatrick, after his encounter with Stuart, at Hanover, had followed him as far as Berlin, but failing to come up with him, had returned to Abbottstown, where Kilpatrick now was. Tyler, with the Reserve Artillery, except those batteries which had already gone forward by order of the commanding general, was on the road from Taneytown to Gettysburg, in the rear of the Second Corps. General Meade had just arrived on Cemetery Hill.

On the Confederate side, in the immediate vicinity of the town of Gettysburg, with a partial formation confronting Cemetery Hill and the adjacent ground, were Ewell's corps and A. P. Hill's corps. McLaw's division, and Hood's division, of Longstreet's corps, except Law's brigade of the latter, which had been left on picket duty at New Guilford, were at the crossing of the Chambersburg Road over Marsh Creek. Pickett's division of this corps had remained at Chambersburg, guarding the rear. General Lee was encamped on Seminary Ridge, near the Chambersburg Pike, laying his plans for the morrow.

In following the movements of Stuart, who had been making a cavalry raid from the rear around the right flank of the Army of the Potomac, we had left him, after his engagement with the cavalry under Kilpatrick, in which he had been forced to fall back from the town of Hanover, embarrassed with his captured wagons, and with his direct road to the north obstructed by Kilpatrick, hastening, as well as his jaded horses would permit, toward Jefferson, intending to go thence in the direction of York, and hoping ultimately to fall in with the column of Early.

This, as will be remembered, was on the night of June 30. His objective point was, of course, the army of Lee, but between it and himself interposed the Army of the Potomac, and to make matters still more serious for him, the cavalry force of Kilpatrick was proving an obstacle in his path. It was an urgent necessity with him to be able, if possible, to join some of the infantry composing Lee's army, with which, uniting himself, he could thenceforward proceed with

safety. Early, according to the best information which he could obtain, had left York and was marching to what Stuart had heard was Lee's point of concentration, at Shippensburg, but he hoped to intercept some portion of Ewell's force and accompany it to the main army. With this purpose in view, he deemed that the best plan for him to accomplish it would be to push on from Jefferson to Carlisle. On the morning of July 1 he arrived at Dover. Passing through Dillstown, he reached Carlisle on the afternoon of July 1, only to find all Ewell's troops gone and the town occupied by a Federal force under General W. F. Smith, who had been sent forward from Harrisburg by General Couch.

Stuart was by this time short of supplies, and both men and horses were thoroughly worn out from constant marching. Carlisle seemed to present an inviting opportunity of obtaining rations for his troops, of which he was not slow to attempt to avail himself. But, unfortunately for him, the presence of the force under Smith at once presented a serious obstacle to his intentions. He demanded the surrender of the town, but this being refused, he proceeded to shell it by way of enforcing compliance with his demands. While thus engaged, his operations were brought to an abrupt close by the receipt during the evening of a despatch from Lee, stating that the army was at Gettysburg, and had been engaged all day with the enemy, and ordering him to move his command at once for that place. Then, burning the barracks, which lay just outside of the town of Carlisle, Stuart at once turned his column in the direction of Gettysburg.